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ABSTRACT 
 
Emotional Ethics in Middle English Literature 
by 
Paul Megna 
This dissertation explores Middle English literary texts that consistantly portray ethics as a 
patently emotional affair. The introduction rehashes recent neuroscientific discourses that 
similarly assert the centrality of emotion in processes of ethical decision-making, as well as 
other contemporary theoretical and historiographic accounts of emotion. Chapter 1 argues 
that Middle English rhetorics of righteous and sinful anger played an important role both in 
sparking the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 and in retroactively reevaluating the dangers of unin-
hibited anger in the uprising’s posttramatic wake. The second chapter discusses Middle Eng-
lish discourses on dread that suggest that devotees in late medieval England conceptualized 
the ascetic project of dreading well as integral to the ethical project of living well. The third 
chapter argues that the three successive versions of Piers Plowman, as we know them today, 
contain three strikingly different theologies of love and dread. Rather than reading these as 
evidence of one man’s gradual movement from a theology of dread to one of love, it 
reimagines the production of Piers Plowman as a densely intersubjective affair that engen-
dered a network of differing (and deferring) theologies of love and dread. Chapter 4 turns to 
the famous Middle English elegy Pearl, arguing that the Pearl-maiden does not prompt the 
dreamer to happily share in her celestial estate, but instead stirs his envy of her heavenly 
bliss, suggesting that terrestrial devotees ought to work through, rather than eschew, their en-
vy of their celestial loved ones. Chapter 5 focuses on another poem soley attested in Cotton 
Nero A.x: Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. While critics often read Gawain’s shame at the 
   
	  
	   ix	  
end of the poem as sundering him from his fellow courtiers, I read Gawain’s shameful con-
fession to the court as profoundly and successfully reparative of the homosocial, chivalric 
habitus wounded by Gawain’s life loving transgression. Moving next to Geoffrey Chaucer’s 
Troilus and Criseyde, Chapter 6 builds on a scholarly tradition that reads Troilus as a maso-
chistic courtly lover, arguing that, at the poem’s conclusion, Troilus spontaneously trans-
forms into a sadistic courtly hater. Since masochistic courtly love and sadistic courtly hate 
constitute different responses to social privilege, the courtly lover always already possesses 
the potential to morph suddenly into a courtly hater, as does Chaucer’s Troilus when he 
channels his disappointment at having lost Criseyde’s love into vengeful, militarized violence 
against any and all Greeks. Finally, by way of conclusion, I discuss some of the pedagogical 
implications of my research into Middle English ideologies of emotion, focusing particularly 
on the vexed question of how one might ethically teach medieval cultures of compassion.  
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INTRODUCTION: 
EMOTIONAL ETHICS IN MIDDLE ENGLISH LITERATURE 
I. EMOTION AT THE ROOT OF ETHICAL DECISION 
The past few decades have seen exponential advances in our understanding of the human 
brain, particularly its role in the complex, psychosomatic processes that we call emotions 
(i.e., proto-voluntary, psychsomatic judgments about our relationship to others).1 Antonio 
Damasio influentially argues that these advances point toward a flaw in post-Enlightenment 
philosophy that he calls “Descartes’ Error.” Descartes errs, according to Damasio, in categor-
ically separating mind from body, assigning reason to the former and emotion to the latter 
(Descartes’ Error 247–52). Damasio’s somatic-marker hypothesis (SMH) constitutes an at-
tempt to correct Descartes’ error by mapping the process through which emotions inform our 
ostensibly rational decisions (Ibid. 173–75). Reason involves the prefrontal cortex, which is 
uniquely massive in human beings, but it also involves the closely interrelated limbic system, 
which is integral to both triggering emotions and remembering emotional experience. Since 
our engorged prefrontal cortex is a relatively recent evolutionary development compared to 
the limbic system, which all mammals have, it is apparent that reason did not evolve inde-
pendently of emotion; more properly (at least from an evolutionary perspective), reason grew 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Oxford English Dictionary defines emotion “as any strong mental or instinctive feeling, 
as pleasure, grief, hope, fear, etc., deriving esp. from one's circumstances, mood, or 
relationship with others” (3a.). Although this definition is helpful in shoring up our colloquial 
use of the word, the terms “mental,” “instinctive,” “feeling” and “mood” render it too vague 
for my purposes here. My definition modifies the OED’s with recourse to my current, 
admittedly limited understanding of emotion. I revise the OED’s “mental or instinctive” as 
“psychosomatic,” since emotion is both mental and bodily and therefore deconstructs any 
mind-body binary. Following Martha Nussbaum’s neo-stoic philosophy, moreover, I cast 
emotions as non-cognitive judgments (Upheavals of Thought 1–19). I call them “proto-
voluntary,” rather than “involuntary,” to suggest that emotions, along with cognitions, (i.e., 
thoughts) constitutes, rather than opposes, volition (i.e., desire animated decision-making). 
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out of emotion (Ibid. 191–96). According to the SMH, emotional experience facilitates neu-
roplasticity (i.e., the multifaceted mechanism through which the brain changes itself).2 Since 
neuroplasticity is memory’s modus operandi, emotional memories tend to be more vivid and 
durable than others (Schacter 192–217). Though they were unequipped with terms like neu-
roplasticity, pre-Cartesian thinkers were well aware of emotion’s importance to memory and 
taught each other to strategically utilize emotion to aid memory-acquisition (Carruthers 387, 
392). By revealing that reason is rooted in emotional memory, then, Damasio’s somatic-
marker hypothesis does not just correct Descartes’ error, but also hearkens back to premod-
ern psychologies less invested in a rigid, reason-emotion binary.  
In constructing the SMH, Damasio draws famously from the controversial case of 
Phineas Gage, a nineteenth-century railroad worker who suffered massive damage to his 
brain’s left frontal lobe when an iron rod accidentally shot through his skull (Decartes Error 
3–33). Though Gage miraculously survived the ordeal, his disposition (according to some 
witnesses) was greatly altered as a result. Those who knew Gage before the accident went as 
far as to lament that the coarse, vulgar man who recovered therefrom was “no longer Gage” 
(Ibid. 8–10). When he lost his frontal lobe, Gage seems to have lost with it his social graces, 
at least temporarily. He suffered trauma, however, to the limbic system (i.e., the area of the 
brain that we usually associate with emotional memory), not his prefrontal cortex (i.e., the 
area of the brain we usually associate with cognition) (Ibid. 31–33). According to Damasio, 
Gage’s injury and its repercussions suggest that rational processes depend upon emotional 
processes. Hence, when Gage damaged his left frontal lobe, he did not simply become une-
motional; he also became irrational. Some of Damasio’s critics not unfairly accuse him of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For a detailed and accessible introduction to neuroplasticity, see Doidge xv, 97–98. 
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over-hyping Gage’s post-accident social dysfunction for the sake of proving the SMH 
(MacMillan 72–87). In so doing, they often point out that first-hand accounts of Gage’s be-
havior when he worked as a stagecoach driver in Chile years after his accident do not note 
any significant social dysfunction (MacMillan 302–04). If Gage’s story is a testament to 
emotion’s constitutive role in decision-making, it is also a testament to the neuroplastic 
brain’s fantastic capacity to restructure its own neuronal networks in the wake of trauma 
(Doidge 215–44). Nevertheless, we need not throw the proverbial baby out with the bath wa-
ter because emotional memory is not necessarily reason’s sine qua non. Damasio has used 
Gage’s case, along with many other contemporary cases that he has studied more directly, to 
effectively demonstrate that emotion and reason are usually not independent processes (even 
though they utilize different areas of the brain) and therefore should not be perceived in bina-
ry opposition to each other. Even though Gage was able to adapt to his posttraumatic circum-
stance, the testaments of those who saw his post-accident self as “no longer Gage” certainly 
suggest that emotion generally plays an important role in the decisions that make us recog-
nizably ourselves. 
Fear, for example, is integral to everyday decision-making. In fear, an organism not 
only anticipates an aversive future, but also learns to avoid the factors precipitating a (poten-
tially) traumatic situation (OED, s.v., “fear”). Evolution has molded the fear response (often 
called the fight-or-flight response) to provide us heightened mental acuity and a burst of im-
mediately disposable physical energy when we believe ourselves imperiled. In fact, a 2006 
study conducted at Rice University found that subjects who had been artificially frightened 
through intranasal exposure to human fear hormones performed cognitive tasks more quickly 
and accurately than those who had not (Chen). Physical manifestations of fear, moreover, 
   
	  
	   4	  
facilitate interpersonal cooperation by alerting others of impending danger (Tomkins 235–
240). During a fear response, the amygdala—one of two almond-shaped clusters of nuclei in 
the medial temporal lobe of the brain—trigger the release of a cocktail of hormones and neu-
rotransmitters, including cortisol, epinephrine (adrenaline) and norepinephrine, which in turn 
modulate heart rate, respiration and metabolism (LeDoux, “The Emotional Brain” 727–28). 
Beyond these short-term effects, fear expedites the process through which we assess the 
world thereafter. Memories recorded when the amygdalae are in use are more vivid and du-
rable than those recorded under normal circumstances (Schacter 192–217). Sadly, this ac-
counts for the intense nature of the flashbacks experienced by people suffering from PTSD.3 
However much emotional memory can mar posttraumatic life, functional amygdalae are vital 
to everyday decision-making. “The modulatory role of the amygdala,” according to Daniel 
Schacter,  
is linked to its role in determining how various hormones affect memory. Studies of 
rats and other animals have shown that injecting a stress-related hormone such as epi-
nephrine (which produces high arousal) immediately after an animal learns a task en-
hances subsequent memory for that task. This strongly implies that some of the bene-
ficial effects of emotional arousal on memory are due to the release of stress-related 
hormones by a highly emotional experience. (215) 
From an evolutionary perspective, our heightened ability to record fearful memories makes a 
fair amount of sense. After all, under normal circumstances (notwithstanding PTSD, in which 
trauma is remembered all-too-well), a detailed recollection of the events that previously cul-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 PTSD is largely the malfunctioning, or over-functioning, of the system through which our 
emotional memories of fearful past experiences constantly inform our decisions.  
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minated in an unfortunate scenario facilitates the crucial task of avoiding similar situations in 
the future (LeDoux, “The Role of the Amygdala” 291–300).  
As he does with the records detailing Gage’s trauma and its psychic effects, Damasio, 
like most neurologists, cultivates hypotheses by observing patients with dysfunctional brains. 
One such patient, “S,” suffers from Urbach-Wiethe disease, which has entirely calcified both 
of her amygdalae. Consequently, S is unable to experience fear, recognize it on another’s 
face or express it on her own. While we often use the adjective “fearless” positively to cele-
brate bravery, the effects of S’s actual fearlessness, as described by Damasio, are not alto-
gether positive: “The fearlessness of her nature has prevented her from learning, throughout 
her young life, the significance of the unpleasant situations that all of us have lived through. 
As a result she has not learned the telltale signs that announce possible danger and possible 
unpleasantness” (The Feeling of What Happens 66). S exemplifies Damasio’s longstanding 
claim that emotion plays a crucial role in rational decision-making:  
The inability to make sound social judgments, based on previous experience of situa-
tions that are or are not conducive to one’s welfare has important consequences for 
those who are so affected. [. . .] These individuals cannot protect themselves against 
simple and not-so-simple social risks and are thus more vulnerable and less independ-
ent then we are. Their life histories testify to this chronic impairment as much as they 
testify to the paramount importance of emotion in the governance not just of simple 
creatures but of humans as well. (Ibid. 67)  
If victims of PTSD suffer too much from fear, victims of Urbach-Wiethe disease, like S, do 
not suffer enough. Through S’s story and others, Damasio demonstrates how fear fundamen-
tally informs our capacity to make ostensibly rational decisions in day-to-day life.  
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Fear, of course, is not the only emotion to do so. For better or worse, acutely painful 
moments of shame condition us to avoid their precipitating factors in the future. Wonder, ac-
cording to Plato, is the only beginning of philosophy and therefore the affective impetus be-
hind a conscious decision to deliberately analyze world (66). Envy feeds into revolutionary 
decisions to protest plutocrats hoarding of wealth, as well as reactionary decisions to deny 
the poor state-sponsored welfare. As Freud knew when conceiving the pleasure principle, our 
past experiences of bliss or pleasure, which behaviorists might call positive reinforcement, 
powerfully direct our decisions, though not without being tempered by both the reality prin-
ciple and the death drive.4 For drug addicts, as for mystics, memories of past bliss (and the 
pain that marks its absence) fade imperceptibly into decisions designed to attain future bliss. 
If we define love generally as an attraction to the good, moreover, it can be thought of as the 
basis of a host of rational decisions, despite the fact that Western discourses (especially dis-
courses on courtly love composed long before Descartes’ error) often characterize love as a 
cessation of reason.5 On the other hand, hate—i.e., repulsion from evil (whatever that is)—
also breeds decision.  
Anger is particularly important to this project, which is devoted to Middle English 
treatments of emotional ethics, since anger most obviously proves ethics to be a thoroughly 
emotional affair. Anger, according to Aristotle’s seminal definition, occurs when the subject 
believes herself or her friends to have been wronged and desires compensation for that wrong 
(36–39). Following Aristotle, Western definitions of anger tend to presuppose an ethical dis-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For Freud’s work on the pleasure principle, reality principle and death drive see Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle. 
5 See, for example, Marie de France who writes: “Such is the nature of love that no one under 
its sway can maintain command over reason” (56). 
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tinction between right and wrong, or at least the subject’s capacity to make judgments based 
on belief in such a distinction (OED, s.v. “anger”). Anger marks a moment of ethical frustra-
tion that proves the subject has an ethical code to be violated. It is therefore inextricably 
bound up with ethics—the branch of philosophy devoted to determining right and wrong 
conduct and therefore the branch of philosophy most closely concerned with decision-
making. From an evolutionary perspective, anger anticipates ethics, since our brain’s emo-
tional systems evolved long before the relatively recent prefrontal cortex, which is necessary 
for complex ethical reasoning (Panksepp 187–205). Anger is proto-ethical, though this vis-
ceral older brother of ethics is not moving away from home any time soon; hence Western 
philosophy’s long preoccupation with anger management. The fundamental contention of 
this dissertation is that all emotions play a role in ethical decision-making, though it pays 
careful attention to anger, dread, bliss, envy, wonder, shame, love and hate.  
Just as Damasio blames Descartes for proliferating spurious mind-body, emotion-
reason dualisms, he celebrates Baruch Spinoza, “who saw ethics, the structure of the state, 
and the law as means for individuals to achieve the natural balance expressed in joy” (Look-
ing for Spinoza 174). Indeed, Spinoza’s Ethics is particularly preoccupied with the origin and 
nature of the affects, which he defines as “affections of the body by which the body’s power 
of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of 
these affections” (70). It must be noted, however, that Spinoza too was prone to producing an 
intellect-emotion binary, situating the former as the driving force behind human freedom 
(Ibid. 160–82), and the latter as the driving force behind human bondage (Ibid. 113–59). 
Though he is not simply an opponent of Cartesian dualisms, Spinoza does recognize the in-
extricable connection between ethics and affects. Following Spinoza, Damasio argues that 
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ethics, like reason, is rooted in emotion. Imagining a “dire scenario” in which “humanity had 
dawned with a population deprived of the ability to respond toward others with sympathy, 
attachment, embarrassment, and other social emotions that are known to be present in simple 
form in some nonhuman species” (Looking for Spinoza 156–57), Damsio writes: 
I suspect that in the absence of social emotions and subsequent feelings, even on the 
unlikely assumption that other intellectual abilities could remain intact, the cultural 
instruments we know as ethical behaviors, religious beliefs, laws, justice, and politi-
cal organization either would not have emerged, or would have been a very different 
sort of intelligent construction. A word of caution, however. I do not mean to say that 
emotions and feelings single-handedly caused the emergence of those cultural instru-
ments. First, the neurobiological dispositions likely to facilitate the emergence of 
such cultural instruments include not just emotions and feelings, but also capacious 
personal memory that allows humans to construct a complex autobiography, as well 
as the process of extended consciousness that permits close interrelations among feel-
ings, self, and external events. Second, a simple neurobiological explanation for the 
rise of ethics, religion, law, and justice is hardly viable. It is reasonable to venture that 
neurobiology will play an important role in future explanations. But in order to com-
prehend these cultural phenomena satisfactorily we need to factor in ideas from an-
thropology, sociology, psychoanalysis, and evolutionary psychology, as well as find-
ings from studies in the fields of ethics, law and religion. (Ibid. 159–60) 
I include this lengthy quotation, substantially more proviso than hypothesis, to demonstrate 
that Damasio neither advocates neurobiological essentialism, nor argues that ethics grew out 
of emotion alone. He does, however, present an extremely convincing argument that ethical 
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processes cannot be said to be either a purely cognitive or purely emotional. Rather, ethics 
always already constitutes the process through which emotion and cognition mutually inform 
volition.  
As we have seen, emotions do not simply “happen” in the limbic system. They are the 
result of exceedingly complex interactions between the limbic system, the prefrontal cortex 
and the myriad bodily processes regulated therefrom. Contra post- (and pre-) Cartesian phi-
losophies that conceptualize human subjectivity as centered on the brain’s rational faculties, 
which are effected (but not constituted) by emotions, this dissertation presupposes the impos-
sibility of a purely rational subject who has conquered emotion, because the decisions we 
make are rooted in emotional experience (barring aberrant cases such as those of S and 
Gage). Though Damasio is right to hold Descartes responsible for proliferating mind-body, 
emotion-reason dualisms, Descartes did not invent these erroneous binaries. Indeed, the fan-
tasy of a purely rational subject bereft of all fear and anger was a favorite of the ancient sto-
ics (Sellars 118, 142). On the other hand, the stoics arguably recognized the emotional nature 
of ethics more thoroughly than most; they were certainly forerunners of anger management.6 
Just as Decartes’ error is older than Descartes, Damasio’s correction is older than Damasio. 
In fact, this dissertation demonstrates that Middle English literature is deeply invested in 
thinking through emotion’s constitutive role in ethical practice.  
The Middle English texts that I examine herein conceive of ethical decision-making 
as a necessarily emotional affair and therefore conceive of decision-making as a matter of 
willfully integrating emotion and cognition in a never-ending quest to act ethically. These 
texts are both pedagogical (i.e., they offer to subjects an ideology of emotion and a concomi-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Martha Nussbaum’s neo-stoicism attempts to revive stoicism’s interest in emotion without 
endorsing its more apathetic ideals. See Upheavals of Thought 89–138. 
   
	  
	   10	  
tant ascetic program for emoting well) and meta-pedagogical (i.e., they teach subjects that 
emotional experience is always a “learning experience,” insofar as it always reveals some-
thing about the subject’s relation to others). These texts not only convey how and why a sub-
ject ought to manage or repress certain emotions and solicit or perform others; they also 
teach subjects that deliberate, cognitive engagement with both positive and negative emo-
tions is integral to ethical decision-making. In the next three sections, I step back and briefly 
survey three of the scholarly movements—affect theory, theories of affective piety and histo-
ry of emotion—in which this dissertation participates with an eye toward the profound im-
pact that their foundational texts have had on my own writing and thinking these past few 
years.  
II. AFFECT THEORY 
Neuroscience is far from the only discipline to make advances in our understanding of emo-
tion in recent decades. During its affective turn, critical theory has repeatedly re-
conceptualized the role of bodily experience—alternately called emotion, affect and feel-
ing—in complex processes of acculturation.7 Brian Massumi, for one, makes much of the 
half-second lag between actually events and our experience of them (Parables for the Virtual 
28–34). During this half-second, the brain interprets bodily experience in language. I con-
vulse upon seeing a spider first; then, during the “missing half-second,” my brain retroactive-
ly interprets the sensory data and my initial reaction into language: “I see a spider and jump.” 
Due to the missing half-second, I experience the jump and narration simultaneously. Affect, 
for Massumi, constitutes our “prepersonal” experience prior to its capture in language, as 
well as the residual affect that always evades linguistic capture (Ibid. 27–28). Although he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For helpful overviews of the affective turn see Clough, as well as Gregg and Seigworth.  
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does not acknowledge it, Massumi draws upon the apophatic rhetoric of mysticism to de-
scribe in language conceptualizations of a prelinguistic, virtual reality not unlike Kant’s 
noumena. Massumi, like the mystics, blends metaphysics and empiricism in an effort to in-
ject wonder into everyday life. His definition of affect, however, cannot easily escape the 
paradoxes that inevitably accompany language meant to signify ineffable referents.8  
Teresa Brennan offers a less paradoxical definition of “affect” as “the physiological 
shift accompanying a judgment,” thereby drawing our attention (as does Martha Nussbaum) 
to affect’s evaluative nature (5). Brennan’s more central point, however, is that affect is by its 
very nature transmissible: “The transmission of affect means that we are not self-contained in 
terms of our energies. There is no secure distinction between the ‘individual’ and the ‘envi-
ronment’” (6). Refreshingly, Brennan is quick to recognize that premodern subjects were 
quite able to recognize affect’s transmissible nature, though they often attributed groupified 
affects to angels, demons, the Holy Spirit or the Devil (21–22). Like Brennan, Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick draws on psychoanalytic treatments of the affects to highlight their interpersonal 
character (1–27). In a chapter of particular importance to this dissertation, Sedgwick uses in-
fant psychology to argue that shame is not originally “about prohibition,” but rather a visual 
plea for an other to reopen a communicative circuit the shamed subject judges to be imper-
iled (93–122). Later in life, of course, shame becomes inextricably bound with our ever-
changing judgments about what behavior is or is not socially acceptable in a given situation. 
It is, of course, important to not over-celebrate shame, since contemporary (as well as medie-
val) heterosexist societies use(d) shame to painfully stigmatize counter-normative desires and 
behaviors (Neisen). Not only do such societies prohibit queer behavior, they, even more per-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For a thorough dismantling of Massumi’s thinking on affect see Leys, “The Turn to Affect: 
A Critique.”  
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fidiously, raise subjects to subordinate queer desires to social expectations. In medieval and 
modern societies, however, shame also functions as a recuperative call for compassion. 
Sedgwick’s intervention in shame studies is helpful insofar as it reminds us that, in post-
infantile life, shame is about both prohibition and compassion. As we will see, the Middle 
English romance Sir Gawain and the Green Knight (SGGK) is acutely aware of shame’s im-
portance to intra- and inter-personal communication; or, more specifically, the communica-
tive process through which shame sutures self to society.  
Finally, Sianne Ngai draws our attention to “ugly feelings” including envy, anxiety, 
irritation and contempt (1–37). These affects are less exhausting and therefore potentially 
more long lasting than rage or terror (6–7). Although Ngai’s primary project is to analyze, 
rather than recuperate, ugly feelings, many of her readings beautifully illustrate that affects 
like envy or irritation are often produced by uneven and unethical social hierarchies, but ret-
rospectively interpreted as character deficiencies.9 Scholars of the Middle Ages have recently 
begun bringing Ngai’s insights to bear on Middle English texts. Andrew Cole argues that 
Margery Kempe seeks out worldly shame as spiritually valuable experience (Literature and 
Heresy 155–82); likewise, Jessica Rosenfeld argues that Kempe’s autobiography records her 
making positive, devotional use of envy (“Envy and Exemplarity”). Continuing their work, 
my chapter on fear explores the considerable authority Kempe derives from performing 
dread.  
III. THEORIES OF AFFECTIVE PIETY 
Long before the critical theory’s affective turn, the term “affective piety” was developed to 
describe a mode of Christian devotion centered on willful meditations on Christ’s life, partic-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See, for example, her chapters on envy (126–73) and irritation (174–208). 
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ularly his infancy and suffering on the cross, which greatly influenced European culture dur-
ing the Middle Ages.10 R.W. Southern famously argues that the eleventh century saw a 
switch in Western European Christianity from devotion to a heroic, warrior Christ, to a more 
emotional devotion to a contorted, suffering Christ or an adorably sweet, baby Christ, both of 
which remained mainstays in visual art throughout the high and late Middle Ages (219–58). 
More recently, however, Anglo-Saxonists, as well as scholars of late antique Christianity, 
have argued that the various modes of affective devotion that Southern argues to have grown 
out of the eleventh century and largely invented by Anselm of Canterbury were quite present 
in earlier Christian cultures.11 Through the interminable retrogression accomplished by an 
increasingly backwards-looking series of revisions to the Southern hypothesis, microhistory 
creeps back towards the grand narratives it was designed to replace.  
In a related revision to the Southern hypothesis, a long tradition of feminist scholars 
including Clarissa Atkinson, Carolyn Walker Bynum and Sarah McNamer argue that affec-
tive piety was an essentially female endeavor. Although Atkinson does not argue against the 
Southern hypothesis, her important study on The Book of Margery Kempe recognizes the po-
tentially empowering nature of affective piety for women who practiced it (129–56). Bynum, 
of course, ran considerable distance with this hypothesis in both Jesus as Mother and Holy 
Feast and Holy Fast, both of which demonstrate that women were able to subvert patriarchal 
discourses that associate masculinity with the spirit and femininity with the body by empha-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This section is deeply indebted to Wikipedia’s “affective piety” entry (http://en.wikiped-
ia.org/wiki/Affective_piety), authored by Mary Agnes Edsall. I recognize scholarly citations 
of Wikipedia entries are generally frowned upon. Having expended no small amount of 
effort, however, I have not been able to discover an equally comprehensive and thoughtful 
survey of the scholarship on affective piety in any more traditional source.  
11 See, for example, Allen J. Frantzen’s “Spirituality and Devotion in the Anglo-Saxon 
Penitentials.” 
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sizing the theological significance of Christ’s maternal carnality. By fasting, Bynum argues, 
women situated themselves as empty vessels readily filled by divinity in a mystical union 
with God. Despite the fact that misogynists associated women with absence, by owning this 
association some medieval women were able to speak from a position of absolute, transcen-
dental presence by ventriloquizing God (Holy Feast and Holy Fast 208–18).  
Following Bynum, Sarah McNamer radically revises Southern’s hypothesis of the 
Anselmian origins of affective piety, arguing that the genre’s foremost text, the Meditationes 
Vitae Christi (which was translated into Middle English over and over again) was potentially 
developed by Benedictine nuns (Affective Meditation 58–85; 110–15). Michelle Karnes, 
however, disputes McNamer’s hypothesis (not to mention those of Bynum and her follow-
ers), arguing “affective meditation is at its foundation neither female- nor lay-oriented” 
(12).12 Less controversially, McNamer helpfully demonstrates that many Middle English de-
votional texts functioned as “emotion scripts”—“the loosely affiliated cultural prescripts that 
aid in establishing and maintaining [. . .] ‘emotional communities’”—designed to facilitate 
deliberate performances of devout compassion (Affective Meditation 11–14). This disserta-
tion carries on McNamer’s important work by analyzing Middle English emotion scripts that 
solicit emotions other than compassion, including anger, dread, envy, shame, love and hatred. 
On the other hand, it also explores how Middle English texts teach their audience, not only to 
manage, but to learn from emotions. 
Although massively influential and important, Bynum and her followers have been 
justly critiqued for their depiction of affective piety was an essentially female endeavor. In 
her article “Genders, Bodies, Borders: Technologies of the Visible,” for example, Kathleen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Karnes casts doubt on McNamer’s hypothesis in Imagination, Meditation, and Cognition 
206, n. 49. 
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Biddick accuses Bynum of essentializing woman and paying scant attention to the always-
complex interactions between gender difference and other nodes of social difference includ-
ing class, race and religion (397). Likewise, Sharon Farmer argues that class differences af-
fected medieval social practice as much as, if not more than, gender differences (153–171). 
Amy Hollywood, moreover, systematically argues that the binary Bynum constructs between 
an affective devotion practiced by women and an intellectual devotion practiced by men is 
profoundly deconstructable: 
when men’s and women’s religious writings are looked at together, we see that men 
and women engage in often intense relationships of mutual influence, debate, and ap-
propriation. As a result, any clearly marked distinction between men’s and women’s 
spirituality almost immediately breaks down (although the tendency for men to want 
women’s spirituality to take certain forms remains constant at least throughout the 
Middle Ages and no doubt well into the modern period). (“Feminist Studies” 371)  
Both Hollywood and Nicholas Watson illustrate that the fourteenth-century hermit Richard 
Rolle, whose works include The Fire of Love, The Melody of Love, Against Lovers of the 
World and two English Meditations on the Passion, evinces all of the tropes that Bynum at-
tribute to female affective piety (Watson, Richard Rolle and the Invention of Authority 106–
08). It should be noted, however, that Bynum never advocated an absolute divide between 
modes of female and male devotion in the Middle Ages and her model remains a powerful 
explanatory schema for a great deal of medieval devotional literature (Jesus as Mother 134–
35).  
Finally, David Aers counters what he calls Bynum’s “empowerment hypothesis” (i.e., 
her theory that women empowered themselves by “owning” initially misogynistic discourses 
   
	  
	   16	  
aligning them with absence and carnality), with his “disempowerment hypothesis,” which 
holds that affective devotional practices actually disempowered women and the laity in gen-
eral (“The Humanity of Christ” 30–34). There is validity in Aers’ “disempowerment hypoth-
esis,” but, like any radical revision, it runs the risk of replacing one reductive argument for 
another. Aers’ hypothesis, for Watson, threatens a “collapse of Bynum's model of female re-
sistance into generalized model of compliance to make space for a picture of Lollard heroism 
that seems as idealizing as what it replaces” (“Desire for the Past” 68). In other words, by 
making affective piety a mode of containment, rather than subversion (it is, of course, poten-
tially both), Aers leaves us mired in a pessimistic historiography centered on conflict, not co-
operation, despite the considerable amount of intra- and inter-gender cooperation that pro-
duced the cultural assemblage to which we refer to today as affective piety.13 His disempow-
erment hypothesis, moreover, indulges in as much gender essentialism as the empowerment 
hypothesis it attempts to negate. 
Although Bynum and Aers may err in essentializing gender and, in so doing, reducing 
affective piety to an essentially female experience, they are certainly correct that gender poli-
tics are legible in any work of affective piety. Sometimes affective piety empowered women, 
as it no doubt does in the theological autobiography of Julian of Norwich and the auto-
hagiography of Margery Kempe. Sometimes churchmen like Nicholas Love relegate affec-
tive piety to the project of fabricating docile, un-thinking laity too busy meditating about Je-
sus to realize the knowledge-power being withheld from them (225).14 The medieval con-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For a critique of New Historicism’s fascination with subversion and containment see 
Fradenburg, Sacrifice Your Love 75–76. 
14 For a discussion of the social conservatism of Love’s vernacular theology Watson, 
“Censorship and Cultural Change in Late-Medieval England.” 
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struction of affective piety, therefore, is a story of subversion and containment, as well as one 
of struggle between and among men and women. On the other hand, it is also a story of co-
operation and mutual admiration between and among men or women. In what follows, I try 
to focus on the latter story, not because the former is inaccurate, but because it has been so 
carefully told by so many influential scholars. I do not, however, entirely abandon the notion 
of subversion and containment, but instead try to think beyond this stagnant dialectic by in-
troducing a careful consideration of enjoyment’s role in affective piety. This project is of 
course inspired by the scholarship and mentorship of L.O. Aranye Fradenburg (Sacrifice 
Your Love 75–76).  
IV. HISTORY OF EMOTION 
Historiography, like neuroscience and critical theory, has also seen a turn toward studying 
emotion in the early twenty-first century (Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions in Histo-
ry.”) Much of the early work in historiography’s turn toward emotion is indebted to William 
M. Reddy’s concept of emotive utterance. To J.L. Austin’s distinction between constative 
utterances (i.e., those that describe reality or alternate realities, e.g. “It was a dark and stormy 
night”) and performative utterances (i.e., those that make something happen, e.g. “I now pro-
nounce you husband and wife”), Reddy adds emotives, (i.e., expressions of emotion through 
the use of language; or, more generally, attempts to interpret something that is observable to 
no other actor, e.g., “That spider frightens me”) (104, 128). For Reddy, emotives lie some-
where in between constatives and performatives: they attempt to describe extant emotion, 
but, in so doing, they also change, build, manage, hide and intensify these emotions (319–
30). Neither entirely descriptive, nor entirely performative, emotives deconstruct any holistic 
constative-performative binary. Emotives are neither simply a posteriori descriptions of 
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emotion, nor a priori productions of emotion; they can be either and more often fall some-
where in between, which makes a fair amount of sense, given the human brain’s constant 
project of integrating emotion and cognition into ethical action. Following Reddy, Fiona 
Somerset demonstrates that medieval mystics like Richard Fitzralph ascribed a “different 
truth-value” to “excitative speech” (i.e., speech intended to express and/or stir emotion), 
holding it less obligated to accuracy than less emotive, constative utterances (“Emotion” 
296–97).15 Although Fitzralph does so to get himself out of hot water with the papacy, his 
theory of excitative speech is consonant with a great deal of devotional discourse written un-
der substantially less duress including that of Richard Rolle and Margery Kempe. 
Barbara Rosenwein, moreover, develops the concept of “emotional communities” 
(i.e., “social groups whose members adhere to the same valuations of emotions and their ex-
pression”) (“Problems and Methods” 1). The concept of emotional communities is of central 
importance to this dissertation. The Middle English texts upon which it focuses are profound-
ly interested in imagining, forming, maintaining and castigating various emotional communi-
ties. My primary project, however, is not to represent medieval emotional communities by 
speculating about how these texts made historical subjects feel. Of course, some Middle Eng-
lish texts tempt us to engage in such speculation more than others. For example, Ancrene 
Wisse—a rule for anchoresses—often uses imperative verbs to instruct a second-person ad-
dressee how she should or should not feel.16 On the other hand, the vast majority of Middle 
English texts are not so explicitly designed to codify an emotional community. In addition to 
representing and constructing a discrete emotional community, Middle English literature fre-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For a fuller account of Fitzralph theory, Somerset, “Excitative Speech.” 
16 See Chapter 2. 
   
	  
	   19	  
quently stages the moments of conflict and cooperation that occur when subjects already be-
longing to several extant and overlapping emotional communities come together to create a 
new emotional community. That is, after all, an accurate assessment of what occurs at the 
moment in which Chaucer’s Canterbury pilgrims decide to band together in play. As Derek 
Pearsall notes, “Chaucer [. . .] makes it almost impossible to talk about the ‘historical’ audi-
ence of The Canterbury Tales on the basis of internal evidence” (The Canterbury Tales 295). 
However true that may be, while reading Chaucer’s great mennipean satire, it is profoundly 
difficult to resist imagining the early audience of The Canterbury Tales as resembling the 
Canterbury pilgrims themselves: a heterogeneous assemblage of subjects from all walks of 
life drawn together by a common love of fiction.  
Piers Plowman too is an instructive example of the difficulties that attend the task of 
using Middle English literary texts to represent the medieval emotional communities that 
they grew out of and/or produced. Surviving in over fifty manuscripts, Piers Plowman was 
among the most popular poems in late fourteenth- and early fifteenth-century England. Mod-
ern scholars have reconstructed three versions of the poem (A, B and C), which are often tak-
en as a single author’s drafts.17 As will become abundantly clear over the course of this dis-
sertation, these major versions of the poem imagine, critique and construct radically different 
emotional communities. Piers Plowman’s early audience was neither a single emotional 
community, nor three discrete emotional communities. Instead, the poem’s many manu-
scripts express a textual plurality much more complex than our three modern versions; one 
produced by a host of scribes, redactors and bowdlerizers in addition to Piers Plowman’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For a recent critique of this view (particularly regarding the validity of modern editions of 
B) see Warner, The Lost History of Piers Plowman. See also my discussion of Piers 
Plowman in Chapter 2. 
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original author(s).18 If we cannot reconstruct the manner in which Piers Plowman brought its 
medieval audience together, we also cannot simply ignore the question of emotional commu-
nities when discussing the poem, especially since scholars have demonstrated the dramatic 
extent to which Piers Plowman resoundingly self-identifies as “public poetry” (Middleton, 
“The Audience and Public”). Indeed, the poem begins with the dreamer witnessing a “fair 
field of folk” commonly read to represent Christendom and continues to depict myriad emo-
tional communities melting into each other throughout all of its versions. When studying 
Piers Plowman, there is a nearly irresistible urge (at least for me) to speculate about how the 
poem expresses its author’s feelings and generated those of its earliest audience. As Stepha-
nie Trigg compellingly argues, we need not renounce such urges, though we should subject 
them to the same critical scrutiny that we apply to Piers Plowman:  
[T]wofold attention to medieval emotions and the difficulties and pleasures of reading 
medieval emotions [. . . has] the virtue of drawing attention to the way that aesthetic 
and affective judgments are made. Langland’s writing—especially in the doubled and 
tripled fragments of parallel texts and revisions—is the unstable product of changing 
emotions and the elusive complexities of poetic form. (“Langland’s Tears” 45) 
Following Trigg, my foremost concern below is to explore the poem’s treatment of emotional 
ethics, which shaped its early audience’s emotional judgments and ethical actions, just as it 
might shape ours (if we let it). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For a skeptical reading of “the Langland myth” (i.e., the canonical belief that one man, 
William Langland, wrote three successive drafts of Piers Plowman, accurately represented 
by modern editions of A, B and C see C. David Benson, Public Piers Plowman 3–42. For a 
critique of Benson’s critique, see Lawrence Warner’s scathing review of Public Piers 
Plowman.” 
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This dissertation is explores how Middle English literary texts teach their audience, 
which includes us, to practice an emotional ethics. Somewhere between emotion scripts and 
premodern affect theories, the literary texts that I analyze in this study are all pedagogical in 
nature, though they do not always tell their audience directly how to feel in a given situation. 
Instead of privileging one set of emotions over another, they treat emotions as embodied 
judgments pertaining to certain situations (always in reference to an other, Other, or others) 
that help us make ethical decisions. Indeed, the medieval doctrine of the Seven Deadly Sins 
only prohibits certain kinds of negative emotions, rather than outlawing ugly feelings like 
anger wholesale. Following Aristotle, pastoral theologians (emblematized in Chaucer’s Par-
son) always leave room for righteous anger (CT.10.540). That is not to say that Middle Eng-
lish literary texts fail to recognize the many ways that emotions (especially anger) often 
cause us to behave in a manner that we later deem profoundly unethical. Nevertheless, they 
do not advocate the stoic belief (or, more properly, fantasy) that the ideal subject experiences 
neither fear nor anger, but is ruled entirely by reason and rewarded by experiencing only pos-
itive emotions. Instead, they conceptualize ethical volition (i.e., decision-making) as a matter 
of deliberately integrating emotion and cognition. 
V. EMOTIONAL ETHICS IN MIDDLE ENGLISH LITERATURE (CHAPTER OUTLINE) 
To put the matter anachronistically, this dissertation explores Middle English literary texts 
designed to endow their audience with a sort of “emotional intelligence,”19 at least if we un-
derstand “intelligence” to mean the capacity to behave ethically while simultaneously con-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Goleman 3–12. According to Goleman’s mixed model, “emotional intelligence” is a 
complex network of competencies involving self-awareness, self-regulation, social skill, 
empathy and motivation. Although it has gained considerable popularity in both academic 
and business-oriented circles, the concept of emotional intelligence has met with substantial 
criticism. See, for example, Locke, “Why Emotional Intelligence is an Invalid Concept.” 
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ceptualizing a standard of ethical behavior based on social experience. As we will see, Mid-
dle English literary texts (de)construct, exemplify and advocate a standard of emotional intel-
ligence, which I call “emotional ethics,” according to which ethical volition is a matter of 
integrating emotion and cognition. Among other things, then, this dissertation demonstrates 
that, well before Damasio’s influential and controversial reading of Phineas Gage’s life rec-
ords, Middle English texts conceptualized emotion at the root of ethical decision.  
While medievals were of course unfamiliar with the term “emotional intelligence,” 
they nevertheless were acutely invested in the ethical project of helping themselves and oth-
ers cultivate a “healthy” emotional disposition through willful acts—a project that undergirds 
the modern “emotional intelligence movement.” Of course, any standard of “emotional intel-
ligence,” whether tacit or explicit, is a cultural construct and therefore biased towards the 
ideals of those with the privilege to construct culture. Indeed, medieval scholastic theologians 
(not unlike modern theorists of emotional intelligence) jealously guarded their privilege, not 
only to imply when and where their audience ought to experience a given emotion, but also 
to define emotion itself, as well as its role in the psychomachia of everyday life (Knuuttila 
177–255). In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, scholastic theologians such as John 
Duns Scotus and William of Ockham increasingly espoused a voluntarist theology according 
to which emotions are indirectly controllable and, consequently, “one can learn to feel them 
in a proper manner by forming habits which change the conditions of the passions” (Knuut-
tila 256–86). For voluntarists, acts of volition are capable not only of managing involuntary 
emotional reactions, but also of changing the subject’s emotional disposition and, resultantly, 
her subsequent emotions. In this regard, their ideas live on to this day. Modern psychologists, 
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for example, often treat phobia by prompting patients to willfully confront feared objects in 
order to gradually reduce their emotional aversion thereto (Parsons and Rizzo 250–61). 
In medieval England, of course, explorations of the relationship between the will and 
emotion were certainly not the sole province of lofty, Latinate scholastics. With the skyrock-
eting of literacy rates in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a new brand of devotional 
literature—Nicholas Watson’s “vernacular theology”—flourished throughout England, much 
of which directly assesses the extent to which willful acts can dictate one’s emotional dispo-
sition.20 The first two chapters of this dissertation explore how Middle English works of ver-
nacular theology (particularly Piers Plowman) produce ideologies of anger (in Chapter 1) 
and dread (Chapter 2) designed to teach subjects to deliberately and carefully use these emo-
tions to pursue ethical behavior. Chapter 1, “Langland’s Wrath: Righteous Anger Manage-
ment in The Vision of Piers Plowman,” shows that the A-text of Piers Plowman displays cau-
tious optimism about righteous anger’s capacity to act as an engine of social change, particu-
larly by excluding wrath from a several catalogues of Deadly Sins. By conspicuously eliding 
sinful wrath and narrating righteous anger, the A-text seems to have acted as a catalyst of one 
of the largest paroxysms of group anger in English history—the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381—
and many have thought that, in its aftermath, Langland revised his poem to recant his posi-
tion on the urgent need for reform. I argue instead that Langland’s revisions to the B- and C-
texts were intended not to deny righteous anger’s necessity, but to clarify the perils of will-
fully performing it. 
 Chapter 2, “Better Living through Dread in Middle English Devotional Literature” 
explores the representations of dread across the versions of Piers Plowman, as well as those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Watson, “Introduction: King Solomon’s Tablets” and Gillespie, “Vernacular 
Theology.”  
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in Middle English mystical autobiographies, sermons, confession manuals, treatises on pray-
er, dramas and polemics in order to suggest that medieval England was home to a host of in-
teracting, overlapping and at times competing dread-based emotional communities. Indeed, 
St. Anselm of Canterbury—the father of affective piety, at least according to the Southern 
Hypothesis21—wrote a meditation to stir up fear that was frequently translated into Middle 
English and is even cited by Chaucer’s Parson to describe the “anguish” of hell 
(CT.10.169).22 As Chapter 2 demonstrates, however, medieval preachers did not simply re-
gale the laity with vivid depictions of fire and brimstone in an effort to stir up fear; they also 
imparted to their audience an elaborate ascetic program for distinguishing between the bad 
and good fears, eschewing the former and performing the latter. 
Chapters 1 and 2 conclude by examining the uncanny resonances between Middle 
English treatments of anger and fear respectively and postmedieval discourses thereon. Chap-
ter 1 concludes by exploring the rhetoric of righteous anger still at work in the reactionary 
politics of America’s “Tea Party” movement. Chapter 2 delves deeply into exploring the me-
dieval influence on postmedieval philosophies of fear, dread and anxiety. Intellectual histori-
ans often credit Søren Kierkegaard as existential anxiety’s “prime mover.” Arguing against 
this popular sentiment, I read Kierkegaard, not as the ex nihilo inventor of existential anxiety, 
but as a modern practitioner of a deep-historical, dread-based asceticism. Kierkegaard and 
the existentialists who followed him participated in a Judeo-Christian tradition of dread-
based asceticism, the popularity of which had dwindled, but never completely vanished since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Against this assumption, McNamer argues that “affective meditation originally was a 
woman’s genre” 18, 86–115. 
22 For Anselm’s Meditatio ad concitandum timorem, see Anselm 221–24. For a discussion of 
the Middle English translations of Anselm’s text, including Chaucer’s, see Haewaerts 258–
69.  
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the Middle Ages. Following medieval ascetics, modern philosophers like Kierkegaard, Mar-
tin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre deliberately cultivated and analyzed anxiety in an effort 
to embody authenticity. By beginning to consider premodern ascetics early existentialists and 
modern existentialists latter-day ascetics, Chapter 2 conceives of the long history of existen-
tial anxiety as an ascetic tradition built around the ethical goal of living better through dread. 
In the concluding section of Chapter 2, I explore the echoes of John Wycliffe’s fear-based 
political theology in the conservative political theory of Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. 
Chapter 3 argues that the three successive versions of Piers Plowman, as we know them to-
day, contain three strikingly different theologies of love and dread. Rather than reading these 
as evidence of one man’s gradual movement from a theology of dread to one of love, it 
reimagines the production of Piers Plowman as a densely intersubjective affair that engen-
dered a network of differing (and deffering) theologies of love and dread. 
Chapter 4, “Envying Heavenly Bliss in Pearl”, and Chapter 5, “Shame, Chivalry and 
Salvation in SGGK” deal with poems from the famous manuscript Cotton Nero A.x, which 
also contains Patience and Cleanness. Given the prominence of voluntarist ideas in late me-
dieval England, I understand Cotton Nero A.x as a series of exemplary narratives designed to 
help their audience willfully construct an ethical emotional disposition. Yet these narratives 
tend to portray, not characters who un-problematically emote ethically, but ones who struggle 
to emote well: Pearl’s dreamer erratically swings from melancholia, to bliss, to dread, to en-
vy and back to melancholia; characters in Cleanness are terrorized for their “unlawful” en-
joyment; Jonah learns that patience amounts to willfully enduring anger at God; and Gawain 
is compelled by a love of his own life, and concomitant fear of losing it, to withhold the 
green girdle from Bertilak on the third and final day of their “exchange of winnings game,” 
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though he eventually re-ingratiates himself both to Bertilak and denizens of his own homo-
social habitus, Arthur’s court, through two public displays of shame.23 According to these 
narratives neither positive feelings (bliss, mirth and love), nor uncomfortable feelings (envy, 
fear, anger and shame) are extraneous bodily conditions to be avoided, obfuscated or re-
pressed. Instead, they are valuable—if potentially dangerous—ecstasies and adversities to be 
worked through in an effort to achieve a more finely tuned emotional disposition. In compil-
ing these narratives, Cotton Nero A.x vies to teach us, not only how (not) to willfully craft 
emotional relationships with terrestrial and celestial others, but also that the capacity to 
emote ethically is not an innate character-trait, but an art-form that we must deliberately cul-
tivate through a lifelong process of trial-and-error. The pedagogical character of these narra-
tives, therefore, accords well with scholastic and voluntarist devotional programs that hold 
willful acts capable of habituating the passions.  
The process of trial-and-error through which Cotton Nero A.x’s characters struggle to 
emote well is nowhere more pronounced than in Pearl, much of which is spent detailing ei-
ther the dreamer’s mercurial emotional state or the pearl-maiden’s critique thereof. Some 
critics argue that the dreamer successfully accomplishes the work of mourning over the 
course of Pearl (e.g., Astell, The Song of Songs 121). Others read him as obstinately refus-
ing, right up until the end of the poem, to perform an identificatory shift from a melancholic, 
courtly lover of the pearl-maiden to a universalist, Christian lover of the corporate church 
(e.g., David Aers, “The Self Mourning”). While in some ways opposed, these two critical 
strains both presuppose that the pearl-maiden’s didactic agenda is to coax the dreamer from a 
melancholic obsession with his lost love-object to an acceptance of his loss. To the contrary, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For in-depth analyses of the political uses of misogyny in SGGK, see Ingham, Sovereign 
Fantasies, 107–36; and Schiff, Revivalist Fantasy, 72–99. 
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I argue in Chapter 3 that the dreamer evinces exactly this brand of acceptance in the poem’s 
seventh fitt and that the pearl-maiden subsequently does everything in her power to render 
the dreamer desirous, even envious, of her existence in a celestial world characterized, ironi-
cally enough, by a complete lack of envy. Pearl, therefore, powerfully asserts the spiritual 
utility of envy and grief. 
Just as Middle English devotional literature flourished throughout late medieval Eng-
land (at least until the fifteenth century), a proliferation of chivalric literature likewise dis-
seminated a network of interacting ideologies of emotional ethics. As I mention above, 
SGGK portrays shame as a communicative call for the other to reinstate social bonds the 
shamed subject judges to be threatened. On the other hand, shame also acts in SGGK as nega-
tive reinforcement that helps the shamed subject to avoid potentially shameful situations in 
the future. Hence, SGGK portrays shame as a crucial, but fallible, ethical compass, as well as 
a social cry for help. As McNamer argues, SGGK is less interested in insisting that knights 
ought to fear dishonor before death and more interested in forgiving knights who fail to live 
up to this exceedingly difficult standard of emotional ethics (“Feeling” 256). Where 
McNamer argues that SGGK prompts its readers to dis-identify with the jaded, paranoid 
Gawain of the poem’s conclusion and instead identify instead with the life-loving courtiers, I 
focus on the nature in which the acceptance of the life-loving courtiers allows Gawain to 
identify again as a valued member of the chivalric community. Just as Edward III exercises 
sovereign decision to transvaluate an ostracized subject into an honored one in the Order of 
the Garter’s origin myth (Trigg, Shame and Honour 27), so to do Arthur and his courtiers at 
the end of SGGK (Ibid. 61). 
   
	  
	   28	  
Chapter 6 turns to the transmodern affective assemblage called “courtly love.” It be-
gins with a brief review of psychoanalytic theories of courtly love, particularly those of 
Jacques Lacan and Slavoj Žižek.24 Both thinkers characterize courtly love as masochism be-
fore the invention of that term. In his famous essay on courtly love, Žižek makes use of 
Gilles Deleuze’s observation in Coldness and Cruelty that sadism and masochism do not 
constitute a binary opposition. For Deleuze, sadism and masochism are both modes of en-
joyment that respond to privilege (33–41). The sadist enjoys exercising his privilege by in-
flicting pain upon others from the perspective of a Godlike arbiter of justice. The masochist, 
on the other hand, enjoys abandoning his privilege, though in a carefully pre-regulated man-
ner, and suffering at the hands of otherwise abject subjects. It is curious that both Žižek and 
Jeffery Jerome Cohen use Deleuze to discuss the courtly lover’s masochism without discuss-
ing his potential sadism (Žižek, The Metastases of Enjoyment 91; Cohen 89) According to 
Deleuze’s view, however, the masochistic courtly lover always already possesses the prereq-
uisite privilege to simultaneously act as a sadistic courtly hater. The courtly lover, therefore, 
is never simply a masochist, but always potentially also a sadist. Chapter 6 demonstrates that 
Geoffrey Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde reveals, through Troilus’ character arc, the swift-
ness and ease in which passive, masochistic, courtly lovers can become violent, sadistic 
courtly haters. Chapter 6 concludes by comparing Troilus to a real-life would-be courtly lov-
er turned courtly hater, Elliot Rodger, who terrorized Isla Vista, the small, college-town bor-
dering my university, killing six people and injuring many more, while I was in the midst of 
writing this dissertation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For Lacan see “Courtly Love as Anamorphosis” in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 139–54, 
especially 108. For Žižek see “Courtly Love, or Woman as Thing” in The Metastases of 
Enjoyment 89–112, especially 109.   
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Finally, I conclude by briefly discussing the pedagogical implications of my research 
into treatments of emotional ethics in Middle English literature. Over the seven years I have 
spent conceiving of and writing this dissertation and simultaneously teaching courses in Eng-
lish literature, it has become abundantly clear to me that English instructors, whether we 
acknowledge it or not, are responsible for endowing our students with a culturally construct-
ed standard of emotional intelligence by mediating and (hopefully) facilitating the process 
through which our students’ emotional responses to literature influence their lives as ethical 
subjects thereafter. I often find myself mildly ashamed, however, while openly discussing my 
feelings, even in a class on English literature. Perhaps this shame is rooted in the fact that 
English classes provide the stereotypical environment for discussing emotions and some-
where, deep down, I believe (as do many instructors) that English teachers ought to be op-
posing this stereotype head-on. We do not “just talk about feelings” in English classes; we 
investigate what literature can tell us about history and vice versa; we open our students’ 
eyes to uneven distributions of social privilege as they are evinced in literature; we teach stu-
dents (often implicitly) to actively resist the emotional pull of literary texts and provide in 
their essays a rational (often suspicious) analysis of said texts. These latter projects are in-
deed imperative, but cannot be fully undertaken without a consideration of emotion’s role in 
literary experience. Perhaps we should not just talk about feelings and ignore political and 
social issues; but we should discuss the myriad ways that literature reveals ethics to be the 
necessarily emotional practice that it is because, in so doing, we help students learn to delib-
erately integrate emotion and cognition into ethical decision, just as Middle English authors 
did centuries ago.   
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CHAPTER 1:  
LANGLAND’S WRATH: RIGHTEOUS ANGER MANAGEMENT IN THE VISION OF PIERS PLOWMAN 
Anger is the political sentiment par excellence.  
                       — Jean-Luc Nancy (qtd. in Lingis 212) 
Angry people aren’t interested in logic; they aren’t interested in odds; they aren’t in-
terested in consequences. When they get angry, they realize the condition that they’re 
in—that their suffering is unjust, immoral, illegal, and that anything they do to correct 
it, they’re justified. 
                                                                                       — Malcolm X (107–08) 
PRÉCIS  
This chapter begins by arguing that theologians, preachers and poets in late medieval Eng-
land tended to conceptualize anger as morally ambiguous (i.e. potentially either sinful or 
righteous). In so doing, it closely examines a series of Middle English descriptions of the 
Deadly Sin wrath. Although these texts obviously depict the affect as spiritually detrimental, 
they frequently also cite Ps. 4.4 “irascimini et nolite peccare” (“be angry and do not sin”) in 
zealous approbation of righteous anger. Reading this ambivalence as pedagogical, this chap-
ter suggests that religious writers in late medieval England taught devotees to take anger’s 
judgements both seriously and critically. 
“Langland’s Wrath” turns next to the A-text of William Langland’s alliterative mas-
terpiece The Vision of Piers Plowman, which appears to deviate from this traditional ambiva-
lence by twice excluding wrath from catalogues of the Seven Deadly Sins. Despite the fact 
that the A-text elsewhere characterizes wrath as a grievous threat to sanctity, taken out of 
context, these lacunae can be read as subtle attempts to cleanse the affect of sinfulness and 
thereby implicitly endorse righteous anger as a catalyst for positive, social action. In fact, the 
Prima epistola iohannis balle—an insurgent missive, instrumental in sparking the Peasants’ 
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Revolt of 1381—references Langland’s A-text by excluding wrath from a list of Seven Dead-
ly Sins. Given the dramatic consequences of Ball’s allusion to Piers Plowman, this chapter 
posits that certain emendations made to the post-1381 C-text ought to be read as responses to 
the Prima epistola’s Langlandian elision of wrath. Specifically, it argues that Langland pur-
posefully omits Piers’ “pure tene” at a pivotal crux in the C-text—the infamous Pardon-
Tearing Scene—in an effort to distance his poem from the concept of righteous anger in the 
wake of the Rising. Although this gesture is no doubt condemnatory, it constitutes an at-
tempt, not to annihilate the socio-cultural memory of Piers Plowman’s influence on the Ris-
ing, but to dramatize the manner in which revolutionary discourse (i.e., the A-text’s elision of 
wrath) all-too-frequently manufactures its own reactionary censor (i.e., the C-text’s excision 
of Piers’ “pure tene”). Having made this point, “Langland’s Wrath” briefly re-assesses the 
critical term “affective piety”—which is currently employed almost exclusively to describe 
an empathic mode meditating on Christ’s passion—in light of the radical theology of anger 
and action promulgated by Ball and company. Finally, I examine some of the ways that rhet-
orics of righteous anger continue inflect reactionary politics in modern America.       
I. ANGER’S TWO FACES  
As we have seen, emotion is neither opposed, nor prior to cognition or knowing (Damasio, 
Descartes’ Error 127–64). On the contrary, it is knowledge “at first blush.” If a taste disgusts 
me, for instance, I have already judged that which I am eating to be repulsive. There is no 
guarantee, however, that the “knowledge” manifested by a given emotion is accurate. I sup-
press the impulse to spit out the disgusting medicine because reason (or, more precisely, my 
faith in scientific reason) assures me that its effects are actually desirable (Ibid. 191–92). Up-
on retrospect, we often come to consider our initial, emotional judgments to be dispropor-
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tionately severe, if not downright irrational. Despite our penchant for spouting saccharine 
fiats to “trust your gut” or “follow your heart,” as a culture we tend to trust visceral judg-
ments considerably less than rational ones.  
If emotion is epistemic, anger is juridical. Aristotle’s Rhetoric defines anger as “the 
desire, accompanied by [mental and physical] distress, for conspicuous retaliation because of 
a slight that was directed, without justification, against oneself or those near one” (124). An-
ger, in other words, is the visceral experience of a breach in justice: a form of a posteriori 
knowledge, necessarily predicated on an a priori moral code. I cannot, after all, feel slighted 
if I am unequipped with a sense of right and wrong. Aristotle’s definition of anger has had a 
profound impact on Western culture. Like so much Aristotelian thought, St. Thomas Aquinas 
subsumed it into scholastic theology in the thirteenth-century. For Aquinas, anger is the de-
sire for just vengeance (ST.I-II.47.1–2). The rub, so to speak, is that affects (which Aquinas 
calls “passions”) are necessarily subjective and therefore fallible. Consequently, Aquinas rea-
sons that anger itself must be subjected to moral judgment: “ira est bona inquantum ratione 
regulatur: si autem ordinem rationis excludat, est mala” (ST.II-II.158.2; “anger is good in so 
far as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it sets the order of reason aside” 1839–
40). Anger can be righteous, but only by submitting to reason’s rule (ratione regulatur). By 
depriving anger of juridical sovereignty, Aquinas effectively split the subject, ceding to rea-
son (ratio) the censorial task of policing raw affect (passio).25 The fact that Western penal 
codes continue to distinguish crimes committed “in cold blood” from those committed “in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Aquinas’ distinction between affect to reason is echoed by Sigmund Freud, who explicitly 
states in The Ego and the Id that: “The ego represents what we call reason and sanity, in 
contrast to the id which contains the passions” (25). As a staunch atheist, however, Freud 
would probably have understood Aquinas’ “reason” as less akin to the ego than the super-
ego, which is formed when the father’s external authority is internalized as a persecutory 
agent of psychic censorship. 
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the heat of passion” suggests that this rupture has yet to close (Foucault, History of Madness 
451–53). 
Aquinas was by no means alone in his desire to distinguish between righteous and 
sinful anger. Medieval theologians the likes of Gregory the Great, John Cassian, Alcuin, 
Hugh of St. Victor and Robert Grosseteste (to name a few) all theorized righteous anger 
(with varying degrees of enthusiasm).26 Further, short descriptions of “good” anger frequent-
ly precede the lengthy diatribes on wrath contained in popular, medieval treatises on the Sev-
en Deadly Sins. Geoffrey Chaucer’s Parson, for instance, proclaims to the Canterbury Pil-
grims that: 
Ire is in two maneres; that oon of hem is good, and that oother is wikked. / The good 
Ire is by jalousie of goodnesse, thurgh which a man is wrooth with wikkednesse and 
agayns wikkednesse; and therefore seith a wys man that Ire is bet than pley. / This Ire 
is with debonairetee, and it is wrooth withouten bitternesse; nat wrooth agayns the 
man, but wrooth with the mysdede of the man, as seith prophete David, “Irascimini et 
nolite peccare” (CT.X.540–52). 
“Good Ire,” according to the Parson, is spurred on by the “jalousie of goodnesse [. . .] agayns 
wikkednesse”; “bet than pley,” righteous anger is productive, spiritual labor. Through the 
experience of such anger, the subject participates in the pan-historical struggle of “good-
nesse” against evil. Anger “withouten bitternesse,” however, is in constant danger of becom-
ing embittered (Rosenwein 235). Jerome’s translation of Ps. 4.4—to which Paul alludes in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 For Gregory the Great, see the Magna moralia V.xlv.82. For John Cassian, see De 
institutis coenobiorum VIII.VII. For Grosseteste, see the Dicta LXXV. For a comparative 
discussion of the discourses on righteous anger proliferated by Alcluin, Hincmar of Rheims, 
Hugh of St. Victor and Thomas of Chobham, see Barton 155-156. See also, Althoff 69-74 for 
an interesting discussion of kingly anger. 
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Eph. 4.26—neatly encapsulates the ideo-affective straightjacket into which demagogues like 
the Parson forced their adherents: while the initial imperative (irascimini) demands anger, the 
corollary injunction prohibiting sin (nolite peccare) anxiously subordinates affective judg-
ments to doctrinal law.  
According to Siegfried Wenzel, Chaucer is likely to have employed a late thirteenth-
century, English abbreviation of William Peraldus’ Summa vitiis et virtutibus in composing 
the Parson’s Tale (“The Source” 351-352). An extensive treatise on the Seven Deadly Sins 
and their corresponding Seven Heavenly Virtues, Peraldus’ Summa was widely influential in 
both France and England during the late Middle Ages. The Dominican Friar Laurent of Orle-
ans drew heavily from it in composing the Old French Somme le roi, which was in turn trans-
lated into Middle English no less than nine times during the fourteenth- and fifteenth-
centuries.27 Further, as Wenzel has illustrated, Latin preaching-manuals such as the Francis-
can Fasciculus morum borrowed both form and content from Peraldus’ Summa (Verses in 
Sermons 10). While the Parson’s Tale, Peraldus’ Summa, the Fasciculus morum and the 
Middle English Book of Vices and Virtues uniformly oppose the Deadly Sin wrath to the de-
finitively passive heavenly virtue patience, they all explicitly acknowledge the existence of 
righteous anger.28  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Dan Michel’s Ayenbite of Inwyt, The Book of Vices and Virtues and Caxton’s Royal Book 
all belong to this group, The Book of Vices and Virtues ix. 
28 Fasciculus morum explicitly states that “duplex est odium, scilicet virtuosum et viciosum” 
(II.iii.4 “there are two kinds of wrath, one virtuous, the other a vice” 121). It cites Ps. 4.5 in 
II.i.12–13). For an in-depth comparison of The Parson’s Tale and a thirteenth-century 
abbreviation of Peraldus’ Summa, see Wenzel’s “The Source of Chaucer’s Seven Deadly 
Sins,” 362–64. Finally, The Book of Vices and Virtues—a Middle English translation of the 
Old French Somme le roi, which is in turn based of Peraldus’ Summa—contains the 
following passage: “vnderstonde wel þat þer is an ire þat goode holy men han aȝenn euele, 
þat is vertue to destroie wiþ yuele” (fol. 9b), but cites neither Ps. 4.4 nor Eph. 4.26.      
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Such summary texts were in high demand throughout Chaucer’s England, largely due 
to the fact that ecclesiastical legislation such as the Constitutions of the Council of Lam-
beth—called by the Franciscan Archbishop of Canterbury John Peckham in 1281—mandated 
that “[q]uilibet sacerdos [. . .] quater in anno dilucide exponat subditis suis Articulos fidei” 
(qtd. in The Book of Vices and Virtues ix–x; “all priests [ . . .] clearly expound the articles of 
the faith to their subjects four times a year”).29 In fact, the Constitutions of the 1287 Synod of 
Exeter go as far as stipulating that every priest of that diocese must have at his disposal a cat-
echism, which would have invariably included a description of the Seven Deadly Sins (Ibid. 
x).30 Given this social context, it is likely that Chaucer’s fictional account of the Parson zeal-
ously indoctrinating his fellow pilgrims on anger’s “two maneres” would have “rung true” to 
a contemporary audience.  
Indeed, his treatment of anger is clearly echoed in an anonymous Middle English 
sermon, most likely composed during the last quarter of the fourteenth-century (Middle Eng-
lish Sermons xxxiv–xlii):  
þer be two ires, on gode, a-nother euell. Þe tone comyth of the flessh, that other of the 
spryte. Ire þat comyth of the flessh commenly is euell, oute of the qwych ire spryngen 
foure braunches, hert swellynge and dedayne, scorne, stryfynge, and blasfeme. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For a convincing discussion of the manner in which Pecham’s Constitutions, which 
demand a minimum of theological knowledge to be possessed by the laity, differ from the 
Constitutions of Thomas Arundel’s 1407 Synod of Oxford, which seek to limit theological 
learning in the laity, see Watson, “Censorship and Cultural Change”  825–28, as well as 
Craun 121. 
30 Among the most famous of these catechisms is The Lay Folks’ Catechism, compiled by 
John of Thoresby, which is based on Pecham’s 1281 Constitutions. Revealingly, the text does 
not discuss righteous anger in its description of the Deadly Sin wrath.     
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when an irus man oft tymes hym wrathes, his hert swelles a-non for tene. (Middle 
English Sermons 306) 
Like the Parson—who warns his audience that anger causes “the herte of man, by eschaw-
finge and moevynge of his blood, [to] wexeth so trouble that he is out of alle juggement of 
resoun” (CT.X.536)—the author of this sermon denigrates the affect’s physiological, or 
fleshy, aspects as sinful, while sacralizing a purely spiritual anger. This provocative notion of 
a righteous anger “of the spryte,” however, sits somewhat uncomfortably next to points made 
earlier in the sermon about anger’s capacity to disrupt mental and social stability:  
For what man so is irefull, oft he is vnwyse, as Goddes lawe teches, Iacobi ij: “Ira en-
im viri iusticiam Dei non operatur.” And therfore says Salomon þus, “Cum iracundo 
noli conuersari—wyth a wrathfull man be not þou conuersante.” For they maken dis-
corde and leten men of pease. And also Ysaye ij, “Quiescite ab homine in cuius nari-
bus spiritus eius est—[rest] ȝe ȝu fro a man in whose nese-thyrlles his spryte is.” 
(305–06)  
The paranoid contention that the subject ought to trust no one “in whose nese-thyrlles his 
spryte is” (Is. 2.22) is subtly ironized by the aforementioned invocation of a righteous anger 
“of the spryte.” Somewhat paradoxically, the sermon employs the noun “spryte” to signify 
both righteous anger’s modus operandi (irascimini) and the inherent fallibility of embodied 
judgments (nolite peccare). Like the preaching manuals on which it is based, the sermon 
therefore betrays a deep-seated ambivalence towards anger’s juridical value.   
Although the sermon-cycle containing these passages is thoroughly orthodox (Middle 
English Sermons lv n.1), a near-contemporary Wycliffite sermon gives an analogous account 
of righteous anger:  
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And þus as Poule biddiþ aftir men shullen be wrooþ and not synne, for men shulden 
hate mennus synne and loue þer kynde and þer uertues. And þus was Crist wraþful, 
but þe sunne fill not on his wraþþe. And þus shulden cristen men be wrooþ, and kepe 
þre þyngis in þer wraþþe. First þat þer wraþþe shulde not longe laste. [. . .] Þe 
secounde witt of Poulis wordis biddiþ þat þe sunne of ryȝtwisnesse go not doun fro 
man bi grace, for siche wraþþe þat he haþ. And so þe þridde witt of Poulis wordis 
biddiþ þat man shulde not be wrooþ, but for þe more lyȝt of loue þat shulde shyne 
faste in his soule. (Wycliffite Sermons I.E49.49–59, emphasis mine). 
Unlike the Parson’s Tale or the Fasciculus morum, the heterodox sermon attributes the 
phrase “irascimini et nolite peccare” to Paul rather than David. It is, moreover, a good deal 
more exegetically adventurous than its orthodox counterparts. Like them, however, the Wyc-
liffite sermon insists that anger should be directed at “mennus synne,” not “þer kynde.” Fur-
ther, like Aquinas, it appoints an alternate psychic agent (the “lyȝt of loue”) to regulate wrath.  
Thus far, I have argued that, following Aristotle, medieval Christian ideologues tend-
ed to conceptualize anger as an embodied mode of moral judgment. Since they considered 
impassioned judgments fallible, however, they portrayed subjective anger as morally ambig-
uous and therefore requiring a supplementary psychic agency to evaluate its juridical claims 
(i.e., Aquinas’ ratio, the Parson’s “debonairete,” the orthodox sermon’s “spryte” and the 
Wycliffite Sermon’s “lyȝt of loue”). Although they differ considerably in particulars, taken 
together, the aforementioned examples suggest that “righteous anger management” was a 
widely discussed issue in Chaucer’s England. The remainder of this chapter traces the emer-
gence of an alternative theology of anger—one that drastically downplays the affect’s capaci-
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ty for sin in a tacit endorsement of its juridical efficacy—in the ideological economy of late 
fourteenth-century England. 
II. IRE UNDER ERASURE  
Some late medieval texts are less tolerant of anger’s moral ambiguity than others. The early 
fifteenth-century Wycliffite polemic The Lanterne of Liȝt, for example, zealously asserts that 
“as iust wraþþe is no wraþþe, but a feruent diligence, so riȝtwise smyting is no smyting, but a 
just amending” (XII.9–11; fol. 93r). Curiously, the Lanterne introduces the notion of right-
eous anger only to erase and rename it. Where the Parson and his ilk reconcile the moral am-
biguity of “ire” by bifurcating the affect along moral lines—“ire is in two maneres; that oon 
of hem is good, and that oother is wikked”—the Lanterne-author presents righteous anger as 
conceptually implosive. There is an implicitly performative quality to the seemingly consta-
tive statement “iust wraþþe is no wraþþe”: the very act of its utterance (if felicitous) effec-
tively evacuates the signifier “wraþþe” of any potential justice.31 Those feelings that would 
be called “wraþþe” if not for their justness are semantically displaced onto the phrase “fer-
vent diligence.” Supplementing this performative de-sacralization of “wraþþe” is a parallel 
treatment of violence. Accordingly, righteous anger becomes juridical diligence and just vio-
lence becomes valid retribution.  
Why does the Lantern-author indulge in this paradoxical phrasing? Why not simply 
state that righteous “wraþþe” and “smyting” are also known as “fervent diligence” and “iust 
amending” respectively? Perhaps this self-destructive conceptualization of righteous anger 
betrays an authorial desire to render the signifiers “wraþþe” and “smyting” exclusively pejo-
rative, in order to sidestep, in “vernacular theology” (Gillespie 401–20), the moral ambiguity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 On the difference between “performative” and “constative” utterances, see Austen 1–12.  
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already firmly entrenched in the Latin ira. After all, as Kantik Ghosh convincingly argues, 
Wycliffites tended to be easily as wary of semantic instability as their ecclesiastical oppo-
nents, despite (or perhaps because of) their zeal for translating scripture into the vernacular 
(22–66). Unlike the Wycliffite sermon above—which registers, but also restricts, the plurali-
ty of meaning present in the statement “þe sunne fill not on his [Christ’s] wraþþe”—the Lan-
terne is completely unwilling to tolerate moral ambiguity in the signifier “wraþþe.” Seman-
tics, above all, are at stake in the Lanterne’s performative disavowal of “iust wraþþe.”  
No matter how radical its wording, the Lanterne’s conception of righteous indigna-
tion is not simply a progressive answer to the Parson’s “conservative” orthodoxy. Just as the 
Parson subordinates affect to morality—allowing the former to determine the latter, but not 
vice versa—the Lanterne’s de-moralization of “wraþþe” and “smyting” presupposes the su-
premacy of an a priori moral law. Although it clearly attempts to perpetuate anti-institutional 
sentiment, the Lanterne’s “call to arms” is haunted by the specter of sin: the fact that “iust 
wraþþe is no wraþþe” does nothing to alleviate anxieties about anger’s association with sin. 
The Lanterne’s audience is therefore no freer to embrace anger as an autonomous mode of 
judgment than that of the Parson. Implicit within both texts is the mandate that irascimini 
must always be tempered by nolite peccare. The deadliness of the sin wrath, it seems, stands 
between a zeal for righteous anger and a wholehearted endorsement of the affect’s juridical 
potential.  
Yet it is not difficult to imagine a theology of anger devoid of ideological constraint: 
irascimini without nolite peccare. Since anger’s moral fallibility forces the subject to “se-
cond-guess” its judgments, such a theology would have to eschew the notion of sinful anger. 
This brings us to the A-text of Langland’s The Vision of Piers Plowman, which notably 
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elides the Deadly Sin wrath. All three major versions of Langland’s poem—the A-, B- and 
C-texts—contain a discrete episode commonly referred to as the Confession of the Seven 
Deadly Sins.32 An artistic tour de force, it depicts personified Deadly Sins as they confess 
publically to their newfound priest Repentance. However, in the A-text—long thought to be 
an early draft of the poem, composed sometime in the mid 1370’s (Piers Plowman: The A-
text 6–8)—we only meet six Deadly Sins: Pride, Lust, Envy, Covetousness, Gluttony, and 
Sloth. Wrath is conspicuously absent.33 
 Of course, Wrath’s absence alone hardly suggests that Langland’s exclusion of anger 
constitutes an intentional elision, or even an unconscious repression. After all, he might 
simply have forgotten to personify Wrath in this early draft of the poem. Alternatively, he 
may have waylaid his treatment thereof because he did not yet feel up to that particular artis-
tic task. These possibilities, however, are unlikely for two reasons. First, although the A-
text’s Confession Scene never personifies wrath, the signifier “wraþþe” and its cognates ap-
pear multiple times therein. Curiously, each mention of wrath occurs in direct relation to En-
vy. Envy, for instance, describes the manner in which he sabotages his neighbor’s reputation 
by exclaiming: “Betwyn hym & his meyne I haue mad wraþþe” (A.V.79). Later, he says 
“whoso haþ more þanne I, þat angriþ myn herte” (A.V.97). Even Envy’s physical appearance 
is affected by wrath: “His body was bolnid for wraþþe þat he bot his lippes, / And wroþliche 
he wroþ his fest, to wreke hym he þouȝte” (A.V.66–67). It is improbable that the existence of 
the Deadly Sin wrath slipped the same mind that so emphatically pointed out envy’s capacity 
to engender anger. Further, when Langland does portray Wrath in the B- and C-texts, his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The Confession Scene takes place in Passus V of the A- and B-texts and Passus VI of the 
C-text. 
33 For an early discussion of Wrath’s absence from the A-text see Manly 115–16. 
   
	  
	   41	  
character vignette appears directly after that of Envy, thus maintaining the A-text’s sense that 
sinful anger issues from a matrix of jealousy (B.V.135–87; C.VI.103–70). There is a consid-
erable difference, however, between characterizing wrath as a Deadly Sin that tends to result 
from envy, and demoting the former to a mere noxious byproduct of the latter.  
Secondly, Passus II of the A-text also contains a catalogue of six Deadly Sins that ex-
cludes wrath:  
 Wyten & wynessen þat wonen vpon erþe, 
 Þat I, Fauel, feffe Falsnesse to Mede, 
 To be present in Pride for pouere or for riche, 
 Wiþ þe Erldom of Enuye for euere to laste, 
 Wiþ alle þe lordsshipe of Leccherie in lengþe & in brede; 
 Wiþ þe Kingdom of Coueitise I croune hem togidre; 
And al þe Ile of Vsurie, & Auarice þe faste,    
Glotonye & grete oþes I gyue hem togidere; 
Wiþ alle þe delites of lust þe deuil for to serue, 
In al þe Signiure of Slouþe I sese hem togidere; 
Þei to haue & to holde & here eires aftir 
Wiþ alle þe purtenaunce of purcatorie into þe pyne of helle. (A.II.57–68, emphasis 
mine) 
Thus Favel weds Falseness to Lady Mede. Although the character in whose mouth this 
speech is placed is by no means reputable—the semantic valance of the noun “favel” in-
cludes lying, deceit and insincerity (“favel”)—it remains quite telling that his otherwise-
standard cartography of sin should exclude wrath altogether. Both the B- and C-texts sup-
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plement the fourth line of the passage above, elongating “þe Erldom of enuye” to “þe Erl-
dome of Envye and Yre togideres” (B.II.84; C.II.91). Furthermore, immediately after the A-
text’s Favel completes his unholy marriage ceremony, Theology angrily alludes to St. Truth’s 
anger: “Þanne tenide hym Theologie what he þis tale herde, / And seide to Cyuyle, ‘now 
sorewe on þi bokes, / Such weddyng to werche to wraþþe wiþ Treuþe’” (A.II.79–81). Once 
again, Langland seems to go out of his way to remind us that he is conscious of wrath’s ex-
istence, but does not consider it a Deadly Sin. 
Perhaps the A-text’s elisions of wrath are meant to facilitate an ulterior condemnation 
of acedia (sloth). John Bowers has convincingly argued that Piers Plowman evinces a dis-
tinct preoccupation with sloth by consistently depicting it as the last in its catalogues of 
Deadly Sins (61–96). If Langland was particularly worried about the prevalence of sloth in 
his community, he might have come to suspect the populace of passing laziness off as pa-
tience, which, as we have seen, was often defined as the righteous eschewal of wrath. By 
twice passing the sin over in silence, the A-text implicitly critiques the absence of righteous 
anger in its portrait of a slothful, contemporary Christendom. In other words, it downplays 
wrath’s sinfulness in order to reduce its audience’s self-conscious reservations about impas-
sioned, social action. Indeed, this rhetorical strategy makes sense in the context of Lang-
land’s larger theological project, which, if not “semi-Pelagian” (Adams 367–71), is certainly 
in favor of good works: “chastite wiþoute charite worþ cheyned in helle” is his narrator’s 
harsh vernacularization of “fides sine operibus mortua est” (A.I.162; “faith is dead without 
works”).  
On the other hand, Langland was not willing—or, perhaps, able—to completely 
cleanse anger of sinfulness. By depicting an irascible Envy, the poet implies that angry be-
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havior is at least closely related to sin. If he intentionally elides a portrayal of Wrath in order 
to incite social action in his audience, Langland also implicitly cautions his readers not to 
mistake their frustration with worldly poverty for righteous anger. In fact, the A-text does 
personify wrath, though not in the Confession Scene. Shortly thereafter, towards the end of 
Passus VI, the crowd to which the narrator belongs—presumably comprised of the aforemen-
tioned six sins, though no more is heard from them—is first introduced to the eponymous 
Plowman, who gives them elaborate directions to the abode of St. Truth (who represents 
God-the-Father, salvation and moral rectitude, to name a few).  
In and of themselves, these directions allegorize the Christian’s journey through life, 
giving a schematic account of the mental states and ideals one ought to either pursue or avoid 
in the quest for salvation. At the climax of this sub-allegory, the subject presupposed by 
Piers’ directions finally discovers the ever-elusive St. Truth, embedded in her own heart: 
“And ȝif grace graunte þe to gon in on þis wise, / Þou shalt se treuþe wel sitte in þin herte / 
And lere þe for to loue & his lawes holden” (A.VI.92–94). The act of inwardly “seeing” this 
kernel of divinity renders one able to learn and uphold celestial law. By allegorizing the Au-
gustinian dictum that knowledge of divinity begins with introspection,  Langland celebrates 
the divine “moral sentiment” innate within the human soul (Raw 153–54).  
This introspective epiphany, however, does not mark the end of the Plowman’s direc-
tions. Immediately after enjoining his audience to follow the laws of Truth, which are also 
the laws of the heart, Piers warns them to “be war þanne of Wraþþe, þat wykkide shrewe / 
For he haþ enuye to Hym þat in þin herte sitteþ” (A.VI.95–96). In this unsettling reversal, the 
A-text for the first time explicitly personifies anger. The poem’s audience can no longer 
write wrath off as a mere characteristic of Envy; in Passus VI, envy becomes an attribute of 
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Wrath. Piers’ warning implies that wrath has the capacity to disrupt the subject’s internal 
communion with Truth. Otherwise, why would his audience need to “be war”? In this vein, 
the Plowman goes on to delineate the manner in which anger can initiate a devastating fall 
from grace:  
[Wraþþe] pokiþ forþ pride to preise þiselue.  
Þe boldnesse of þi biefait makiþ þe blynd þanne,  
And so worst þou dryuen out as dew & þe dore closid, 
Ikeiȝid & ycliket to kepe þe þeroute  
Happily an hundrit wynter er þou eft entre. (A.VI.97–101)  
The intrusion of Wrath into Piers’ allegory is likened to the onset of a spiritual blindness that 
tragically obscures the subject’s “moral compass.” Piers’ precautionary allegation against 
wrath echoes Gregory the Great’s warning that “per iram, inquit, lux veritatis amittitur, quia 
cum iracundia confusionis tenebras menti incutit, huic Deus radium sue cognicionis ab-
scondit” (qtd. in Fasciculus morum II.ii.11–13; “through wrath the light of truth is lost, for 
when anger injects the darkness of confusion into the mind, God withholds from it the ray of 
his knowledge,” 119). For both Gregory and Piers, anger is not simply a fallible mode of 
moral judgment, but a threat to the subject’s God-given contemplative faculties.     
According to Joseph S. Wittig’s Concordance, Kane’s A-text contains about twenty-
three words for anger ("angre," "wraþþe,” “tene,” “yre” and their respective cognates).34 Of 
these, four refer to celestial anger—that of St. Truth, Do-Wel, or, in one case, an angel—ten 
refer to anger felt by a character within the narrative (of these, four are directed at Lady 
Mede and two are instances of Piers Plowman’s “pure tene”), five refer to the personified 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 None of these “anger words” has a stable “moral hue.” Each can be used to describe 
righteous anger and sinful anger. Their context determines their morality.  
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Envy, three are used in general injunctions to eschew wrath and one appears in an account of 
how it arises from willful behavior (Wisdom tells Wrong “Whoso werchiþ be wil wraþþe 
makiþ ofte” A.IV.56).35 Although Langland’s theology of anger is substantially complicated 
by the B- and C-texts, this “mixed bag” of usages clearly registers a profound ambivalence 
towards anger, already apparent in the A-text. After all, Langland may have omitted Wrath in 
the Confession Scene in an effort to render his violent incursion in Passus VI all the more 
shocking. Whatever his intentions, no complete version of Piers Plowman unequivocally en-
dorses the notion that anger cannot sin, although certain passages, taken out of context, ap-
pear to do just that. Just as the Parson’s contention that righteous anger is “bet than pley” is 
ironized by the recurrent laudations of “pley” throughout The Canterbury Tales (Fradenburg, 
Sacrifice Your Love 35), Wrath’s unexpected absence in Passus V is counter-balanced by his 
unexpected presence in Passus VI. Like most medieval Christian ideologues, Langland seems 
to have been, from the start, “on the fence” about anger. 
III. WRATH IN THE RISING  
Although he explicitly warns his audience to beware Wrath, Piers Plowman became thor-
oughly ensconced in the greatest outburst of public anger in English history—the Peasants’ 
Revolt of 1381. In his otherwise-Latinate account of the Rising, the Augustinian canon and 
chronicler Henry Knighton includes several snippets of Middle English prose and verse, sup-
posedly uttered by the rebel leaders, Jakke Milner, Jak Carter, Jak Trewman and John Ball. 
The text attributed to Carter famously references Langland’s Plowman as follows:  
Iakke Carter preyes ȝowe alle þat ȝe make a gode ende of þat ȝe haue begunnen and 
doþ wele and ay bettur and bettur, for at þe euen men heryeþ þe day. For if þe ende be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Wittig 28, 328, 635, 776–77. 
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wele þan is alle wele. Lat Peres þe Plowman my broþur  duelle at home and dyȝt vs 
corne. And I will go wiþ ȝowe and helpe þat y may to dyȝte ȝoure mete and ȝoure 
drynke, þat ȝe none fayle. Lokke þat Hobbe Robbyoure be wele chastysede for lesyng 
of ȝoure grace. For ȝe haue gret nede to take god wiþ ȝowe in alle ȝoure dedes. For 
nowe is tyme to be war. (fol. 174r) 
The narrator, Carter, clearly identifies with Piers, calling him “my broþur.” His Plowman is a 
pacifist, remaining patiently “at home” to “dyȝt” corn. In alluding to Langland’s character,36 
Carter aims to instill within his audience the comforting notion that, whatever might happen 
during the Rising, the archetype of the peaceful and humble yeoman farmer will live on, 
completely intact, “at home.” While Piers stays home, however, Carter proposes that he and 
his second person addressee ought to leave it in search of meat, drink and, of course, the op-
portunity to chastise “Hobbe Robbyoure,” who may or may not stand in for one of the Ris-
ing’s most famous victims, Robert Hales, Richard II’s Lord Treasurer (Astell, Political Alle-
gory 58). Unsurprisingly, many critics have detected Langland’s influence in this passage’s 
rustic imagery, its allegorical characters—Hobbe Robbyoure quite resembles Piers Plow-
man’s Robert þe Robbere (A.V.242; B.V.469; C.VII.316; Hudson, Premature Reformation 
399)—and its command to “doþ wele and ay bettur and bettur” (Justice 118–25).  
In his seminal work on the 1381 Rising, Steven Justice argues that the “Rebel Let-
ters” included in both Knighton’s Chronicle and that of Thomas Walsingham constitute acts 
of “assertive literacy”:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Although this allusion is most likely to Langland’s Piers, both Paul Freedman and Wendy 
Scase have discussed the relationship between the figure of the plowman of the Rebel Letters 
and a literary tradition of complaints against servitude dating back to the ninth century (Scase 
6; Freedman, Images 40–55). In fact, Ælfric’s Colloquy features a Plowman protesting his 
abject condition: “Magnus labor est, quia non sum liber” (“the labor is great because I am not 
free”; qtd. in Scase 6).   
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Clearly, [the letters] had to mean something more than and different from [their mani-
fest content] to be worth the writing or the reading amid the violence of insurgency. 
Writing itself—both the activity and the product—was at issue in these letters: their 
composition and copying, recomposition and recopying were so many acts of asser-
tive literacy. (24) 
I would go one step further to argue that the composition of Carter’s Letter, at least, was an 
act of assertive literary criticism. By alluding to “Peres þe Plowman,” the insurgents pro-
claimed their ability to grasp the philosophical complexities of Langland’s poem. As any 
reader of Piers Plowman will readily attest, this task requires far more of its practitioner than 
mere literacy.  
 In fact, the Rebel Letters contain another, hitherto unrecognized allusion to the A-
text. The last snippet of Middle English dissent recorded in Knighton’s chronicle—entitled 
Prima epistola iohannis balle—contains the following lyric:  
Now raigneth pride in price,  
Covetise is holden wise,  
Leacherie without shame,  
Gluttonye without blame:  
Envie raigneth with treason,  
And slouth is taken in greate season;  
God doe bote, for now is time. (fol. 174v)  
Like the A-text’s Confession Scene and Favel’s narrative map of sin, Ball’s Prima episotola 
lists six Deadly Sins, excluding wrath. It is, of course, impossible to definitively prove that 
Langland’s elision of wrath influenced Ball’s. In fact, the Prima epistola is almost entirely 
   
	  
	   48	  
derived from another source. As Rossell Hope Robbins illustrated more than fifty years ago, 
Ball’s lyric closely mirrors a Middle English complaint copied in a near-contemporary com-
monplace book:  
Now pride ys yn pris,  
Now couetyse ys wyse,  
Now lechery ys schameles,  
Now gloteny ys lawles,  
Now slewthe ys yn seson,  
In envie & wrethe ys treson;  
Now hath god enchesyn  
to dystrie thys worle by reson (Historical Poems xlii).  
Although they initially seem all but identical, Robbins argues that “[i]n these two poems, the 
distinction [between criticism and subversion] consists in a single line at the end of [Ball’s 
letter]: ‘God doe bote for nowe is time.’ Previously, many had regretted evils; Ball wanted to 
remove them” (Ibid.).  
According to Wenzel, Ball’s Prima epistola is genetically related to another lyric, 
contained in the preaching handbook of the Franciscan John Grimestone (174–98):  
Gula is samel[es]  
Luxuria is laweles  
Ira is rithfulness  
Inuidia is holiness  
Accidia is feblesse  
Superbia in prise  
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Cupiditas is holden wys. (qtd. in Wenzel, Preachers 174) 
Although Grimestone’s poem uses the Latin names for the Seven Deadly Sins, its rhetorical 
formula (sin = virtue) is quite similar to that used in the other two lyrics. Wenzel claims that 
all of these poems belong to a family of English complaint lyrics, dating back to the thir-
teenth-century (Ibid. 198). Members of this family are most frequently found in common-
place books and preaching manuals such as that of Grimestone, the Dominican John of 
Bromyard’s Summa praedicantium and the aforementioned Fasciculus morum (Ibid. 101–
02).  
Although it is unclear whether or not he ever belonged to a particular mendicant or-
der, Ball seems to have been an itinerate preacher. After paraphrasing one of Ball’s sermons, 
Jean Froissart tells us: “Enssi dissoit cils Jehans Balle et parolles semblables les diemences 
par usage, à l’issir hors des messes as vilages” (II.213.70–72; “John Ball usually preached in 
the villages on Sundays when the congregations came out from mass,” 212). Ball was, in 
short, precisely the sort of person likely to own a book such as Grimestone’s. Additionally, it 
is more than likely that he was a reader of Piers Plowman. In a sixth Rebel Letter—included 
in Walsingham’s Chronicle, but not in Knighton’s—he explicitly “biddeþ Peres Plouȝman go 
to his werk and chastise wel Hobbe þe Robbere” (fol. 287r). Unlike Carter’s Letter, Ball’s 
depicts “Peres Plouȝman” actively taking part in the chastising poor Hobbe, suggesting that 
he saw Piers as a symbol, not of passive endurance, but of radical, social action. 
As Richard Firth Green adeptly points out, Ball’s Prima epistola differs from its ana-
logues “in reversing the order of Sloth and Envy and omitting, perhaps for obvious reasons, 
Wrath altogether” (182). The A-text shares these exact particularities. Given the several 
Langlandian allusions elsewhere in the Rebel Letters, it is probable that, in composing the 
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Prima epistola, Ball adopted a standard Fransiscan complaint lyric and effectively Lang-
landized it by switching sloth and envy and deleting wrath. In a likeminded gesture, he also 
appended to his source the final lines with the phrase “god doe bote for now is time”; a revi-
sion that, according to Robbins, “turned [the original lyric] into a call for action” (Historical 
Poems xlii). Unlike its source, Ball’s lyric is not a complaint, but a suggestion. 
By interweaving Langland’s works-centered theology with a traditionally Franciscan 
strain of complaint, Ball constructed an understanding of anger far more radical than that of 
either of his sources. Somewhat ironically, it is through the exclusion of a line such as “[i]ra 
is rithfulness” that Ball implicitly places “ira” within the bounds of actual “rithfulness.” 
Where the Lanterne invalidates the phrase “iust wraþþe,” thereby rendering all “wraþþe” sin-
ful, Ball elides anger in his litany of contemporary moral-decay in order to render all 
“wraþþe” righteous. In so doing, the demagogue clearly aimed to produce a maximum of un-
inhibited, public anger—irascimini without nolite peccare. He was, needless to say, quite 
successful in this venture.     
IV. RAGE, REVOLUTION, REACTION 
Most retrospective portrayals of the 1381 riots are less than sympathetic to its participants. 
John Gower, for instance, depicts the rebels degenerating into wild beasts as their fury cre-
scendos (VC. I.184 –240). His hysterical account of the Rising portrays furious peasants (rus-
ticos) refusing to hed the prayers of mercy put forth by their innocent victims: 
Consumptis precibus furiens violencior extat 
Rusticus, et peius quod valet ipse facit. 
Sic nec aper media silua tam seuus in ira 
Fulmineo rapidos conrotat ore canes. (VC.I.1191–94) 
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(When prayers were employed, the peasant raged more violently and did the worst 
deeds that he was able to. Hence, even the wild boar, assaulting quick dogs in the 
middle of the forest, did not fulminate so much in his anger.)   
Gower’s comparison draws a sharp distinction between the choreographed violence of the 
aristocratic hunt and the anarchic, boorish rage of the insurgents. His beastialization of the 
angry rusticos is echoed by the Fasciculus morum, which describes the wrathful subject as 
“non homines, sed pocius bestie” (II.iii.30; “not a man, but a wild beast,” 120). Although the 
rebels saw themselves as zealous proponents of Truth, from Gower’s perspective their rage 
was unnatural and therefore dehumanizing. Sadly, as Paul Freedman has extensively illus-
trated, it is extremely rare to find any favorable, medieval representations of peasant anger 
(“Peasant Anger” 171–90). While the aristocratic knights of medieval romance are frequently 
animated by righteous anger, its churls generally do not experience such lofty affects. The 
insurgents of 1381 asserted more than literacy, more too than literary criticism; they asserted 
their capacity to feel righteous anger.  
That having been said, they were hardly moral relativists; time and again the sources 
depict them employing a fundamentalist rhetoric of truth. Hence, during the burning of John 
of Gaunt’s palace, the Savoy, the rebels reportedly threw a looter into the fire, “dicentes se 
zelatores ueritatis et iusticie, non fures aut latrones” (Knighton fol. 173r; “crying that they 
were men zealots for truth and justice, not thieves and robbers,” 215). The rebels seemed to 
believe that their anger provided them unmediated access to divine truth. Like Langland, 
however, they also worried about envy’s tendency to masquerade as righteous anger. “Si quis 
in aliquo furto fuerat” (“If anyone had been caught in an act of theft”), another source re-
counts, “deprehensus sine processu sine judicio ad mortem rapiebatur decapitandus” (“he 
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would have been taken off for execution without trial or verdict,” Polychronicon 9.2).37 The 
insurgents aligned themselves, in other words, with “Peres Plouȝman,” not “Hobbe þe Rob-
bere.”      
 Among the primary objects of their anger was the rapidly expanding London bureau-
cracy, which the mob blamed for both the Poll-tax and the Statute of Laborers (Rodney Hil-
ton 137–64). They were angry at government, but they were not anarchists. According to the 
otherwise Anglo-Norman Anonimalle Chronicle, when asked “With whom haldes yow?” the 
rebels identified themselves by replying “wyth kynge Richarde and wyth the trew com-
munes” (fol. 344r). While critics have debated the extent to which this “wache worde” re-
flects actual loyalty to Richard II, its presence certainly suggests that the insurgents were not 
rebelling against government-qua-government (Justice 172–73; Strohm 41–42). Sadly, it was 
their (misplaced) loyalty to the adolescent Richard at Mile End that finally caused the mob to 
disband, incorrectly believing their mission to have been accomplished (Justice 3). Accord-
ing to Green, the rebels were not progressives, but conservatives:  
Traditional complaint literature may well have been [. . .] profoundly conservative in 
outlook, [. . .] but if at the same time it helped to articulate and focus popular discon-
tent [. . .] perhaps this was because those who rallied to its call were also conserva-
tive—because they were trying to prevent a new age, not usher one in; reactionaries, 
not revolutionaries; Luddites, not Bolsheviks. (189) 
In a sense, Green is correct to characterize the rioters as more backward than forward think-
ing. After all, Walsingham recounts that during an open-air sermon at Blackheath Ball fa-
mously asked: "When Adam dalf, and Eve span, who was thanne a gentilman?” (fol. 287r).  
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Walsingham depicts in Ball the conviction that historical progress ought to follow a regres-
sive trajectory away from the feudal present, into the Prelapsarian past. Green’s claim that 
the rebels were “trying to prevent a new age, not usher one in,” however, is more dubious. In 
Walsingham’s synopsis, Ball preached that  
omnes pares creatosa natura, seruitutem per iniustam oppressionem nequam hominum 
introductam contra Dei uoluntatem; quia, si Deo placuisset seruos creasse, utique in 
principio mundi constituisset quis seruus, quisue dominus, futurus fuisset. (Ibid.) 
(all men were by nature created equal from the beginning, and that servitude had been 
introduced by the unjust and evil oppression of men, against the will of God, who, if 
it had pleased Him to create serfs, surely in the beginning of the world would have 
appointed who should be a serf and who a lord, 547).  
By likening the rise of serfdom to the fall from Eden, the “mad priest from Kent” undermines 
feudal hegemony as an unnatural evil and advocates its immediate elimination. Ball would 
have believed, of course, that humanity’s fall into original sin was reversed by Christ’s guilt-
less Passion. Accordingly, by proposing to reverse feudal stratification, he renders his own 
violent agenda messianic by analogy. If that’s not an attempt to usher in a new age, what is? 
In fact, Jean Froissart’s Chronicle depicts a downright proto-Marxist Ball, opining to 
his flock that “les coses ne poent bien aler en Engletière ne iront jusques à tant que li bien 
iront tout de commun et que il ne sera ne villains ne gentils homs, que nous ne soions tout 
ouni” (II.212.42–45; “things can’t go right in England and never will, until goods are held in 
common and there are no more villeins and gentlefolk, but we are one and the same,” 212). 
Further, according to Walsingham, the sermon at Blackheath ended with Ball urging his au-
dience  
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essent uiri cordati, et amore boni patrisfamilias excolentis agrum suum, et extirpantis 
ac resecantis noxia gramina que fruges solen opprimere, et ipsi in presenti facere fes-
tinarent. Primo, maiores regni dominos occidendo, deinde iuridicos, iusticiarios, et iu-
ratores patrie, perimendo, postremo quoscunque scirent in posterum comunitati noci-
uos, tollerent de terra sua. (fol. 287 r)  
(to be men of courage, and out of love for their virtuous fathers who had tilled their 
land, and pulled up and cut down the noxious weeds which usually choke the crops, 
to make haste themselves at that present time to do the same. They must do this first, 
by killing the most powerful of the lords of the realm, then by slaying the lawyers, 
justiciars and jurors of the land, and finally by weeding out from their land any that 
they knew would in the future be harmful to the commonwealth, 547). 
With a truly Langlandian flare, Ball allegorizes his audience as virtuous tillers of the land. 
With a patently un-Langlandian polemical tone, however, he calls for the “weeding out” (tol-
lerent de terra sua) of any potential threats to his project of social demolition. These are 
hardly the words of a proponent of social stasis.  
Unlike Langland, Ball was a thoroughgoing revolutionary. His sadistic fantasy of 
“slaying the lawyers, justiciars and jurors of the land” is driven by an overarching desire to 
destroy and re-form law. As Jacques Derrida notes, however, “the word ‘revolutionary’ [. . .] 
also includes the sense ‘reactionary’—that is, the sense of return to the past of a purer origin” 
(“Force of Law” 281). If Ball advocated violence to human law, he did so for the sake of an 
unchanging divine Law. However radical Ball may have been, in his desire to return to an 
Edenic state of equality, he was also, in a very real sense, conservative. He was, to modify 
Green’s statement, both revolutionary and conservative, both Bolshevik and Luddite. Like-
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wise, the Rising itself was both a revolutionary social movement and a murderous riot, engi-
neered by a few savvy rhetoricians with a knack for capitalizing on popular discontent. While 
the rebels utilized and altered popular theological principles in order to assert their capacity 
for independent feeling and thought, their actions ultimately contributed to the institutional 
stigmatization of speculative theology that steadily progressed throughout England over the 
next four decades (Justice 193–208). Indeed, the Blackfriars’ Council that officially con-
demned Wycliffe’s teachings as heterodox was held in 1382, hot on the rising’s heels.38 If 
John Ball ushered in a new age, it was certainly not the one he had hoped for.  
V. WRATH REVISED 
When Wrath finally does rear his ugly head in the Confession Scene of the B- and C-texts, he 
flaunts his ubiquity. Although he initially identifies as a particular mendicant—“I was som 
tyme a frere” (B.V.138)—he immediately re-presents himself as “the Couentes Gardyner,” 
an abstract agent capable of “grafting” dishonesty onto friars: “On lymitoures and listres 
lesynges I ymped/ Til þei beere leues of lowe speche lordes to plese” (B.V.139). The “leues 
of lowe speche” that the friars speak (or sprout) ultimately contribute to their well-known 
ecclesiastical rivalry with localized parsons: “And now persons han parceyued þat freres 
parte wiþ hem/ Thise possessioneres preche and depravue freres / And freres fyndeþ hem in 
defaute, as folke bereþ witnes” (B.V.145–46). Thus Wrath exploits the mobility and influ-
ence of the mendicant orders, thereby sowing discord throughout Christendom. As an ideo-
logue—“I, Wraþ, walke wiþ hem and wisse hem of my bokes” (B.V.148)—he corrupts his 
victims intellectually, causing them to “speken of spiritualté þat eiþer despiseþ ooþer” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For a comprehensive timeline detailing the steady increase in theological censorship that 
took place in England during the decades following the Rising, see Kerby-Fulton xli–li. See 
also, Watson, “Censorship and Cultural Change.” 
   
	  
	   56	  
(B.V.150). Not unlike John Ball, Wrath weaponizes the “spiritualté” found in “bokes” in an 
effort to incite social antagonism.  
Significantly, the only place that Wrath meets any resistance is the monastery 
(B.V.174–77). Like Augustine’s Ordo monasterii, Wrath’s confession suggests that strict, 
institutional regulation keeps antipathy at bay (Gillete 92–103).  As we have seen, Wrath’s 
pregnant-absence from the A-text’s Confession Scene could potentially be read as a call to 
social action. Conversely, his confessions in the B- and C-texts suggest that social interaction 
renders the subject vulnerable to sinful anger. Through Wrath’s sociopathic confession, then, 
the B- and C-texts of Piers Plowman promote, not revolutionary violence, but an ethics of 
ascetic withdrawal. 
Wrath’s ability to ventriloquize his victims threateningly blurs the borders of identity. 
In fact, at the apex of his absolution, the B-text conflates Wrath’s identity with that of the 
Dreamer: “‘Esto sobrius!’ he [Repentance] seyde, and assoilled me after / And bad me wilne 
to wepe, my wikkednesse to amende” (B.V.186–87). Although the C-text corrects this slip—
replacing the aberrant first-person pronouns “me” and “myn” with “hym” and “his”—B-text 
manuscripts consistently collapse Wrath into the Dreamer (C.VI.168–69).39 Perhaps this 
chain of displaced identity—connecting Langland to Wrath via the Dreamer—reflects an au-
thorial anxiety that Piers Plowman itself could potentially act as Wrath’s conduit. Indeed, 
Wrath never reveals to his audience exactly which “bokes” he reads to his followers.           
If Langland was anxious about Piers Plowman’s capacity to promulgate wrath, he 
was right to be. Despite the poet’s ambivalence regarding anger’s juridical efficacy, the fig-
ure of Piers Plowman was highjacked by fundamentalists who lacked his cautious reserva-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 According to Elizabeth Robertson and Stephen H.A. Shepherd’s edition of the B-text: 
“The first-person pronouns here [. . .] are clearly present in the manuscripts” (73, n. 8).   
   
	  
	   57	  
tions. A great deal of ink has been spilled on the seemingly reactionary revisions that he 
made to the C-text in the wake of the 1381 revolt (Hudson, “A Problem Revisited”; Justice 
240–44). Unsurprisingly, much of this criticism has revolved around the poet’s most 
(in)famous treatment of righteous anger: the Pardon-Tearing Scene.40 In both the A- and B-
texts, Langland’s eponymous Plowman angrily tears apart a pardon granted to him by “St. 
Truth.” Although the Dreamer initially refers to the document as a pardon a poena et a culpa 
(from guilt and punishment)—thus rendering it substantially more powerful than any actual 
indulgence (Minnis 68–89)—when the material text is unveiled, it turns out to contain noth-
ing more than “Verse 41” of the Athanasian Creed: “Et qui bona egerunt ibunt in vitam eter-
nam; / Qui vero mala in ignem eternum” (“And they that have done good shall go into life 
everlasting; / they that have done evil, into everlasting fire,” A.VIII.95–96; B.VII.113–114). 
Despite the seemingly uncontroversial nature of this statement, upon reading the document 
Piers “for pure tene” pulls it “assondir” (A.VIII.101; B.VII.119).  
After tearing the pardon, the Plowman recites Psalms 23.4—“si ambulauero in medio 
umbre mortis / non timebo mala; quoniam tu mecum es” (“even though I walk through the 
valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, because you are with me”)—and announces 
his imminent withdrawal from pedestrian life:  
“I shal cessen of my sowyng,” quod Piers, “& swynke noȝt so harde,  
Ne aboute my bilyue so besy be na moore;   
Of preieres & of penaunce my plouȝ shal ben hereafter,  
And wepen whan I sholde werche, thouȝ whete breed me faille.’ (B.VII.120–25)41  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 For influential readings of the Pardon-Tearing Scene, see Woolf, Schroeder, Adams, 
Steiner 109–55 and Minnis.  
41 cf. A.VIII.102–07. 
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By exchanging manual labor for prayers and penance the now-ex-Plowman abandons the vita 
activa for the vita contemplativa. In its cataclysmic impact on both Piers’ character-arc and 
Langland’s poem as a whole—Piers’ ensuing argument with the Priest wakes the Dreamer, 
thus ending the Visio and ushering in the Vita—the Pardon-Tearing Scene possesses an un-
deniably revolutionary aspect. Piers’ “pure tene,” moreover, is clearly depicted as the affec-
tive compulsion behind his display of anti-documentary violence. Since the Middle English 
noun “tene” can mean anger, shame, insult, physical harm, anxiety, lovesickness or defeat, 
however, the exact nature of Piers’ vexation is ambiguous. Although the adjective “pure” ac-
centuates the affect’s influence on Piers’ actions, it remains unclear exactly what purity caus-
es him to tear the pardon. To make matters worse, the content of the document he destroys is 
undeniably dogmatic and supposedly issued by Truth himself.  
For over a century, critics have debated the significance of the Pardon-Tearing Scene. 
Some read the episode as a poignant satire of the “cheap grace” offered through the sale of 
indulgences (Frank 28–29). Others marshal it as evidence of Langland’s semi-Pelagian ten-
dency to emphasize the role of good works in Catholic soteriology (Adams 369). Still others 
read Piers’ “pure tene” not as righteous anger, but as misguided frustration with the Priest’s 
learned and valid sentiments (Lawlor 70–84). While these modes of reading the passage pos-
sess some virtue, they are all too bent on explaining why Piers does violence to such a seem-
ingly harmless document to fully appreciate the fact that the scene’s gravitas stems from its 
ambiguity (Smith 39). More satisfying is Rosemary Woolf’s suggestion that Piers’ act of 
tearing the pardon is not necessarily tantamount to a rejection of its validity, but instead my-
thologizes the historic shift from Judaic legalism to Christian mercy:  
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the traditional allegory of Church and Synagogue [. . .] when represented iconograph-
ically, Church on the right side of the Cross holds a chalice into which flows the 
blood from Christ’s side, whilst on the left side stands Synangogue from whose hands 
fall the tablets of the law. This analogy is helpful because it shows that there was 
nothing doctrinally repugnant in demonstrating in artistic form the dispossession of 
the Old Law under the New Dispensation. That the Ten Commandments fall from the 
hands of Synagogue does not mean that they are not binding on the Christian [. . .]. 
Similarly the text from the Athanasian Creed can be torn up without its validity in 
other contexts being questioned. (74) 
If Woolf is correct in reading the Pardon-Tearing Scene as mythic recapitulation of “the dis-
possession of the Old Law under the New Dispensation,” the violence that Piers does to the 
pardon is indisputably analogous to that done to Christ’s body during the Passion. While 
such an analogy might strike modern readers as odd, Emily Steiner has recently illustrated 
that late medieval, English poets frequently employed documentary metaphors to dramatize 
soteriological history. In fact, the various versions of the Charter of Christ, a Middle English 
lyric popular in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, depict Christ’s mutilated body as a le-
gal document (chirographum Dei) that is only validated when torn (Steiner 193–94). 
 Following Woolf, Mary Carruthers reads the Pardon-Tearing Scene as a typological 
rendition of Moses destroying the tablets containing the Ten Commandments in Exodus 
32.19: “Cumque appropinquasset ad castra, vidit vitulum, et choros: iratusque valde, projecit 
de manu tabulas, et confregit eas ad radicem montis” (“As soon as he came near the camp 
and saw the calf and the dancing, Moses’ anger burned hot and he threw the tablets from his 
hands and broke them at the foot of the mountain”). According to Carruthers, Piers’ anger is 
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not directed at the content of the pardon, since Moses is angry, not at the tablets that he 
breaks, but at the idolatry practiced by the Israelites in his absence. In other words, the Par-
don-Tearing Scene references a historic misdirection of anger: although Moses’ is frustrated 
by idol-worship, his destruction of the tablets is not properly iconoclastic, since he destroys a 
valid signification of celestial law. As Fradenburg puts it: “Mount Sinai is given to us as a 
revolution in the history of the signifier” (“Making, Mourning, and the Love of Idols” 31). 
Despite the fact that Moses reveres the God-given message written on the tablets, he is furi-
ous with the with the signifier’s capacity to detract glory from a divine referent. Importantly, 
Fradenburg elucidates that both extremes of Moses’ love-hate relationship with the signifier 
involve enjoyment. Although Moses and Piers are angry at the injustices around them, the 
discomfort of anger is sated by their violent outbursts (Ibid). 
Expanding upon Carruthers’ typological analysis of the Pardon-Tearing Scene, Stei-
ner argues that Piers’ rending of the pardon refers on a literal level to a common late medie-
val legal ceremony in which a “notary or scribe would ceremoniously rip or, more common-
ly, cut an indenture in half and distribute the parts to the legal actors” and on an anagogical 
level to the separation of sheep from goats on Doomsday (which is also known as the Day of 
Wrath), to which it’s content refers (“qui bona egerunt ibunt in vitam eternam; / Qui vero 
mala in ignem eternum,” Steiner 140–41). Further, like Abraham’s aborted sacrifice of Isaac, 
medieval exegetes commonly read Moses’ breaking of the tablets as prefiguring God-the-
Father’s sacrifice of Christ (Holloway 195). The Pardon-Tearing Scene, therefore, inserts it-
self within an extant web of analogous historic moments of revolutionary violence: Abra-
ham’s would-be sacrifice, Moses’ destruction of the tablets, Christ’s death and “the Day of 
Wrath.” In so doing, it also evokes violent rituals, such as the ceremonious tearing of inden-
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tures, or the liturgical rending of the host at mass (Steiner 140). While the Pardon-Tearing 
Scene does not unilaterally allegorize any of these violent moments, it cannot help but refer-
ence them all.         
Whatever Langland’s reasons for creating the Pardon-Tearing Scene, he ultimately 
excised it from the C-text. This is most likely due to the fact that the 60,000 Rebels who in-
vaded London in June of 1381 demonstrated an unabashed enmity towards documentary cul-
ture that was uncomfortably similar to that of the poet’s Plowman (Justice 240). As both Jus-
tice and Susan Crane illustrate, “all the sources [concerned with the rising], chronicles and 
indictments alike, agree that the seizure and destruction of documents happened wherever 
rebellion did” (Justice 40; Crane 204–10). Given Piers Plowman’s influence on the Rebel 
Letters and the fact that their appropriations of Langland’s poem tend to be, as Justice puts it, 
“willful, at least tangential to and mostly at odds with Langland’s purpose” (111), it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that at least some of the insurgents consciously re-enacted the Par-
don-Tearing Scene in their many acts of anti-documentary violence. Although the scene itself 
hardly constitutes an explicit call for violent upheaval, the rebels nonetheless imitated the 
violence depicted therein, thereby appropriating the righteousness not only of Moses, but also 
of God himself. 
“Iconoclasm,” for Fradenburg, “is as much a mode of enjoyment as iconophilia; the 
desublimation of artefacts [. . .] can produce the jouissance of mass fusion just as easily as 
their sublimation in worship” (35). Although, anger and enjoyment initially strike us as less 
than compatible, I would argue that the rage shared by the rebels of 1381 was comparable to 
the “jouissance of mass fusion” that Fradenburg describes. Through their imitatio Petri, the 
Rebels were doing something very radical indeed: they were enjoying angry acts of violence 
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within the doctrinal confines of a theology centered on non-violent passivity. Unlike the lit-
urgy surrounding the Eucharist, which evokes the Passion through an extremely regulated 
ritual (Rubin 49–63), the rebels actualized the sacred violence at the core of the Christian tra-
dition within the socio-political sphere. In their many acts of iconoclasm they performed and 
re-performed, not Christ’s passive endurance, but the violence done to his body during the 
crucifixion. In this light, it is not difficult to understand why Langland cut the Pardon-
Tearing Scene out of the C-text: in (mis)reading it, the rebels stood “affective piety” on its 
head, so to speak. 
 Somewhat ironically, Langland violated his own text in an effort to disassociate it 
from the many acts of anti-documentary violence perpetrated during the Rising. In omitting 
Piers’ anger, however, the C-text recalls the two junctures in the A-text at which wrath is left 
conspicuously absent. In other words, while Langland’s censorship of the C-text is reaction-
ary in every sense of the word, it also subtly alludes to the very radical sections of the A-text 
that Ball’s Prima epistola misappropriated in order to provoke the Rising in the first place. In 
so doing, the C-text both evokes and eschews Piers Plowman’s influence on the Rising. Alt-
hough Langland’s bowdlerization of the C-text is clearly tantamount to a condemnation of 
the anti-documentary violence perpetrated during the Rising, it is unlikely that he expected 
such a minor revision to completely eradicate, or even repress, his poem’s causal influence 
on that event from English cultural memory. It is much more likely that Langland intended 
the pardon-tearing’s absence to directly signify his newfound cautiousness regarding icono-
clastic violence. Further, by de-radicalizing the C-text in the precise manner that he radical-
ized the A-text, Langland rendered visible to his audience the exact means by which the re-
bels exploited his poem in pursuit of their own violent ends. Even as it dissociates Piers 
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Plowman from the Rising, therefore, the C-text’s pregnant aporia monumentalizes the some-
what tragic manner in which radical discourse produces its own reactionary censor.  
VI. RETHINKING AFFECTIVE PIETY  
According to Aristotle’s definition, anger is always comprised of a vengeful desire to inflict 
reciprocal suffering on another. Anger is, therefore, patently other than compassion, which 
seeks to partake in the suffering of the other. As Sarah McNamer has illustrated, the Chris-
tian ideology of compassion—“cum + patior,” “to suffer with”—is rooted in the premodern, 
gendered practice of meditating on Christ’s Passion (Affective Meditation 11). At present, the 
scholarly term “affective piety” is used to refer almost exclusively to compassionate piety. 
Unsurprisingly, practitioners of compassionate piety, in their zealous empathy, tend to op-
pose themselves to antagonistic affects such as anger.  
Julian of Norwich, for example, adamantly refuses to attribute anger to the Godhead: 
“I saw no manner of wrath in God, neither for shorte time nor for longe, for sothly, as to my 
syte, if God might be wroth a touch we shuld neither have life, ne stede, ne being” 
(RL.49.11–14). Ever the Neo-Platonist, Julian insists that, since it is contrary to peace and 
love, wrath must therefore be contrary to God: “wrath and frienshippe, be two contraries. For 
he that wastith and destroyeth our wrath, and maketh us meke and milde, it behoveth nedes to 
be that he be ever one in love, meke and mildd, which is contrarious to wrath” (RL.49.8–10). 
There is an undeniable difference between the ethics of compassion endorsed by Julian and 
the rhetoric of rage that Ball proliferated. Both, however, participate in the tradition of imita-
tio Christi. While compassionate piety calls for the imitation of Christ’s Passion, the theolo-
gy of anger endorsed by Ball attempts to recuperate a more active, even violent, Christ; the 
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Christ who zealously proclaims in Matthew 10.34 “non veni pacem mittere, sed gladium” (“I 
have not come to bring peace, but a sword”).  
CODA: ON POSTMEDIEVAL ANGER 
In her astute essay, “American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neocoservatism and De-
Democritization,” Wendy Brown argues that, in an effort to mass-produce docile citizens, 
uninterested in performing the “legwork” necessary to maintain a liberal democracy, the 
American right employs two distinct political rationalities: neoliberal economic policy, 
which fetishizes individual liberty (often at the expense of morality) and neoconservatism, 
which champions the state’s duty to regulate morality, both at home and abroad. Since she 
published this essay in 2006, at the height of George W. Bush’s second presidential term, 
Brown’s alarmism is understandable. Despite the fact that both neoliberalism and neocon-
servatism remain very much with us today, however, the American public has been anything 
but apolitical during the six years separating 2006 from the present. 
In fact, the Democratic Party’s sweeping triumph in the 2006, midterm elections was 
largely fueled by bottom-up, grassroots activism, as was Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential 
bid. Although these landmark victories gave the Democrats control of the White House, 
Congress and the Senate, they also provoked an oppositional, populist backlash from the far 
right. On February 19, 2009, less than a month after Obama’s term officially began, CNBC 
reporter Rick Santelli launched into an irate, on-air diatribe against the President’s Home 
Owner Affordability and Stability Plan, which allocated $75 billion dollars to help up to 9 
million homeowners avoid foreclosure on ill-advised mortgages. A true neoliberal, Santelli 
complained that the plan “rewarded bad behavior,” calling Americans who purchased high-
risk mortgages “losers,” unworthy of taxpayer support. During his harangue, Santelli pro-
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posed, in an ostensibly offhand manner, that Chicago have a “Tea Party,” protesting the un-
fair tax-hike that would supposedly result from Obama’s reckless spending. Although it is 
impossible to determine how spontaneous or premeditated Santelli’s rant actually was, his 
allusion to our country’s initial, iconic eschewal of British rule struck a profound chord with 
a substantial cross-section of the American public. Within days of Santelli’s rant, agitated 
conservatives nationwide began organizing email lists, facebook groups, private meetings 
and public protests, all in the newly minted name of the Tea Party (Skopcal and Williamson 
1–13).   
 Since 2009, the Tea Party has developed into one of the most influential populist 
movements in recent U.S. history. Of course, grassroots activism is not solely responsible for 
its meteoric rise to political prominence. From its conception, the movement has been subsi-
dized by older, wealthier national advocacy organizations such as FreedomWorks, which is 
chaired by the former Republican House Majority Leader Dick Armey (Ibid. 11). Citing such 
advantages, Nancy Pelosi and other Democrats are quick to deride the Tea Party movement 
as “Astroturf,” in that it claims to have grass roots, but actually does not. However rhetorical-
ly delightful, Pelosi’s metaphor is not entirely fair to the thousands of Tea Partiers nation-
wide who continue to zealously engage in bottom-up activism on a regular basis. Tea Partiers 
rally around their common distrust of the Obama administration, abhorrence of the welfare 
state and quasi-Evangelical reverence for America’s founding documents. More than any-
thing, they share the fervent belief that America is currently moving in the wrong direction: 
away from the egalitarian principles on which it was founded and towards a dismal collapse, 
either into ruinous socialism or all out anarchy. In this, they are clearly indebted to a long-
standing rhetorical tradition, which Sacvan Bercovitch calls “the American jeremiad.” The 
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jeremiad, or political sermon, takes its name from the Biblical prophet Jeremiah, who had 
something of a penchant for critiquing contemporary moral decay. America’s earliest Purtian 
settlers appropriated the jeremiad in order to glorify their separatist endeavor and prevent 
themselves from backsliding on their theocratic principles. Bercovitch argues that, unlike the 
older, European jeremiad—which heaps scorn on a hopelessly static society, perpetually fall-
ing out of God’s favor—the American jeremiad hopefully asserts that progress can always be 
achieved, somewhat paradoxically, through a return to the religious standard on which Amer-
ica was founded. In other words, while Americans have always self-identified as “sinners in 
the hands of an angry God,” to borrow John Edwards’ chilling phrase, they have also always 
taken comfort in the fact that the ability to solicit God’s favor lies in their own hands. One 
would be hard-pressed to find a better description of the potent concoction of hope and fear 
distilled in Tea Party rhetoric.  
Hope and fear, however, are not the only emotions associated with the Tea Party. 
Since its conception, “anger” has been the emotional watchword most central to the move-
ment. In an April, 2010 poll conducted by the New York Times and CBS News, participants 
from a smattering of political affiliations were asked: “Which comes closest to your feelings 
about the way things are going in Washington—enthusiastic, satisfied but not enthusiastic, 
dissatisfied but not angry, or angry?” While only 19% of American adults self-identified as 
angry, a whopping 53% of Tea-Party Supporters did so. When these Tea Partiers were asked 
to name the object of their anger, popular responses included “government spending,” 
“healthcare reform” and “an overall lack of governmental representation.” Indeed, Tea Par-
tiers never seem to tire either of voicing their indignation at rallies or “townhall”-style meet-
ings, or of writing it on web sites, bumper stickers, t-shirts and, of course, protest signs. 
   
	  
	   67	  
Among the most prolonged and nuanced first-hand articulations of Tea Party anger on record 
is a youtube clip of the Evangelical radio personality Rose Tennant literally sacralizing anti-
governmental anger at the “Official Pittsburg Tax Day Tea Party” on April 15, 2010: 
The left just hates what’s been happening [i.e., the rise of the Tea Party movement] 
and they’ve taken to namecalling. Right? The most recent criticism: we’re an angry 
mob. Turn around, do we look like an angry mob to you. [At this point, a male mem-
ber of the crowd yells “Yeah”]. We’re being criticized for our anger; make no mis-
take about this. And it scares them. And it scares them not because they honestly be-
lieve we’re going to spit on someone, or because we’ve yelled out a derogatory slur, 
or that we wish them bodily harm, not because they believe we would do any of those 
things, because you know what, they know that we don’t. They know that we make 
them uncomfortable in their town hall meetings. They know we just might show up in 
Washington, at their office. That is what they know and that is what they’re afraid of. 
They know that we’re not going to take it anymore. So don’t let them in their fear to 
turn your anger into something that you should be ashamed of. Even scripture tells us 
that there is an acceptable anger. There is a distinction that’s made. There’s a thing 
called righteous anger and I think we’ve got it. When we look around us and we see 
the arrogance and the determination to destroy a nation that God has sanctioned, to 
see ourselves stripped of our God-given and constitutionally affirmed rights and liber-
ties, we’re angry. We’re angry with a righteous anger. But scripture tells us also to be 
angry and sin not and our peacable demonstrations exemplify that command. 
In this alarming new twist on the American jeremiad, Tennant highjacks the wrath of God, 
characterizing her left-leaning opponents as sinners in the hands of an angry mob. Despite 
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her jingoistic rhetoric of American exceptionalism, there is nothing exceptionally American 
about Tennant’s sentiments. I first stumbled across her tirade while doing preliminary re-
search for chapter above. Consequently, I was quite accustomed to sifting through medieval 
discussions of righteous anger, which, somewhat surprisingly, occur most frequently in long, 
didactic treatises on the Seven Deadly Sins. Among the most famous of these is Geoffrey 
Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale, which asserts that there are two manners of ire, one good and the 
other wicked. Like Tennant, the Parson supports his claim by citing Psalms 4.4, “Irascimini 
et nolite peccare,” “Be angry and do not sin,” which St. Paul echoes in Eph. 4.26. For both 
ideologues, this Scriptural double imperative is nothing less than rhetorical “pay dirt.” In just 
four words it forces its adherents into an ideo-affective straightjacket, by simultaneously de-
manding them to feel anger and stipulating that, even in anger, their actions should remain 
consonant with Christian ethics.  
Although I personally disagree with virtually all of Tennant’s political positions, I 
cannot help but appreciate her insistence on non-violent protest. By evoking the specter of 
sin in their respective discussions of righteous anger, both Tennant and the Parson attempt to 
safeguard against the violence that their rhetoric could potentially incite. Sadly, not all dema-
gogues are so responsible. As the chapter above contends, the theological concept of right-
eous anger had much more to do with the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 than has been hitherto 
recognized. Like the Tea Party, the group of roughly 60,000 insurgents who caused so much 
trouble throughout England in the early summer of 1381 was extremely heterogeneous, con-
sisting of a hodgepodge of Peasants, clerics, proto-Bourgeoisie artisans and under-paid, local 
apprentices (the graduate students of their day). Also like the Tea Party, the rebels seem to 
have been vexed at what they saw as unfair taxation and regulatory legislation. According to 
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Rodney Hilton, they were particularly incensed by their government’s continued enforcement 
of the 1351 Statute of Laborers, which froze wages and prevented rustics from relocating in 
search of better work, as well as the third instantiation of the “poll tax” (144–64). In fact, the 
Rising was sparked in late May of 1381, when Peasants in Essex vehemently refused to pay 
royal poll tax collectors. Shortly thereafter, rebels from all over England marched into Lon-
don through an unguarded gate, torched John of Gaunt’s palace the Savoy, killed lawyers and 
Flemish immigrants, and ultimately demanded that the Young King Richard II abolish feudal 
hegemony once and for all.     
Unfortunately, as Paul Freedman has demonstrated, modern scholars don’t have ac-
cess to many sympathetic, firsthand accounts of the Rising. The so-called winners write his-
tory books and the Rebels did not win. On the other hand, Steven Justice and other historians 
of the Rising suggest that a great deal can be gleaned from a series of Middle English “sound 
bites” contained in the otherwise Latinate Chronicles of Thomas Walsingham and Henry 
Knighton. According to the chroniclers, the Rebel leaders composed these so-called letters in 
order coordinate their revolutionary efforts. Among the most famous of these is John Ball’s 
above-mentioned short lyric entitled the Prima epistola Iohannis Balle:  
Now raigneth pride in price,  
Covetise is holden wise,  
Leacherie without shame,  
Gluttonye without blame:  
Envie raigneth with treason,  
And slouth is taken in greate season;  
God doe bote, for now is time. (Walsingham fol. 174v)  
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As Rossell Hope Robbins has demonstrated, this verse, supposedly composed by John Ball, 
one the Rising’s most notorious leaders, borrows heavily from an extant complaint, which 
was commonly recorded in mendicant Preachers’ handbooks such as the Fasciculus morum. 
Truly a jeremiad, the lyric rhetorically bewails the contemporary moment, complaining that, 
in its decadence, English society has come to consider Deadly Sins valuable. Unlike his 
sources, however, Ball excludes wrath from his lyric. As we have seen, Ball’s elision of 
wrath was rhetorical. By omitting wrath from his list of Seven Deadly Sins, Ball denounced, 
not English society’s excess of sinful anger, but its dearth of righteous anger. In so doing, he 
attempted to provoke a maximum outpouring of public indignation. He was, needless to say, 
quite successful in this endeavor. 
I would argue that Ball’s lyric is not only a jeremiad, but an American jeremiad, as 
defined by Bercovitch. Although he complains that society has failed to live up to the moral 
standard implicit in the Christian doctrine of sin, by appending the phrase “now it’s time” to 
the end of his source, Ball implies that revolutionary reform is not only plausible, but neces-
sary. In fact, Walsingham’s Chronicle paraphrases a sermon, supposedly delivered by Ball at 
Blackheath, in which the zealot poses to his audience the now-famous question: “Whan Ad-
am delved and Eve Span, who than was a Gentleman?” According to Walsingham, Ball elab-
orated on this theme by asserting that “all men were by nature created equal from the begin-
ning, and that servitude had been introduced by the unjust and evil oppression of men, 
against the will of God, who, if it had pleased Him to create serfs, surely in the beginning of 
the world would have appointed who should be a serf and who a lord.” In calling for a willed 
return to an idealized, prelapsarian past, Ball’s rhetoric is simultaneously revolutionary and 
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conservative. It clearly anticipates not only the American jeremiad, but also our culture’s ev-
er-enduring obsession with notions of freedom, equality and its own origin. 
Similar to that of Walsingham, Jean Froissart’s Chronicle depicts Ball opining to his 
flock “things can’t go right in England and never will, until goods are held in common and 
there are no more villeins and gentlefolk, but we are one and the same.” Unlike Bercovitch’s 
European jeremiad, Ball’s rhetoric is not meant to provoke repentant despair, but a revolu-
tionary leveling of the proverbial playing field. According to Walsingham, he urged his audi-
ence “to be men of courage, and out of love for their virtuous fathers who had tilled their 
land, and pulled up and cut down the noxious weeds which usually choke the crops, to make 
haste themselves at that present time to do the same. They must do this first, by killing the 
most powerful of the lords of the realm, then by slaying the lawyers, justiciars and jurors of 
the land, and finally by weeding out from their land any that they knew would in the future 
be harmful to the commonwealth.” Unencumbered by anxieties about wrath, Ball and his ilk 
imagined their anger as wholly God-given and their violent actions as entirely righteous. Alt-
hough the Tea Partiers, by and large, are avowedly non-violent, the line between Tennant’s 
righteous anger and that of Ball is all-too-fine. For example, in 2010, a Virginia Tea Party 
blog published what its author incorrectly thought to be the home address of Democratic 
Representative Tom Periello, a champion of Obama’s healthcare reform. In no uncertain 
terms, the blog urged Tea Partiers to stop by for a face-to-face chat with a personal touch. 
Hours after the blog was posted, the gas-line leading into Periello’s brother’s suburban home 
was intentionally severed. Thankfully, the disastrous explosion that could have resulted from 
this terrorist act did not, but the episode stands as a reminder that an exceedingly thin line 
separates political activism from violent insurgency.   
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To be clear, I don’t mean to suggest that the Tea Party is likely to enact a violent re-
volt comparable to the Rising of 1381. Nor am I claiming that the structural resemblances 
between Ball’s rhetoric and that of Tennant are particularly unique or extraordinary. I’m sure 
that one could find a John Ball doppelganger in any historical time period, if she looked hard 
enough. Instead, I am simply sharing one way that my research as a literary historian of late 
medieval England has informed my understanding of our current political situation. Studying 
the 1381 rising has taught me, above all, that righteous anger is a potentially dangerous con-
cept. Consequently, it is worth paying very close attention to the manner in which extremists 
on either side of the political spectrum are mobilizing it today. After all, we live in quite an-
gry times. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
BETTER LIVING THROUGH DREAD IN DEVOTIONAL LITERATURE AND BEYOND 
Fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. 
                                          — Psalms 110.10 
Whoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has learned the ultimate. 
                                                          — Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety   
I. TOWARDS A LONG HISTORY OF EXISTENTIAL ANXIETY 
For well over a decade, a de facto cadre of medievalists have set themselves the formidable 
task of shoring up modern philosophy’s hitherto unacknowledged debts to premodern ideo-
logies.42 The medieval roots of existential anxiety, however, have not garnered much recent 
attention. This is understandable enough. Existentialism has long since fallen out of vogue in 
philosophical circles and, colloquially, “existential anxiety” has come to signify an oft-
juvenile dissatisfaction with life’s hard truths. But before it was a stock-phrase for the brood-
ing of melancholic adolescents, existential anxiety was a hotly debated philosophical con-
cept. Intellectual historians often credit the nineteenth-century Danish philosopher Søren 
Kierkegaard as its “prime mover.” “Nobody before Kierkegaard,” the renowned Walter 
Kaufmann writes, “had seen so clearly that the freedom to make a fateful decision that may 
change our character and future breeds anxiety” (Discovering the Mind 26). Arguing against 
Kaufmann’s popular sentiment, this essay reads Kierkegaard, not as the ex nihilo inventor of 
existential anxiety, but as a modern practitioner of an ancient, dread-based asceticism. While 
existentialism’s explicators occasionally pay lip service to Kierkegaard’s premodern prede-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See, for example, Biddick; Cole and Vance; Davis; Hollywood; Holsinger; Labbie; and the 
essay-cluster on “The Medieval Turn in Theory” in The Minnesota Review 80 (2013): 80–
150.  
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cessors,43 they have expended much more effort carefully tracing and re-tracing Kierke-
gaard’s influence on Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology and their combined influence on 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism.44 According to countless histories of Western philosophy, 
these three modern philosophers initiated a tradition of existential inquiry that has rendered 
anxiety, according to Louis Dupré, “one of the principal categories through which our epoch 
has come to understand itself” (111). Consequently, intellectual historians often diagnose the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries as particularly anxious. For example, the editors of Phi-
losophy’s Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking posit: “In the nineteenth century, the 
affective dimension of philosophy seems to shift away from the optimism of the enlighten-
ment into a new philosophical state of mind: the mood of anxiety” (8). Whether or not West-
ern philosophy’s mood swung from optimism to anxiety in the nineteenth century, Kierke-
gaard, Heidegger and Sartre themselves would surely have disagreed with this claim since 
they uniformly bewailed a dearth of philosophical anxiety in their own times, complaining 
that, for the most part, their contemporaries fled anxiety at every turn.45  
This chapter examines a wide range of Middle English devotional literature alongside 
some canonical works of modern existentialism in order to argue that Kierkegaard and the 
existentialists who followed him participated in a Judeo-Christian tradition of dread-based 
asceticism, the popularity of which had dwindled, but never completely vanished, since the 
Middle Ages. For Michel Foucault, “asceticism” refers to “the more or less coordinated en-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See, for example, Barrett, William 69–148; and Barrett, Lee 29–112. 
44 See, for example, Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre; Ussher; Moyn and 
Magurshak. 
45 For Kierkegaard, see The Concept of Anxiety 157. See also Grøn 152–64; for Heidegger, 
see Being and Time 234–35; for Sartre, see “Existentialism is a Humanism” 350–51.  
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semble of exercises that are available, recommended or even obligatory [. . .] in a moral, 
philosophical or religious system in order to reach a definite spiritual objective” (398). Ac-
cording to Foucault’s definition, modern existentialists were certainly ascetics. I would ar-
gue, moreover, that premodern ascetics were existentialists insofar as they championed intro-
spective analysis and attributed authenticity to ostensibly negative emotions like dread and 
despair. By beginning to consider premodern ascetics as early existentialists and modern ex-
istentialists as latter-day ascetics, we begin to write the long history of existential anxiety as 
an ascetic tradition built around the ethical goal of living better through dread. 
II. DREADING WELL IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 
Extant Middle English sermons, confession manuals, allegorical poems, dramas and polem-
ics suggest that medieval England was home to a host of interacting, overlapping and at times 
competing dread-based “emotional communities” (i.e. “social groups whose members adhere 
to the same valuation of emotions and their expression”) (1). Sarah McNamer has recently 
shown that many Middle English devotional texts functioned as “emotion scripts”—“the 
loosely affiliated cultural prescripts that aid in establishing and maintaining [. . .] ‘emotional 
communities’”—designed to facilitate deliberate performances of devout compassion (11–
14). In what follows, I examine Middle English devotional texts that act as “emotion scripts” 
designed to solicit a certain kind of dread. Indeed, St. Anselm of Canterbury—(too) often 
considered the father of affective piety46—wrote a meditation to stir up fear that was fre-
quently translated into Middle English and is even cited by Chaucer’s Parson to describe the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 McNamer convincingly argues “affective meditation originally was a woman’s genre” 18, 
86–115. 
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“anguish” of hell (The Canterbury Tales 10.169).47 As we will see, however, medieval 
preachers did not simply regale the laity with vivid depictions of fire and brimstone in an ef-
fort to stir up fear; they also imparted to their audience an elaborate ascetic program for dis-
tinguishing between the bad and good fears, eschewing the former and performing the latter.  
From the earliest books of the Hebrew Bible, Judeo-Christian theology mandates a 
dreadful asceticism (Sherwin 246). Hebrew scripture renders “fear of the Lord” (yirat Ado-
nai) an integral component of the proper affective posture towards God: “The fear of the 
Lord is clean, enduring forever” (Ps. 18.10). In addition to demanding fear of the Lord in 
stark imperatives,48 a host of Psalms and Proverbs align it with spiritual ideals like obedience 
and wisdom.49 Throughout Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, Christian theologians con-
sidered fear of the Lord one of the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit. Deriving from Isaiah 11.2–
3, the Gifts—wisdom, understanding, counsel, strength, knowledge, piety and fear of the 
Lord— enumerate the benefits that Christians receive from God’s worldly presence (Stroud 
21–41). Patristic exegetes including Augustine of Hippo (On the Sermon on the Mount 27) 
and Gregory I (320), and, later, scholastic theologians like Bonaventure of Bagnoregio (17) 
and Thomas Aquinas (I-II, q. 68, a. 7, reply to Objection 2) cite Ps. 110.10 (“the fear of the 
Lord is the beginning of wisdom”) to justify organizing the gifts into an ascending trajectory, 
beginning at the end of the Biblical list, with the fear of the Lord, and ending at its beginning, 
with wisdom. Their writings on the Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost were widely translated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 For Anselm’s Meditatio ad concitandum timorem, see Anselm 221–24. For a discussion of 
the Middle English translations of Anselm’s text, including Chaucer’s, see Haewaerts 258–
69.  
48 See, for example, Lev. 25.17, Deut. 10.12–20, Josh 24.14.  
49 See, for example, Prov. 1.7, 9.10, Ecclus. 1.16–20. 
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into Middle English confession manuals, sermons and lyrics during the church’s early thir-
teenth-century push to catechize the laity.50 A Middle English confession manual known as 
The Book of Vices and Virtues, for example, depicts the gift of dread as the deus ex machina 
through which the Holy Spirit initiates the process of salvation by waking the subject from 
“the sleep of sin” (126–27). The famous hermit Richard Rolle, on the other hand, flouts scho-
lastic tradition and follows the Biblical order in placing dread of God last in his Middle Eng-
lish treatise on the Seven Gifts, thereby rendering fear of God, not merely an early stage of 
spiritual maturation to be transcended and left behind, but also a lasting emotional engine for 
producing ethical behavior: “The fear of God consists in preventing us from returning to our 
sin through any evil enticement; and it is then that fear, holy fear, is perfected in us when we 
may be afraid of angering God by the smallest sin which we may be aware of, and run from it 
as poison [venyme]” (19).51 For Rolle, dread is educative and ethical—it teaches us to flee 
sin. Likewise, the A-text of the popular Middle English dream vision Piers Plowman depicts 
an allegorical representation of wit musing: “For dread men do the better; dread is such a 
teacher [maister] / That makes men meek and mild in their speech, / And all gentle [kynde] 
scholars to learn at school” (10.82–84).   
Like the Hebrew Bible, the Christian New Testament tells its reader how to dread. 
“Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul,” Christ commands, “but 
rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell” (Matthew 10.28).52 Parts of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The production of Middle English devotional literature flourished in the wake of 1281’s 
Council of Lambeth, at which John Peckham, Archbishop of Canterbury mandated that 
parish priests catechize their flock at least four times a year (Woods and Copeland 397). 
51 For the ease of the general reader, I’ve modernized most Middle English terms and 
quotations. 
52 cf. Luke 12.5. 
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the New Testament, however, suggest that love ultimately overthrows fear: “There is no fear 
in love, but perfect love casts out fear because fear torments. He that fears is not made per-
fect in love” (1 John 4.18).53 Patristic exegetes like Augustine reconciled such passages with 
pro-dread passages from the Hebrew Bible, such as Ps. 18.10 (“fear of the Lord is clean, en-
during forever”) and Ps. 110.10 (“fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom”) by distin-
guishing between servile fear of God’s retribution, which is cast out by perfect love, and 
chaste fear of sundering oneself from God through sin, which endures forever (Epistle on 1 
John 516–17). While Augustine certainly prefers the latter to the former, he does not alto-
gether denounce servile fear: “the fear of God so wounds as doth the leech's knife. [. . .] It 
hurts more while he is operating upon it than it would if it were not operated upon; [. . .] but 
only that it may never hurt when the healing is effected. Then let fear occupy your heart that 
it may bring in charity” (515–16). Augustine celebrates servile fear’s therapeutic capacity to 
elicit the love that ultimately casts it out. Instead of opposing servile fear to chaste fear, he 
situates the former as the beginning of the wisdom that endures forever in the latter (515).  
 Augustine’s distinction between chaste and servile fear was extremely popular in me-
dieval devotional writing. In fact, the Wit of Piers Plowman’s B-text states: “He that dreads 
God does well; he that dreads him for love / And not for fear of vengeance thereby does bet-
ter” (9.97–98). Medieval thinkers, however, by no means limited themselves to two types of 
dread. In fact, scholastic theologians often crafted elaborate taxonomies containing up to six 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Such passages were popular in medieval ascetic texts. The early Middle English 
psychomachia Sawles Warde (contained in Anchoretic Spirituality 209–21), for example, 
depicts a mob of allegorical characters including Love of Eternal Life, Joy, Caution, Measure 
and Strength casting out fear. As they are doing so, however, Measure adds that it is very 
important that people listen to Fear and promises he “will very happily be welcomed in as 
often as Love of Life stops talking” (220–21). Thus Sawles Warde is able to enjoy the 
fantasy of a fear-free life without entirely abandoning the Judeo-Christian tradition of 
dreadful asceticism. Fear is an important educator, but periodically cast out by love.  
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(Johnson 23–65).54 Far from the sole province of university men, these Latinate catalogues of 
fear were frequently translated into Middle English, appearing not only in a variety of manu-
als for private devotion,55 but also in highly public sermons. At least three Middle English 
versions of a Latin sermon by the famously dissenting Oxford theologian John Wycliffe out-
line five or six distinct types of fear: some good, some bad, some in between. Unsurprisingly, 
given his desire to disendow the institutional church, Wycliffe’s sermon heaps a good deal of 
scorn on those who fear losing worldly property, defining servile fear as fear of losing goods 
and chaste fear as fear of God instead of the loss of goods (294–95). Its Middle English de-
scendants, however, are much more invested in pastoral pedagogy than anti-clerical polemic 
(Somerset 36–45). In fact, Helen Spenser argues that one such descendant, contained in MS. 
Bodley 95, constitutes a parish priest’s cautious retooling of a more openly separatist Middle 
English cycle based on Wycliffe’s Latin sermons (393–96).56 The analogous taxonomies of 
fear in orthodox and heterodox Middle English sermons attest to dreadful asceticism’s ubiq-
uity among late medieval England’s laity. Like a pro-freedom stance in modern American 
politics, a pro-dread stance in Middle English devotional culture was utterly uncontroversial. 
The taxonomy of fear contained in Wycliffe’s Latin sermon is translated into Middle 
English as Sermon 108 of the English Wycliffite Sermons (273–74), from which the ostensi-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 See, for example, Hugh of St. Victor 377–78, Aquinas ST II-II, q. 19, a. 2 and Wycliffe 
294. 
55 See, for example, Contemplations of Love and Dread of God 8–10.   
56 Spenser holds that the Bodley cycle’s scribe is more critical of friars imposing on priests’ 
pastoral turf than other abuses of clerical power (393–94).   
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bly orthodox Sermon 11 in Bodley 95 derives.57 Sermon 11 is entirely devoted to defining six 
types of dread. By progressing from unholy, to less holy, to holy fears, Sermon 11 prescribes 
an elaborate ascetic program for dreading well that Eric J. Johnson helpfully calls a modus 
timendi (16, 65–90). It characterizes some dreads—such as “worldly dread” (i.e. fear of 
worldly punishment for bad behavior), “manly dread” (i.e. fear of worldly punishment for 
speaking the truth) and “kindly dread” (i.e. fear of worldly punishment for loving God)—as 
categorically immoral, citing Matthew 10.28 (“fear not them which destroy the body, but him 
who can destroy both soul and body in hell”) to imply that fears of worldly violence ought to 
be repressed and fears of infernal punishment ought to be performed. It characterizes other 
types of dread—such as “bondman’s dread” (i.e. fear of God’s capacity to take all that he has 
given) and “beginning dread” (i.e. fear of God, partially for his capacity to punish and par-
tially out of love)—as morally imperfect, but valuable insofar as they potentially engender 
the morally perfect “child-like dread” (i.e. fear of God only for reverent love) (23r–23v). Fol-
lowing Augustine, medieval devotees often saw “chaste” or “childlike” dread and love, not 
as mutually exclusive or contradictory emotions, but as two equally important components of 
an ideal emotional posture towards God.58 Julian of Norwich, for example, insists that equal 
measures of love and dread persist even in heaven (357–58). This utopic, loving dread ap-
pears frequently enough in the writings of career mystics and theologians like Julian.59 Ser-
mon 11 demonstrates, however, that members of England’s laity also aspired—or were ex-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 I discuss Sermon 11 rather than its analogues because it has not yet received any critical 
attention. For a brief discussion of a related six-part, Middle English taxonomy of fear in MS. 
Sidney Sussex 74, see Somerset 43–44. 
58 cf. Deut. 10.12. 
59 cf. Contemplations of Love and Dread of God 9–10. 
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pected to aspire—to dread lovingly. The five other, less valuable forms of dread that it details 
form a latter of ascent from sin to sanctity.  
Like Sermon 11, Middle English devotional dramas idealize an eschewal of worldly 
fears in favor of fear of the Lord. In popular plays like the Brome Manuscript’s Sacrifice of 
Isaac, Biblical characters exemplify proper dread. Therein, Abraham explicitly asserts that 
his dread of God trumps his horror at the prospect of killing his son: 
Forsooth, son, but if I thee kill 
I should grieve God right sore, I dread. 
It is his commandment and also his will 
That I should do this same deed. (181–84)   
Later, the angel who alleviates Abraham of his dark duty (320–21) and God himself (401–
02) praise the patriarch for dreading well. Moreover, God praises Isaac for dreading the di-
vine injunction more than his own death (409–10). Already in medieval drama, Abraham’s 
decision to fear disobeying God’s imperative more than violating his ethical obligation to 
Isaac, which Kierkegaard calls a “teleological suspension of the ethical” in Fear and Trem-
bling (83–95), stands as an exemplar both of dread’s power to inform moral decisions and the 
moral imperative to deliberately dread well. While the ostensible purpose of such Biblical 
dramas is moral edification, not all medieval moralists considered drama an appropriate me-
dium for spiritual learning. The Middle English anti-theatrical tract A Treatise on Playing 
Miracles, for example, complains that Biblical dramas do not generate, but detract from holy 
dread: “the playing and joking [bourdinge] of the most earnest works of God takes away the 
dread of God” (94). Once again, pundits on both sides of a cultural divide champion holy 
dread. On the other hand, where Sermon 11, its analogues, and The Sacrifice of Isaac are 
   
	  
	   82	  
pedagogical insofar as they impart a modus timendi, A Treatise is polemical insofar as it de-
nounces drama without offering an alternative modus timendi. 
 Likewise, the Carthusian monk Nicholas Love’s Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus 
Christ attributes the spread of heretical denigrations of the Eucharist’s efficacy to a dearth of 
“buxom dread” of God’s capacity to work marvels and a concomitant overconfidence in the 
conclusions of “bodily wit” and “natural [kyndely] reason” among the laity (225). Employing 
an ironically analogous rhetoric, the Wycliffite compendium The Lantern of Light rails 
against clergy’s “presumption,” which it defines as “a high puffing up [bolnyng] of the spirit 
without dread of God’s righteousness” (7). While Love and The Lantern’s author profoundly 
disagree about whether the laity’s “bodily wit” can muster theological reasoning, they im-
plicitly agree that all Christians ought to dread God. Indeed, most medieval devotees did, 
though they argued incessantly about how best to do so. 
III. DREAD AND DESPAIR IN THE ANCHORHOLD 
Medieval anchorites practiced an extreme form of asceticism. After being declared dead to 
the world, they were permanently walled into a small room adjacent to a church. Although 
they guardedly interacted with people from the outside world through one window and par-
ticipated in the liturgy through a porthole looking into the church, by and large, anchorites 
turned radically away from the world and devoted themselves to a rigorous process of ascetic 
self-fashioning, often involving performances of dread.60 The Ancrene Wisse, an early Mid-
dle English rule for anchoresses, encourages its audience to use fear to eschew temptation: 
Let no one who lives the life of sublimity imagine that she will not be tempted. The 
good, who have climbed up high, are more tempted than the weak; and this is natural, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 For a detailed introduction to the anchoretic lifestyle, see Nicolas Watson and Anne 
Savage’s introduction to Anchoretic Spirituality 7–32.  
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for the higher the hill, the stronger the wind on it. Since the hill of sublime and holy 
life is higher, the enemy’s blasts, the winds of temptations, are greater and stronger 
on it. If there is any anchoress who feels no temptations, she should fear greatly that 
at this very point she is being all too much and all too greatly tempted. (Anchoretic 
Spirituality 114)61 
As a dreadful “emotion script,” the Wisse asks the anchoress to re-imagine her temptations as 
strong winds that threaten to foil her spiritual ascension. It is precisely because there is a dis-
juncture between the phenomenal promise of pleasure glimpsed in temptation and the meta-
physical peril it “actually” signifies that the anchoress must take matters into her own hands 
and deliberately perform fear of temptation’s winds. Since the most dangerous type of temp-
tation is that which is not felt as such, the anchoress ought to be extremely afraid at moments 
in which she feels least tempted. In order to resist temptation, she commits to a lifelong as-
cetic program according to which both palpable temptation and a lack thereof necessitate the 
immediate production of dread. Since medieval devotees considered dread and love by no 
means mutually exclusive, however, they would not necessarily have considered a life of 
perpetual dread devoid of, or even lacking in, enjoyment.  
After detailing various internal and external temptations, the Wisse offers several 
strategies for managing them. Among these are a series of “dreadful thoughts,” all of which 
situate the anchoress in grave, physical danger: “Think what you would do if you saw the 
devil of hell standing openly in front of you and gaping wide at you, as he does secretly in 
temptation; if people cried ‘Fire! Fire!’ because the church was burning; if you heard bur-
glars breaking down your walls—these and other similar terrifying thoughts” (Anchoretic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 For the original Middle English, see Ancrene Wisse 68. 
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Spirituality 136).62 The Wisse instructs the anchoress to stamp out her unwanted desires by 
conjuring dreadful thoughts. For Linda Georgianna, early Middle English anchoretic texts, 
unlike the monastic rules on which they are modeled, tend to be “descriptive rather than pre-
scriptive” (9). Following Georgianna, Lara Farina suggests that “[t]his shift of form—from 
mandate to persuasion—can be seen as a response to the freedoms of the anchorhold. Ancho-
rites had to be primarily self-policing, and the manuals written for them sought to condition 
the anchor’s inner disposition as much as his/her outer actions” (39). From a secular perspec-
tive, the Wisse’s suggestion that jolts of deliberate fear eradicate obstacles in the anchoress’ 
pursuit of salvation might seem both sadistic and coercive. It is quite possible, however, that 
the anchoress derived a great deal of enjoyment from self-policing—sacrificing prospective, 
worldly pleasures in pursuit of an intensely erotic, enjoyment of God (Farina 38–39).63  
 The writings of England’s most famous anchoress, Julian of Norwich, evince a dis-
tinct fascination with dread marked by Julian’s characteristic desire to reconcile her mystical 
experience with her understanding of Christian doctrine. Julian’s writings are framed within 
an overarching account of an intense revelation that she experienced in 1373. She composed 
A Vision Showed to a Devout Woman (hereafter VS) shortly thereafter, while the longer A 
Revelation of Love (hereafter RL) constitutes an elaborate revision of VS, on which Julian 
may have continued working as late as 1416 (Watson, “The Composition” 637–83). Both VS 
and RL contain quadripartite taxonomies of dread including “dread of affray” (i.e. fear “that 
comes to a man suddenly by frailty”), “dread of pain” (i.e. fear of “bodily death” and “ghost-
ly enemies”), “doubtful dread”  (i.e. “a spice of despair” that doubts God’s capacity for salva-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 cf. Ancrene Wisse 92. 
63 For the enjoyment of sacrifice, see Fradenburg 12, 158. 
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tion), and “reverent dread” (i.e. a sublime fear that causes subjects “to hastily flee from all 
that is not good”).64 All of Julian’s dreads have obvious analogues in Sermon 11, as well as 
other Middle English treatises on dread and devotion such as Contemplations on the Love 
and Dread of God (8–10). On the whole, however, Julian’s treatment of most forms of dread 
is substantially less prohibitive than those found in other Middle English texts. For example, 
where RL states that dread of affray is positive insofar as it “helps to purge man as does bodi-
ly sickness and other pain that is not sin; for all such pains help man if they be patiently tak-
en” (117), Contemplations insists that “dread of man or of the world [. . .] is counted for 
naught” (8), and Sermon 11 vociferates that “they are false cowards that dread a manly 
world” (fol. 23v). Instead of making a sharp distinction between dread of death and dread of 
hellish punishment, moreover, Julian makes both sub-categories of the entirely productive 
dread of pain, which wakes the subject out of the “sleep of sin” and steers her to “seek com-
fort and mercy from God.” Echoing the tradition of initial fear, Julian posits that dread of 
pain acts as an entrance (entre), enabling the subject to have contrition through the “blissful 
touching of the Holy Ghost.”65 Rather than designating dread of pain as a Gift of the Holy 
Spirit, Julian makes it a prerequisite of any communion with the Holy Spirit, arguably plac-
ing the responsibility to fear worldly and infernal pain in pursuit of reverent dread on the sub-
ject’s shoulders.  
Although Julian’s theology is generally more accepting of worldly fears than those 
espoused by her contemporaries, she does not exclusively idealize dread. In fact, the mystic 
treats doubtful dread with marked disdain in VS: “For I am certain that God hates all doubtful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 VS: 117–19; RL: 355–59. 
65 VS: 117; RL: 355. 
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dreads, and he wills that we have them departed from us with true knowing of love” (117). 
Here, Julian—who elsewhere staunchly refuses to ascribe any anger to God (269)—baldly 
states that God hates doubtful dread and he desires that Christian subjects expel it through 
knowing love. While she does not directly specify its proper object, by calling it a “spice of 
despair,” Julian associates doubtful dread with doubt of God’s capacity to forgive sin. In the 
conclusion of VS, Julian differentiates “false dread” that “travails and tempests and troubles” 
from “reverent dread” that “softens and comforts and pleases and rests,” asserting that the 
subject must “know them both and refuse the false, right as you would a wicked spirit” (118–
19). On one hand, Julian’s injunction to suppress fears that God is unable or unwilling to dis-
pense mercy is uncharacteristically censorial. On the other, by sanctioning comfortable fears 
and forbidding tormenting ones, Julian ensures that the subject enjoys dreading God. Julian’s 
relatively scathing account of despair in VS and parts of RL is probably influenced by the 
Augustinian hermit William Flete’s Middle English psychological tract: Remedies Against 
Temptations, which treats despair as an occupational hazard, often caused by demonic inter-
vention, afflicting “religious specialists engaged in contemplative living” (Watson, “Despair” 
345). In addition to Julian, Flete’s pathological account of despair influenced a host of Mid-
dle English devotional texts including Walter Hilton’s Scale of Perfection, The Cloud of Un-
knowing and The Chastising of God’s Children (Watson, “Despair” 345). If Julian’s demon-
ization of doubtful dread is uncharacteristic, therefore, it was far from idiosyncratic.  
Unlike VS, which demands that its audience suppress fears that God is unable or un-
willing to dispense mercy, RL contains “a striking about-face from [Julian’s] earlier warning 
about doubtful dread: [in RL] even despair-inducing doubtful dread turns out to do good” 
(Banchich 339). In a subtle but crucial emendation, Julian renders God’s grace, rather than 
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the subject, responsible for transforming the bitterness of doubt into love: “Doubtful dread, 
inasmuch as it draws one to despair, God will have it turned in us into love by true knowing 
of love: that is to say, that the bitterness of doubt be turned into sweetness of kind love by 
grace. For it may never please our lord that his servants doubt in his goodness” (RL 355–56, 
my emphasis). While it maintains VS’s vituperative stance on doubtful dread, RL does not 
mandate self-censorship. As B.A. Windeatt puts it, “[t]he fuller understanding [of Julian’s 
third dread] explored in A Revelation characteristically turns upon a transformation accom-
plished by means of love, and through a realization that the two responses which seem at var-
iance with each other are in truth interrelated within us” (112). In other words, RL renders 
doubtful dread a sort of affective felix culpa, since it is destined to be transformed into know-
ing love by grace. In so doing, it flies in the face of a great deal of Middle English devotional 
literature that condemns despair outright (Watson, “Despair” 345; Snyder 23).66  
Like Augustine, Julian distinguishes useful but imperfect fears from a reverent, lov-
ing dread of deviating from divinity. Though RL does not call for the out-and-out repression 
of any class of fear, it certainly privileges reverent dread over all others: 
For there is no dread that fully pleases God in us but reverent dread, and that is full 
soft, for the more it is had, the less it is felt, for the sweetness of love. Love and dread 
are brethren, and they are rooted in us by the goodness of our maker. [. . .] And it be-
longs to us that are his servants and his children to dread him for his lordship and fa-
therhood, as it belongs to us to love him for goodness. [. . .] All dreads other than rev-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 In listing Julian as a Middle English opponent of despair, Watson and Snyder make no 
mention of the subtle shift in Julian’s discourse on despair between VS and RL acknowledged 
by Banchich and Windeatt. Watson’s important essay on despair provides an interesting 
counterpoint to my own, since he addresses the Early Modern period largely overlooked 
here. 
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erent dread that are proffered to us, though they come under the color of holiness, 
they are not so true. And hereby may they be known asunder. The dread that makes 
us hastily to flee from all that is not good and fall into our lord’s breast, as the child 
into the mother’s bosom, with all our intent and with all our mind [. . .] that dread that 
brings us into this working, its kind and gracious and good and true. And all that is 
contrarious to this, is either wrong or melded with wrong. (357)   
Julian’s loving dread, of course, owes a great deal to Augustine’s notion of chaste fear. Like 
Rolle, moreover, Julian describes holy fear as a flight, but where Rolle focuses on the ven-
omous sin from which it flees, Julian focuses on God’s matronly bosom to which it flees. For 
Julian, knowledge of God ought to inspire infinite dread of his sovereign might and love of 
his consolatory mercy. Although she insists that subjects ought to perpetually dread God’s 
fatherhood, Julian defines reverent dread as a hasty flight towards God’s motherhood. In an 
empowering short-circuit, her hermaphroditic God eternally elicits dread as (s)he simultane-
ously consoles it. Hardly felt through the love with which it is necessarily comingled, Jul-
ian’s reverent dread is, above all, comfortable dread.  
Julian’s discourse on dread, like that contained in Ancrene Wisse, is both constative 
and rhetorical: it both describes and solicits dread. As Kathryn Kerby-Fulton notes, however, 
Julian’s prose also possesses a distinctly “forensic” dimension absent from purely didactic 
tracts such as the Wisse: in addition to defining and advocating fear, Julian narrates her expe-
rience thereof (315–23). For example, the mystic records her retrospective fear of demonic 
subterfuge after experiencing a vision of Christ’s tormented face: “I was sometime in a fear 
about whether or not it was a [divinely inspired] showing. And then diverse times our Lord 
gave me more sight, whereby I understood truly that it was” (159). Julian’s fear functions as 
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an emotional call for divine consolation—a call that God readily answers. By narrating her 
own doubtful dread successfully soliciting God’s consolatory verification of her mystical ex-
perience, Julian furnishes forensic support for her theological claim that God’s grace turns 
despair into love. In doing so, she anticipates the existential philosophy of Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger and Sartre, all of whom glean authenticity in despair. 
III. DREAD IN PRAYER 
Julian’s concerns about doubtful dread are famously recorded in the mystical autobiography 
of her (in)famous contemporary Margery Kempe. In a well-known episode therein, God in-
structs Kempe to visit Julian’s anchorhold. She does and offers an account of the “many holy 
speeches and dalliances that our Lord spoke to her soul” so that Julian may determine “if 
there was any deceit in them, for the anchoress was an expert in such things” (119–20). After 
hearing Kempe recall her mystical experience, Julian advises her “to be obedient to the will 
of our Lord God and fulfill with all her might whatever he put in her soul,” provided that “it 
is not against the worship of God and profit of her fellow Christian, for, if it is, then it is not 
the moving of a good spirit, but rather of an evil sprit” (120). Both Kempe and Julian dread 
the possibility that their apparently revelatory experience is fabricated by deceit, but in so 
doing they ultimately refute its validity. By posing to themselves, each other and God the 
common accusation that their revelations are demonic rather than divine,67 they court divine 
consolation that denies that accusation before others can launch it.  
Reading more like the author of VS than that of RL, Kempe’s rendition of Julian ex-
plicitly denigrates self-doubt as follows: “A double man in soul is ever unstable and un-
steadfast in all his ways. He who constantly doubts is like the flood of the sea, which is 
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be good ones (1.10.209–10).   
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moved and born about by the wind. That man is not likely to receive the gifts of God. What 
creature that has these tokens, must steadfastly believe that the Holy Ghost dwells in his 
soul” (121). Depicting doubt as windswept water, Kempe’s Julian claims that a self-
conscious repression of doubt and a self-assured faith in the veracity of her showings will 
provide Kempe the stability necessary to continue receiving God’s gifts. Although Margery’s 
Julian evokes the possibility of demonic deceit and encourages Margery to use church doc-
trine to measure the authenticity of her revelatory data, she clearly denigrates self-doubt to 
authenticate, rather than invalidate, Kempe’s mystical experience and encourage her fellow 
mystic to trust her revelations. Neither Kempe, nor Julian wants to suppress God’s super-
egoic presence in her psyche; indeed, they draw transcendent authority therefrom. Instead, 
both women deliberately privilege their reverent dread of God’s voice over the skeptical 
dread that questions its validity.  
Scholars have recently argued that Kempe sanctifies herself by actively courting neg-
ative emotions like shame and envy: I would add dread to that list. 68 The call-and-response 
of terrestrial self-doubt and celestial reaffirmation that Julian only briefly narrates in RL con-
stitutes the veritable pulse of Kempe’s Book. Forever castigating herself and being castigated 
by others, Kempe is in constant need of Christ’s consolation, which he no less constantly 
supplies. For instance, upon rising to nation-wide prominence, Kempe is struck with a self-
conscious dread of vainglory, but is quickly emboldened by her internal Christ:  
Than she was welcomed diverse places and much was made of her. Resultantly, she 
had great dread of vainglory and was much afraid. Our merciful Lord Jesus Christ, 
worshipped be his name, said to her: “Dread not, daughter, I shall take vainglory from 
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you. For they that worship you, worship me; they that despise you, despise me and 
therefore I shall chasten them. I am in you, and you in me. They that hear you, hear 
the voice of God.” (85)  
Kempe’s anxieties about vainglory somewhat ironically allow her to assert that she speaks 
with “the voice of God.” Her dread of enjoying her mystical celebrity solicits its own nega-
tion in Christ’s consolation. Analogous conversations occur throughout the Book—over its 
course, Christ echoes the refrain “dread not daughter” no less than twenty two times. The 
frequency with which Kempe’s dread solicits Christ’s consolation suggests that she, like the 
Julian of RL, considered doubtful dread a means of authenticating revelatory experience.  
 Julian and Margery depict dread acting like a prayer that calls to God for loving con-
solation. Other Middle English devotional texts also explicate loving dread’s essential role in 
prayer. In fact, An Epistle on Prayer, a fourteenth-century treatise that may have been com-
posed by the author of The Cloud of Unknowing (Tixier 109), lists dread as an essential com-
ponent of prayer. An Epistle is an “emotion script” par excellence insofar as it imparts an 
emotion-centered ascetic program for prayer. Citing Ps. 110.10, An Epistle’s author insists 
that prayer should begin with the subject meditating on her/his imminent death, which pro-
vides her/him a “special sight of the shortness of time for amendment” that engenders a 
“working of dread” (48–49). Dread alone, however, causes “over-much heaviness” and there-
fore must be tempered by the hopeful thought that prayer can deliver one to heaven (although 
An Epistle’s author duly concedes the soteriological necessity of the sacraments) (49).69 By 
knitting fear of death to hope for salvation, the praying subject cultivates a “great stirring of 
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love unto him that is so good and so merciful,” which burgeons into a “reverent affection” 
offered to God in prayer (50).  
According to An Epistle, hope neither opposes, nor casts out dread, but is rooted 
therein. Hence, the text likens its ascetic program to a “tree full of fruit, of which dread is 
that part that is in the earth, that is the root, and hope is that part that is above the earth, that 
is the body with the bows. In that that hope is certain and stable, it is the body; in that it stirs 
men to works of love, it is the bows. But this reverent affection is forever the fruit” (52–53). 
An Epistle’s arboreal conceit naturalizes its tripartite method of prayer—dreading death, hop-
ing for salvation, and loving God’s capacity to save—as an organic process of growth. Just as 
Margery’s Julian depicts doubt as a state of windswept instability, An Epistle designates hope 
a state of tree-trunk-like stability. In An Epistle, however, hope’s stability is not threatened 
by, but derives from dread. Rather than portray holy fear as a gift from God, An Epistle 
makes it the foundation of a gift to God, foregrounding performed dread’s spiritual produc-
tivity. Like a host of other Middle English texts, An Epistle is an “emotion script” choreo-
graphing a performance of dread, hope and love designed to court divinity. Their authors per-
formed dread in an effort to talk to God. 
POSTMEDIEVAL DREAD, PART I: EXISTENTIALISM’S ANXIOUS ASCETICISM 
Cataclysmic social change erupted throughout Europe during the four hundred or so years 
that separate Julian of Norwich from Søren Kierkegaard: the Reformation decentered the 
Catholic Church and the Enlightenment decentered scholasticism. Yet dreadful asceticism by 
no means disappeared during that tumultuous period. Martin Luther’s Small Catechism re-
peats the mantra “we should fear God and love him” and the motto inscribed at the very front 
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of René Descartes’ earliest notebook, the Praeambula, is none other than Ps. 110.10: “fear of 
the Lord is the beginning of wisdom” (Cottingham 201).  
Just as Julian’s writings on dread are constative, rhetorical and forensic, Kierke-
gaard’s philosophy of anxiety is intimately bound up with his own anxious history. As a boy, 
he attended a radical, Moravian congregation where he listened to sermons that detailed 
Christ’s humiliation and passion in bloody detail; sermons that, if we read them without 
knowing, we might well call “medieval” (Garff 12). His father, who lived in perpetual guilt 
after having cursed God as a poor, hungry child, transmitted his anxiety to his young son.70 
Consequently, both father and son clung to the morbid belief that Søren would die by thirty-
three: the age attained by Jesus (Garff 346). In an 1848 journal entry, Kierkegaard writes: “It 
is terrible when I think, even for one single moment, over the dark background, which, from 
the earliest time, was part of my life. The anxiety with which my father filled my soul, his 
own frightful melancholy, a lot of which I cannot even write down. I acquired an anxiety 
about Christianity and yet felt powerfully attracted to it” (273). Not only does Kierkegaard 
approach Christianity with a mixture of dread and desire reminiscent of so many Middle 
English devotional texts, he resorts to an inexpressibility topos—essential to the rhetoric of 
apophatic devotion—to signify the ineffable trauma of his childhood anxiety. In Fear and 
Trembling, Kierkegaard (under the pseudonym Johannis Silentio) repeatedly reimagines the 
Abraham story staged in the Brome Manuscript’s Sacrifice of Isaac. In one such re-
imagination, Abraham denounces himself as an idolater before drawing his knife in an effort 
to sacrifice Isaac’s reverence for his father, thereby preserving his son’s reverence for God. 
In another, Isaac notices that his father’s non-knife-bearing hand is “clenched in despair” as 
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he approaches. As a result, Isaac subsequently loses his faith. Given the significance he at-
tached to his father’s childhood transgression, it is easy to read Kierkegaard’s relationship 
with his father into these alternative Abrahams: one who slanders himself for his son’s faith 
and the other whose despair destroys that faith (Garff 252–60).    
By 1848, “anxiety” [Danish: Angest] was already a keyword in Kierkegaard’s ever-
expanding philosophical lexicon. His 1844 work, The Concept of Anxiety (hereafter CA)—
written under the guise of Vigilius Haufniensis (Watchman of Copenhagen) and subtitled A 
Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin—
examines, as its elaborate moniker suggests, hereditary sin from a psychological perspective. 
It argues against a long theological tradition of blaming original sin for producing a rupture 
in a previously unified human subjectivity, contending instead that human subjectivity, 
which synthesizes a temporal body and an eternal soul, is split by its very nature (Barrett, Lee 
36–52). For Kierkegaard, anxiety derives from this fundamental split in human subjectivity 
and is therefore a “sympathetic antipathy”—the experience of struggling with oneself. Unlike 
fear, which has a definite object, anxiety occurs when the subject recognizes the radical inde-
terminacy of her/his future actions. Anxiety, therefore, precedes both sin and law as “free-
dom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility” (CA 42). As such, it constitutes nothing less 
than “the fundamental mode of affective self-awareness in which a person discovers the pos-
sibility of his free self-determination” (Magurshak 170).  
Anxiety, for Kierkegaard, is the experience of freedom in all of its ambivalence. On 
one hand, anxiety educates by bringing the subject face-to-face with the abyss of possibility: 
“Whoever is educated by anxiety is educated by possibility, and only he who is educated by 
possibility is educated according to his infinitude.” (157). On the other hand, not all Kierke-
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gaardian anxiety is beneficial. For example, he warns against a demonic, “anxiety about the 
good”: “The demonic is unfreedom that wants to close itself off. This, however, is and re-
mains an impossibility. It always retains a relation, and even when this apparently disap-
peared altogether, it is nevertheless there, and anxiety at once manifests itself in the moment 
of contact” (123). Anxiety is recognition of freedom and with freedom comes social respon-
sibility. The demonic subject attempts the impossible feat of enclosing in on himself, de-
stroying all inter-subjective connection to alleviate all responsibility.  
In addition to demonic anxiety, Kierkegaard diagnoses “spiritlessness,” which mani-
fests in vain attempts to evade anxiety without first experiencing it: “only he who passes 
through the anxiety of the possible is educated to have no anxiety, not because he can escape 
the terrible things in life but because these always become weak by comparison with those of 
possibility” (157).71 The only way to master anxiety is to descend into its maelstrom. To an 
imaginary representative of those who “pride themselves in never having been in anxiety,” 
Kierkegaard tartly replies: “If [. . .] the speaker maintains that the great thing about him is 
that he has never been in anxiety, I will gladly provide him with an answer: that it is because 
he is very spiritless” (157). The spiritless subject evades anxiety and thereby eschews free-
dom. By promoting educative anxiety and criticizing demonic and spiritless evasions thereof, 
Kierkegaard’s book on anxiety carries on a long ascetic tradition of casting dread as an es-
sential engine for cultivating ethical behavior—better living through dread. 
For Kierkegaard, the “right way” to be anxious is as a preamble to a “leap of faith” 
into the Christian belief that God is love. In an 1850 journal entry, he writes: 
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[I]t is a severe education, the education from inborn anxiety to faith. [. . .]. He, in 
whose soul there is an inborn anxiety can [. . .] easily have even a visionary idea of 
God’s love. But he cannot make his relation to God concrete. If his idea of God’s love 
has a deeper root in him, and if he is piously concerned, before all else, to nourish and 
preserve it, his life can in many ways, and for a long time, continue in the agonizing 
suffering: that in concreto he does not receive the impression that God is love (for 
anxiety continues to overwhelm him and prevents him from seeing the danger, the tri-
al, the temptation, etc. from the right side, which is that it exists in order that he shall 
endure it) whereas he only holds and clings the more firmly to the thought: but all the 
same God is love. That is a sign that he is reared to faith. Thus to keep firmly hold of 
the thought: God is love, is the most abstract form of faith, is faith in abstracto. And 
then, in time, he will succeed in achieving a concrete relation to God. (377–78) 
Here, Kierkegaard depicts a tortured subject (presumably himself, though he sticks to the 
third person) wrestling valiantly with his anxiety-producing freedom to doubt that God is 
love—Julian’s doubtful dread. This particular anxiety, which prevents the subject from 
achieving concrete faith in God’s love, is clearly akin to the Christian concept of despair, 
with which Kierkegaard was endlessly fascinated. In The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard 
writes: “The possibility of this sickness [despair] is man’s advantage over the beast; to be 
aware of this sickness is the Christian’s advantage over natural man; to be cured of this sick-
ness is the Christian’s blessedness” (15). Like the Julian of RL, Kierkegaard considers the 
experience of despair a felix culpa as long as it is ultimately alleviated by a concrete faith in 
God’s love. Just as Julian assures her audience that God’s grace will transvaluate doubtful 
dread into love, Kierkegaard assures himself that to have overcome either despair or anxiety 
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about one’s capacity for despair, is better than to not have felt it at all. Both Julian (or at least 
the Julian of RL) and Kierkegaard recuperate doctrinally sacrilegious despair as an obstacle 
for the heroic Christian to overcome in his/her quest for authenticity. 
POSTMEDIEVAL DREAD, PART II: ANXIETY AFTER KIERKEGAARD 
In a famous footnote to his magnum opus Being and Time, Martin Heidegger acknowledges 
past exponents of anxiety (German: Angst) including Augustine of Hippo, Martin Luther and 
Kierkegaard, who he hails as “the man who has gone farthest in analyzing the phenomenon 
of anxiety” (235, n. 4). Though his note elides the Middle Ages entirely, here and elsewhere, 
Heidegger respectfully references Augustine’s distinction between servile fear and chaste 
fear, which, as we have seen, was extremely influential throughout medieval Europe.72 For 
Heidegger, Augustine’s chaste fear and Kierkegaard’s anxiety are both predecessors of his 
own concept of anxiety. Perhaps due to his affiliation with the National Socialists, Heidegger 
does not mention Augustine’s Hebrew predecessors, but Kierkegaard had no problem doing 
so. He writes in CA: “It is usually said that Judaism is the standpoint of the law. However, 
this could also be expressed by saying that Judaism lies in anxiety” (103).  
An avid reader of Kierkegaard, Heidegger likewise considered anxiety not only emo-
tional evidence of an enlightened, or authentic, worldview, but also a mode of analyzing ex-
istence and therefore, as Simon Critchley puts it, “the philosophical sentiment par excel-
lence.” Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger bewails the scarcity of popular anxiety and the even 
greater scarcity of philosophical analyses thereof: “Even rarer than the existential fact of ‘re-
al’ anxiety are attempts to interpret this phenomenon” (235). Nevertheless, Heidegger be-
lieved anxiety fit “to take over a methodological function in principle for the existential ana-
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lytic” (235).  Modifying Kierkegaard, for whom the object of anxiety is the lack of predeter-
mination afforded by the subject’s radical freedom, Heidegger makes anxiety’s object the 
non-being of death (295). For Heidegger, we can only glean the immense value of our own 
existence by anxiously anticipating our totally individualized, totally inevitable fall into non-
existence (233). Echoing An Epistle of Prayer hundreds of years later, Heidegger insists that 
dread of death is an essential component of authenticity (cf. Yalom 187–203). 
Modifying Heidegger in turn, Jean-Paul Sartre casts the object of anxiety (French: 
angoisse), not as the subject’s eventual non-existence (to which s/he only has partial access), 
but as his/her radical obligation to others (Being and Nothingness 531–53). Where 
Heideggerian Angst reveals an absolute breech between self and other, Sartrean angoisse re-
veals the subject’s inescapable ethical responsibility to others (Moyn 292–93). For Sartre, 
anxiety prompts us to ask of every potential action: “What would happen if everyone did 
so?” If the answer is unfavorable, anxiety dictates that the action ought not to be performed 
(“Existentialism is a Humanism” 351). Despite his obvious debt to Kierkegaard’s concept of 
educative anxiety, Sartre differs from his Danish precursor in absolutely denying the exist-
ence of an a priori metaphysical order. For Sartre, all providential beliefs, including and es-
pecially those regarding an afterlife, constitute instances of “bad faith” in which the subject 
eschews her responsibility to simultaneously behave ethically and define the parameters of 
ethical behavior (“Existentialism is a Humanism” 357). Nevertheless, Sartre, like Kierke-
gaard and Heidegger, defines anxiety as the emotional aspect of an authentic worldview.  
Following Julian and Kierkegaard, Sartre recuperates despair, which he defines as the 
condition in which “we limit ourselves to a reliance upon that which is within our wills, or 
within the sum of the probabilities which render our action feasible” (“Existentialism is a 
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Humanism” 357). Unlike those of Julian and Kierkegaard, Sartre’s despair is never transval-
uated into loving faith; it remains perpetually the very feeling of authenticity insofar as it 
marks the subject’s proper resignation towards things beyond the scope of her/his control: 
“Beyond the point at which the possibilities under consideration cease to affect my action, I 
ought to disinterest myself. For there is no God and no prevenient design, which can adapt 
the world and all its possibilities to my will” (“Existentialism is a Humanism” 357). It is dif-
ficult to imagine a statement more antithetical to Julian’s worldview, or Kierkegaard’s for 
that matter, than Sartre’s emphatic denial of divinity. Where the Julian of VS condemns any 
doubts regarding God’s omnipotent love, Sartre condemns any belief therein. Despite this 
considerable ideological chasm, Sartre, for all his vehement atheism, radicalizes, rather than 
recants, Christian recuperations of despair. Like Julian and Kierkegaard, Sartre was primarily 
interested in working through and learning from feelings of hopelessness, rather than outlaw-
ing them. If he renounced Judeo-Christianity, he did not relinquish, but conserved Judeo-
Christian asceticism’s project of making meaning out of dread and despair.    
Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre not only bewailed the rarity with which their con-
temporaries were anxious about the right things (or, more properly, the right no-things), but 
also presented their philosophy as a corrective—a means of cultivating proper anxiety. In so 
doing, they produced “emotion scripts” designed to erect “emotional communities” in which 
subjects deliberately strive to be “anxious in the right way.” Sartre went the furthest in this 
endeavor by laying substantial groundwork for an anxiety-centered existential psychoanaly-
sis, which has been actualized by Rollo May, Irvin Yalom and Mick Cooper, and continues 
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to be practiced to this day.73 Following Kierkegaard, May’s teacher Paul Tillich distinguishes 
between existential anxiety (i.e. the authentic experience of freedom) and neurotic anxiety, 
which occurs when existential anxiety is eschewed (64–69). Following Tillich, May erected 
an existential psychotherapy to treat anxiety, not as pathological, but as an enlightened re-
sponse to the basic tenants of existence. Instead of viewing uncomfortable feelings like anxi-
ety and despair through the lens of pathology, existential therapists help their patients work 
through and learn from anxiety (May 205–40; Yalom 29–74; Cooper 6–34, 147–151). In so 
doing, they carry into the twenty-first century a tradition of dreadful asceticism as old as 
Western culture. 
Although existential psychotherapists continue to help patients adapt to and learn 
from their anxiety, they are a scant minority. Mainstream psychiatrists generally “measure” 
anxiety through diagnostic surveys such as the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI), which asks 
subjects to rate twenty-one psychosomatic symptoms associated with anxiety—including rac-
ing heart, fear of the worst happening, trembling, fear of losing control and fear of dying—on 
a scale of discomfort ranging from 0 (it did not bother at all) to 3 (I almost could not stand it) 
(Beck et al). Like the Julian of VS, the BAI renders uncomfortable anxiety pathological. I do 
not want to call into question mainstream psychiatry’s practice of assuaging unbearable anxi-
ety through a combination of therapeutic and pharmacological means. To do so would be 
cruel. With the Julian of RL and the existential therapists who follow her, however, I think it 
is also crucial that we help ourselves and others burdened with uncomfortable anxiety find 
(or create) meaning therein. Now more than ever, we must repeat Sartre’s maxim: “We can-
not escape anxiety, because we are anxiety” (Being and Nothingness 82, emphasis original). 
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Anxiety is not a disease to be cured, but evidence of an authentic struggle to live well. For 
millennia, Western subjects have anxiously defined the parameters of ethical behavior while 
simultaneously struggling to remain therein and we are no different. In this venture, history 
can help us only as precedent: it would make no sense to adopt Julian’s particular brand of 
dreadful asceticism, or Kierkegaard’s, or even Sartre’s. To do so would be to eschew our 
own anxiety-producing freedom. Like our predecessors, we must perpetually decide for our-
selves how to live better through dread. 
POSTMEDIEVAL DREAD, PART III: THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN WYCLIFFE, HOBBES, SCHMITT 
In the thirteenth chapter of the Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes mythologizes a pre-political, 
“state of nature” as follows: “during the time [that] men live without a common power to 
keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of eve-
ry man against every man” (62). In Hobbes’ well-known political origin myth, the “state of 
nature” is tantamount to a “state of war”; humanity’s condition prior to the genesis of the 
state—which Hobbes metaphorizes as the Leviathan—is one in which every individual is 
locked in perpetual conflict with every other. Since humans, for Hobbes, are besmirched by 
original sin and thereby predisposed to violence, the “state of nature” is always shot through 
with a ubiquitous fear: “in such a condition,” he writes, “every man has a right to everything, 
even to one another’s body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to eve-
rything endureth, there can be no security to any man” (66). When this atmosphere of fear 
reaches a “tipping point” of intolerability, the Leviathan—a bestial body politic—is born. It 
is at this precise moment, in other words, that each member of a given locality surrenders a 
modicum of natural freedom to the Leviathan’s sovereign head in an effort to alleviate the 
pre-political paranoia permeating the “state of nature.” As the emotional matrix out of which 
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the body politic is born, fear is given pride of place in Hobbesian state theory. As Carl 
Schmitt puts it in his 1938 study of Hobbes, “the terror of the state of nature drives anguished 
individuals together; their fear rises to an extreme; a spark of reason flashes; and suddenly 
there stands in front of us a new god” (92).  
For many political historians, Hobbes’ pessimistic image of a lawless “state of na-
ture” stands as the locus classicus of a conservative tradition in political science. Indeed, both 
Hobbes and Schmitt mobilize the specter of an anarchic fear in order denigrate “the state of 
nature” and apotheosize state power as the only functional anodyne to the horror of a pre-
political world. In other words, according to the tenants of classical conservatism, the state is 
always already ensconced in a “war on terror.” This is not to say, however, that the birth of 
sovereign power entirely evacuates the state of fear. Instead, the movement from the pre-
political to the political is accompanied by a shift in which the anxiety pervading the state of 
nature is transplanted into an equally pervasive fear of the state itself. As Roberto Esposito 
puts it:  
Once tested, fear never abandons the scene. It is transformed from ‘reciprocal,’ anar-
chic fear, such as that which determines the state of nature [. . .], to ‘common,’ insti-
tutional fear, what characterizes the civil state [. . .] It is reduced but doesn’t recede. 
Fear is never forgotten [. . . it] is a part of us; it is we outside ourselves. It is the other 
from us that constitutes us as subjects infinitely divided from ourselves. (23) 
According to this formulation, fear emblematizes the fundamental rupture in subjectivity that 
both necessitates and justifies politics as such; for Esposito, fear both precedes and produces 
politics: “[f]ear isn’t only at the origin of the political,” he writes “but fear is its origin in the 
literal sense that there wouldn’t be politics without fear” (22). 
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 The theoretical trajectory that links Hobbes, Schmitt and Esposito is, of course, fre-
quently placed in contradistinction to a parallel line of thought associated with the “liberal 
tradition.” Indeed, in John Locke’s refutation of Hobbesian state theory, the “state of nature” 
is not synonymous with the “state of war.” Although the Lockean state of nature is  
a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man in that state have an un-
controulable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to 
destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession [. . .]. The state of nature 
has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: [. . .] that being all equal 
and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or posses-
sions. (191) 
Thus Locke’s “state of nature” is governed by a transcendent, God-given set of moral imper-
atives, which are made manifest to humanity by both the intellectual faculty of reason and the 
emotional faculty of empathic love. For the liberal, then, the task of the state becomes, above 
all, to protect and maintain this “law of nature” by bolstering humanity’s natural inclination 
towards love with the force of manmade law. Thus both “classical liberalism” and “conserva-
tism” have recourse to the production of anthropological etiologies in order to offer contra-
dictory theories of the state’s purpose relative to the individual. The operative distinction be-
tween the state theories of Hobbes and Locke, then, is that the Hobbesian “state of nature” is 
a fear-filled dystopia, whereas its Lockean counterpart is a utopian community in which em-
pathy and love bind together the pre-political community.  
 Despite the fact that each of these political etiologies come into being during the early 
centuries of modernity, many historians tacitly root the tradition of classical liberalism in 
Western Europe’s Protestant Reformation. The largely under-interrogated, hegemonic narra-
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tive goes something like this: the medieval Catholic Church—a paragon of institutionalized 
authority—holds the populous of Europe in a stranglehold. Eventually, rampant corruption 
and abuse within the church bring the situation to a head and a popular revolution gloriously 
de-institutionalizes spirituality, placing it back into the hands of the people. Insofar as the 
divide between classical liberalism and conservatism is all-too-frequently conflated with that 
between institutionalism and individualism, it might seem obvious that Reformers—those 
champions of a personalized relationship to Scripture—ought to be considered proto-liberal, 
whereas their Catholic opponents ought to be seen as proto-conservative. However, as schol-
ars such as Eamon Duffy and James Simpson have been at pains to remind us, such an overly 
simplified analogy does little more than institute a prosthetic origin for the “liberal tradition,” 
thereby reaffirming a sense of Protestant triumphalism already too engrained in our under-
standing of the past. In fact, in his recent work Burning to Read, Simpson argues that the 
English Reformation is hardly “at the root of liberal values,” but is, instead, “at the root of 
fundamentalism” (33). For Simpson, the iconoclastic zeal of early Reformers actually engen-
ders its own opposition, thereby initiating the cycle of fundamentalist, religious violence that 
mars Europe over the course of the Reformation.     
Following Simpson’s lead, the first contention of the present paper is that, when left 
unchecked, the historiographical presumptions rooting liberalism in Reform and conserva-
tism in its Catholic opposition bleed back into our understanding of premodernity. The four-
teenth-century, English theologian John Wycliffe, for instance, has long been lauded as “the 
morning star of the Reformation.”74 In fact, Ann Hudson’s seminal study of the Wycliffite 
heresy is aptly entitled The Premature Reformation. I would argue that, in what amounts to a 
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largely unconscious act of historiographical displacement, contemporary scholars frequently 
characterize Wycliffe as a revolutionary champion of individual liberties: “the morning star,” 
not only of the Protestant Reformation, but of the liberal tradition as well. Indeed, such an 
association is somewhat appealing to left-leaning thinkers who tend to romanticize revolu-
tion: many of Wycliffe’s followers, after all, were burned at the stake for their counter-
institutional convictions. However, the fact remains that Wycliffe himself died at home, un-
der the protection of powerful secular patrons such as John of Gaunt, and was an outspoken 
proponent of justifications of secular power not dissimilar to those that become cornerstones 
to classical conservative thought. The remainder of this paper contends that even within the 
premodern antecedents of Reformation ideology, a nascent state-centered fundamentalism is 
palpable and ought to be recognized as such. It does so by shoring up a distinctly proto-
conservative strain of thought in Wycliffe’s tract on kingship, De Officio Regis and suggest-
ing that Wycliffe’s emotion-based justification of secular kingship ultimately seeks to subor-
dinate the public’s intellectual faculties to the dictates of state power even more thoroughly 
than does Hobbes’ Leviathan.  
Shortly after beginning Tractatus de officio regis, Wycliffe evokes the long-standing, 
exegetical tradition, which situates timor domini (the fear of God) as the first of “seven gifts 
of the Holy Ghost.” According to Wycliffe, since the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom 
and Scripture tells us that the secular King is “God’s vicar on earth,” one must honor the sec-
ular King insofar as one fears God (4). Although Wycliffe begins by fastening the Scriptural 
mandate to fear God to the political mandate to honor the king, shortly thereafter he argues 
that “every servant of a secular lord must be bound subject to him not only by the worldly 
fear of loss of goods, but by the spiritual fear of everlasting reward” (5). Unlike Hobbes and 
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Schmitt, who configure the Leviathan as “a new, [manmade] God,” the sovereign head of 
which is to be feared by the public in exchange for alleviating the public’s fear of itself, 
Wycliffe uses Scripture to argue that the secular king is to be feared “spiritually,” although 
he operates at a complete remove from the ecclesiastical structure that the heresiarch sought 
to disendow.  
Since the true pope is, according to Wycliffe’s definition in Tractatus de ecclesia, not 
a leader appointed by the established church, but none other than the holiest man currently 
living—a superlative which cannot be practically recognized by any earthbound individual—
the secular king is the public figure most clearly endowed with verifiable, God-given authori-
ty (560–63). The subject, therefore, owes allegiance to the king, not only because the latter is 
capable of effecting worldly loss, but also because he is imbued with a conspicuous, “royal 
likeness to God” by virtue of the fact that he has been predestined to the divinely-mandated 
office of kingship. As Wycliffe goes on to put it, “the spiritual fear of the King God’s Vicar 
is the reflection of our spiritual of God Himself” (Tractatus de officio regis 5–6). Thus for 
Wycliffe, as for Hobbes, Schmitt and Esposito, fear is the affective baseline undergirding the 
allegiance that a given individual owes to the state. Wycliffe, however, does not offer a 
Hobbesian anthropology of state power, but zealously asserts that the affective wellspring of 
political authority is a conglomerate of spiritual and worldly fear. Wycliffe is not interested 
in hypothesizing an originary, pre-political “state of nature” in an effort to understand the 
manner in which the state comes into being; nor is he interested in reifying a divide between 
secular and spiritual power that inevitably places two institutional formations—the church 
and the state—at odds with one another. Although Wycliffe does differentiate the task of the 
churchman to that of the statesman (and even assures his audience that the former is une-
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quivocally the more perfect of the two), he subtly justifies the secular king’s sovereign power 
on both worldly and spiritual grounds, thus undermining the tendency of Catholic rhetoric to 
attempt to coerce secular rulers in the name of spirituality.  
Hobbes, on the other hand, situates the sovereign power wielded by the Leviathan as 
a critical term in the social contract that allows humanity to escape a warlike, anxiety-ridden 
“state of nature.” For Hobbes, then, it is due to worldly circumstances that obedience and fear 
are due to the sovereign. This comes to the fore in Hobbes’ excursus on miracles in the thirty 
seventh chapter of the Leviathan, in which he argues that the sovereign, as God’s lieutenant 
and the rightful head of the church, has the authority to determine whether or not a given 
event ought to be classified as miraculous. Although such a spiritually driven interpretation 
of sovereign power is certainly in line with Wycliffe’s alternately terrestrial and celestial jus-
tification of kingship, at the culmination of his chapter on miracles, Hobbes undermines his 
claim to a spiritually-justified kingship by introducing a distinction between “public” and 
“private” faith. “A private man,” Hobbes asserts,  
has always the liberty (because thought is free) to believe or not believe, in his heart, 
those acts that have been given out for miracles, according as he shall see what bene-
fit can accrue, by men’s belief, to those that pretend or countenance them, and there-
by conjecture whether they be miracles or lies. But when it comes to confession of 
that faith, the private reason must submit to the public, that is to say, to God’s lieu-
tenant. (201)             
By distinguishing between a register of private belief and one of public confession, Hobbes 
(perhaps unwittingly) endorses a psycho-political distinction between interior convictions 
and exterior confessions.  
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According to Schmitt, Hobbes’ theorization of a psychic interiority that can never be 
subjected to state power, “because thought is free,” opens the door for later liberal philoso-
phers to apotheosize this individuated realm of interior freedom precisely as that which ought 
to be defended by the state at all costs. “[A]t this place,” Schmitt writes,  
at the zenith of the sovereign power that brings about the unity of religion and poli-
tics, occurs the rupture of the otherwise so complete, so overpowering unity, the deci-
sive point, concerning miracle and belief, that Hobbes evades. Concerning the ques-
tion of the belief in miracles, he made his non-eradicable, individualistic proviso [. . 
.]. At this point enters the differentiation between inner faith and outer confession into 
the political system of the Leviathan. Hobbes declares the question of wonder and 
miracle to be a matter of ‘public’ in contrast to ‘private’ reason; but on the basis of 
universal thought—because thought is always free—he leaves to the individual’s pri-
vate reason whether to believe or not to believe [. . .]. The distinction between private 
and public, faith and confession, [. . .] is introduced in a way from which everything 
else was logically derived in the century that ensued until the rise of the liberal consti-
tutional state. (55–56)    
For Schmitt, then, at the moment in which Hobbes theorizes the rupture between the public 
and the private, he inadvertently sets the stage for the rise of the liberal democratic state. 
Thus the archconservative Schmitt sees Hobbes’ distinction between public and private as the 
“seed of death that destroyed the mighty leviathan from within and brought about the end of 
the mortal god” (57). Hobbes’ psychological misstep, therefore, reopens the very rift between 
institution and individual that the latter sought to close in equating the “state of nature” with 
a “state of war.” With the rise of liberal democracy, the state is put into the service of defend-
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ing the individual freedom of thought that Hobbes cedes to the “private” realm. This re-
authorization of the individual comes at the price of de-authorization of state power, in that it 
nullifies the affective displacement in which the fear inherent in “state of nature” is trans-
ferred to a fear of sovereign power. Schmitt worries that if a private realm in which individu-
als are free to agree or disagree with a given sovereign decision is thought to exist then sub-
jects will inevitably cease to recognize their complicity within the Leviathan as a whole. 
Given the chance to disagree with the state, subjects will forget that they have empowered 
the sovereign a priori in exchange for the alleviation of the pre-political fear endemic in the 
state of nature.  
 Like Hobbes, Wycliffe allows for the subject to disagree with the decision of the sec-
ular sovereign at moments in which the latter’s decree does not align itself with Christian 
law. Unlike Hobbes, however, Wycliffe never explicitly mandates a rupture between outward 
confession and inward belief. For Wycliffe, the king ought to be feared on both worldly and 
spiritual grounds; but, insofar as the spiritual always trumps the worldly, when a secular king 
commands one to break explicitly stated scriptural law, the command ought not to be obeyed. 
Although this distinction might seem, at first glance, to render Wycliffe’s justification of 
secular sovereignty weaker than that of Hobbes, it allows for no aporia between outward con-
fession and inward belief and thereby leaves intact Wycliffe’s fear-based, political theology. 
In other words, although the king, for Wycliffe, can break divine law and thereby substantial-
ly diminish the affective charge justifying his sovereignty, as long as he remains an adherent 
to God’s law, he ought to be feared as God is feared. In order to ensure that the king adheres 
to God’s law, Wycliffe tellingly places theology in the service of the state. He argues that it 
is the task of the theologian to advise the secular ruler as to what does and does not constitute 
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heresy. “It is necessary,” Wycliffe writes, “for the security of the kingdom that there shall be 
theologians able to discern what is heresy and to discover the real power of the King and the 
blasphemous excess of power by which Christ’s pretended Vicar [the Roman-Catholic pope] 
claims to control Kings” (Tractatus de officio regis 125). Although this move does not con-
tradict Wycliffe’s contention that spiritual concerns take precedence over worldly ones, it 
does situate the theologian as a sort of bureaucrat, whose function is to maintain state power. 
Furthermore, Wycliffe advocates that theology be practiced in order to not only guide the 
state morally, but also determine who the sovereign can and cannot punish on moral grounds.  
By way of conclusion, I’d like to leave you with what seems to me to be a profound 
historical irony. In 1401, England’s new Lancastrian King Henry IV vetted a parliamentary 
statute entitled De heretico comburendo. The act sanctioned the burning of heretics on spe-
cifically affective grounds: “if any person [insists] upon [. . .] wicked preachings, doctrines, 
opinions, schools, and heretical and erroneous informations, [. . . they shall] before the peo-
ple in a high place be burnt, that such punishment may strike fear into the minds of others” 
(Statutes of the Realm 128, emphasis mine). Written explicitly into this insidious piece of 
legislation is the rhetorical intent to halt the dissemination of heterodox beliefs through the 
spectacular utilization of a governmentally actualized fear: the fear that any spoken or written 
deviation from orthodoxy will lead directly to horrific physical torment. Thus, this piece of 
secular legislation employs a theological judgment regarding what is or is not heretical; just 
as Wycliffe himself would have it, the Lancastrian law subordinates theology to the state, 
configuring it as a bureaucratic mechanism. In short, the juridical rationale justifying the ear-
ly Lancastrian law that caused many of Wycliffe’s followers to be burnt is perfectly in line 
with Wycliffe’s own ideas about the state power: not only does De Heretico Combruendo 
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explicitly rely on the proto-conservative contention that sovereign power is justified in wield-
ing a weaponized fear, it also employs theology in order to bolster and justify secular power. 
Viewed in this light, Wycliffe is neither an anti-institutional defender of individual liberties, 
nor an early proponent of the secularization of the state. Instead, his counter-Catholic tenden-
cies are balanced by a concomitant spiritualization and strengthening of the concept of secu-
lar power. From this angle, Wycliffe can be seen for exactly what he is: an intellectual ante-
cedent to the very draconian logic that was violently deployed against his own followers less 
than two decades after his death. It is therefore crucial that students of premodernity begin to 
explore the ways in which Wycliffe’s zealous iconoclasm and anti-institutionalism—which 
many in the academic left often find so romantic in his thought—are at least partially respon-
sible for initiating a cycle of fundamentalist, religious violence that would mar Europe for 
centuries after his death.        
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CHAPTER 3:  
DREAD, LOVE, AND THE BODIES OF PIERS PLOWMAN A.10, B.9, AND C.10  
INTRODUCTION: DREAD AND LOVE IN MIDDLE ENGLISH DEVOTIONAL LITERATURE 
For the authors and readers of a multitude of Middle English devotional literature, love and 
dread were essential aspects of an ideal emotional posture vis-à-vis divinity: not only must 
the Christian devotee burn with love for God, s/he must also dread his/her freedom to deviate 
from God through sin. Neatly delineating this ascetic project, the refrain of a Middle English 
lyric in MS Digby 102 enjoins its reader to “knowe thyself, loue God, and drede” (Twenty-
Six Political and Other Poems 1–6) By tying the Delphic imperative to a dual directive to 
love and dread God, its author suggests that psychic introspection and ascetic performances 
of love and dread are vital elements of ethical behavior. Forged in this emotional milieu, 
Piers Plowman likewise treats love and dread as vital components of Christian devotion. As 
we will see, however, one cannot speak of the theology of dread and love in Piers Plowman, 
but only the theologies of dread and love scattered throughout its many versions. This chap-
ter analyzes the mercurial treatment of dread and love across the corresponding accounts of 
Wit’s body-as-castle allegory in the major versions of Piers Plowman (A.10, B.9 and C.10). 
Before delving into this task, however, it briefly surveys the profound interrelation of love 
and dread in a range of Middle English devotional literature. 
By theorizing the relation between dread and love, Middle English devotional texts 
taught their audience how to feel towards God and each other. Many such texts treat dread of 
God as a regulator of behavior. The famous hermit Richard Rolle, for example, asserts that 
“drede of God” compels the devotee to “fle syn as venym” (“The Seven Gifts” 19). Like 
Rolle, the author of the aptly named Contemplations of Dread and Love of God insists that 
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proper, Christian dread is necessarily directed at the devotee’s capacity to sunder him/herself 
from God through sin (8, ll. 13–25). Contemplations and other pastoral texts cite Matthew 
10.28—“And fear not fear them that kill the body, and are not able to kill the soul; but rather 
fear him that can destroy both soul and body in hell”75—to demand that devotees deliberately 
privilege fear of breaking divine law over fear of breaking human law.76 Where they treat 
dread of God as a mode of behavioral regulation, Middle English devotional texts treat love 
as the emotional glue holding the world together. The anchoress Julian of Norwich, for ex-
ample, famously receives a vision of creation’s entirety as “a little thing the quantity of a 
haselnot [hazelnut],” which “lasteth and ever shall, for God loveth it” (139, ll. 7–13, cf. 69, ll. 
1–16). This revelation furnishes forensic evidence for Julian’s emotional ontology, which 
holds divine love to be the root and ground of all being.77 For Julian, Rolle and other Middle 
English mystics, the height of devotion is returning God’s love and dreading sin’s capacity to 
cause its cessation. If Middle English devotional texts treat dread and love as equally essen-
tial, however, they do not necessarily treat them as easily analogous. For example, where 
Contemplations enjoins the devotee to dread God instead of other people, it demands that 
s/he love God, not instead of others, but through the act of loving neighbors and enemies 
(14).78 In short, Middle English devotional texts treat love and dread as equally essential, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 See also Luke 13.4–5.  
76 Contemplations of the Dread and Love of God, 8, ll.10–15. See also, Fasciculus Morum 
327. On the other hand, for an example of political writing produced in fourteenth-century 
England that does enjoin its audience to fear the king as s/he fears God (though less so), see 
Wycliffe, Tractatus de officio regis 4, ll. 20–30. 
77 For Julian’s use of forensic support for her theological assertions, see Kerby-Fulton, Books 
under Suspicion 315–23.  
78 cf. The Book of Vices and Virtues 144, ll. 5–11. 
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distinct emotions, which the devotee must simultaneously direct at a variety of (me-
ta)physical objects in an elaborate ascetic performance designed to cultivate ethical action.    
Sometimes, to be sure, Middle English devotional texts oppose dread to love. A dra-
matic example of this comes at the end of the early Middle English anchoretic manual Sawles 
Warde, when a host of allegorical characters including Love of Eternal Life cast out Fear 
(186).79 In so doing, the characters of Sawles Warde enact 1 John 4.18: “Fear is not in love 
[Vulgate: caritas], but perfect love casts out fear because fear has pain. And he that fears is 
not perfected in love.” Despite the fact that he is ultimately expelled, Fear plays a crucial, 
soteriological role in Sawles Warde’s allegory of the body: he informs the other characters 
about the pains of hell in graphic detail (169–74).80 In casting Fear out, Love of Eternal Life 
and company do not entirely renounce chastening fears of fire-and-brimstone, though they do 
place dread and love at odds. According to Measure, Love of Eternal Life must displace Fear, 
but the latter will be welcomed back into the fold whenever the former is silent (186).81 
Sawles Warde, therefore, advocates an ascetic program in which the devotee oscillates be-
tween dread and love, rather than simply transcending the former for the latter in a single, 
revolutionary mood swing (Watson, “The Methods and Objectives” 143).  
A.10: DREAD, SUFFERING, ETHICAL ACTION 
Let us turn now to Piers Plowman A.10, which, like Sawles Warde, is a psychomachia (battle 
of spirits): an allegory of the devotee’s struggle for sanctity against sin. As such, it consti-
tutes an extended meditation on the human body’s (usually) innate capacity to behave well. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 For Modern English see Anchoretic Spirituality 220–21.  
80 For Modern English see Anchoretic Spirituality, 213–15. 
81 For Modern English see Anchoretic Spirituality, 221. 
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A.10 begins with the dreamer-narrator Will meeting Wit shortly after setting off on his quest 
to find Dowel, Dobet and Dobest, who together represent a tripartite hierarchy of ethical ac-
tion. When asked where to find them, Wits A, B and C, launch into a body-as-castle conceit 
popular in Middle English didactic literature and “strikingly similar” to that in Sawles 
Warde.82 There are, however, major differences between the two. For example, where Will is 
Wit’s flighty wife in Sawles Warde, Will is the narrator and protagonist of the markedly vol-
untarist Piers Plowman.83 In Piers Plowman, moreover, Wit is both the narrator of the body-
as-castle conceit and a character therein: Sire Inwyt, who is not the castle’s owner, but its 
steward. The castle, Caro (flesh), belongs to a duke named Dowel, but was built by Kynde 
(God-the-Father) in order to protect Anima (spirit) from the lascivious advances of the devil, 
a “proud prykere of Fraunce, Princeps huius mundi” (1–8). Unlike Sawles Warde, Wit’s 
body-as-castle conceit does not dramatize love casting out fear; though, as we will see, Wit C 
implicitly casts fear out by eliding the dread-centered devotional program endorsed by Wit A 
and modified by Wit B.  
According to Wit’s patriarchal allegory, to do well is to perpetually engage in a psy-
chic battle against sin over the possession of the utterly passive, feminized Anima. Dowel’s 
underling, Sire Inwyt, administers Caro with the help of his sons, Sirs See-well, Say-well, 
Hear-well, Work-well-with-your-hands and Go-well (19–21). By making Sire Inwyt Dowel’s 
agent on the ground, Wit A characterizes wit as the foremost engine of ethical behavior. Un-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 For the similarity between Wit’s speech and Sawles Warde see Anchoretic Spirituality 
210–12. For other examples of the body-as-castle conceit see Ancrene Wisse 146; Richard 
Morris’ Prick of Conscience 161, ll. 5820–29; The Castle of Perseverance; and Chaucer’s 
“Tale of Melibeus” in The Riverside Chaucer 217.  
83 Sawles Warde 166. For Modern English see Anchoretic Spirituality 211. For voluntarism 
in Piers Plowman, see Bowers 41–60; Simpson, “From Reason to Affective Knowledge” 7; 
and Zeeman 64–108. 
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like Anima who resides in the heart: “Inwyt in þe heuid is & an help to þe soule, / For þoruȝ 
his connyng is kept caro & anima / In rewele & in resoun, but reccheles it make” (49–51). 
In a self-aggrandizing gesture, Wit makes Sire Inwyt a sovereign, psychic agent whose 
“connyng” guides the feminized soul to ethical action. By aligning femininity with static pas-
sivity, on the one hand, and masculinity with rational activity, on the other, Wit A’s self-
important auto-allegory, which is not much changed in B and C, relays a series of stale gen-
dered binaries.84 As we will see, however, Wit A does not exclusively ascribe the capacity to 
generate ethical behavior to a masculinized rationality.  
Thankfully for modern readers, Wit A’s misogynistic body-as-castle conceit quickly 
gives way to a much less conventional attempt to locate ethical responsibility for the actions 
of those in whom Sire Inwyt is weak or absent. Inwyt is bound, Wit A claims, in a certain 
physiological circumstance: “whan blood is bremere þanne brayn” (56). This is the condition 
of “sotis” (drunkards), “ȝonge fauntes” (infants), and “folis” (the mentally disabled), all of 
whom lack the capacity to guide their behavior towards ethical ends (58–59). While the devil 
easily sways drunkards, who purposefully drown Inwyt in ale, he has power over neither the 
mentally disabled, nor infants, for whom family, friends and the church are responsible (59–
75). On the other hand, Wit A insists that everyone who possesses “wys vndirstonding / Is 
chief souereyn ouer hymself his soule to ȝeme [govern]” (71–72). For Wit A, then, with “in-
wyt” comes ethical responsibility, both for one’s own actions and for those of relations lack-
ing “inwyt.” 
 At this point, Wit A launches into his first celebration of dread’s spiritual utility. Sire 
Dowel, he reiterates, “is a duc þat destroyeþ vices” (76), whose primary objective is to “sauiþ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 See Robertson, who argues that Wit’s flat portrait of Anima is surpassed by the initially 
abject, toothless Anima who Will meets in B.15 and C.16.    
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þe soule þat synne haþ no miȝt / to routen ne to resten ne roten in þin herte” (77–78). Dow-
el’s martial maneuvers against Sire princeps huius mundi represent the ascetic activity con-
stantly necessary to repress vicious impulses. Doing well, put simply, is actively combatting 
the urge to sin. While Wit A has hitherto assigned the ethical responsibility to do well to the 
rational faculty represented by Sire Inwyt, he re-assigns it here to a patently emotional facul-
ty: fear of God. 
 And þat is dred of god, dowel it makiþ. 
 It is begynnyng of goodnesse god for to douten. 
 Salamon it seide for a soþ tale: Inicium sapiencie timor domini. 
 For doute men doþ þe bet; dred is such a maister 
 Þat he makiþ men meke & mylde of here speche, 
 And alle kynde scoleris in scole to lerne. (79–84) 
Dread, according to Wit A, is educative. Rather than portraying emotion as entirely distinct 
from reason, Wit A portrays fear as a mode of judgment essential for rational decision-
making. For Wit A, reason does not trump, but requires emotion.85 In support of this conten-
tion, he cites Ps. 110.10, which situates fear of God (timor Domini) as the beginning of wis-
dom through experience (sapiencia).86 Like Wit A, Middle English devotional texts frequent-
ly cite Ps. 110.10 to tout fear’s capacity to generate wisdom. In his Commentary on the Psal-
ter, for example, Rolle writes: “[God’s] name that is vertu and myght, is [. . .] agheful [aw-
ful] til wickid men that thai be rad. For thorgh drede thai may cum til wisdome that is, til 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 In this, Wit anticipates modern neuroscientists who claim that our ability to make rational 
judgments relies on our ability to make emotional judgments. See Damasio, Descartes’ Error 
41, 66–67.  
86 Robertson 167. 
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sauoure of gastly swetnes” (396).87 Just as Rolle makes dread of God the means through 
which wicked people cultivate wisdom, Middle English sermons, confession manuals and 
mystical tracts frequently depict dread awakening devotees from “the slepe of syn.”88 Wit 
A’s image of didactic dread, therefore, was anything but idiosyncratic in late medieval Eng-
land’s dread-obsessed devotional culture.  
Where Wit A likens Dowel to the performance of a relatively ambiguous “dred of 
god,” he makes Dobet an awareness of God’s capacity for violence: “Þanne is dobet to ben 
ywar for betyng of þe ȝarde, / And þerof seiþ þe sauter, þe salme þou miȝt rede: / Virga tua & 
baculus tuus ipsa me consolata sunt” (85–87). To be sure, Wit A’s account of Dowel as dread 
of God prompts us to associate this “betyng of þe ȝarde” with divine punishment. Wit A, 
however, culls his Latin quotation from the famously funereal Psalm 22.4, which confidently 
asserts faith in divine protection, rather than fear of divine punishment: “though I walk 
through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil: for you are with me; your rod 
and your staff they comfort me.” Throughout the Vulgate Old Testament, the Latin nouns 
“baculus” and “virga” both signify, among many other things, an instrument of divine protec-
tion (Isaiah 10.5) and one of divine punishment (Ps. 89.32), as does the Middle English 
“ȝarde” into which Langland translates one or both of them.89 According to Wit A, then, do-
ing better entails an awareness of God’s sovereign capacity to wield violence to protect and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See also Contemplations of the Dread and Love of God, 8–9, ll. 1–5, 40–44; A Pistle of 
Preier 49, ll. 6–10; and “Sermon 108” in English Wycliffite Sermons 274, ll. 24–26. 
88 See, for example, The Book of Vices and Virtues 126, ll. 15–24; and The Writings of Julian 
of Norwich 117, ll. 5–10; cf. 355, ll. 5–10.   
89 The Middle English, Wycliffite Bible renders Ps. 22.4’s “virga tua et baculus tuus” as “thi 
yerde and thi staf.” For the semantic valence of ȝarde, see MED s.v. ‘yerd’, n. (2), especially 
def. 1b, a and b. 
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punish his subjects, both of which can be described as an instance of “betyng of þe ȝarde.” 
Where the latter is a species of fear, the former is one of hope. By capitalizing on the poly-
semy of “baculus”/”virga” and “ȝarde,” Wit A craftily situates fear of divine punishment and 
trust in divine protection as two aspects of an ideal emotional posture vis-à-vis divinity. 
Wit’s account of Dobest as a clean conscience aptly triangulates his account of Dowel 
as dread of God and Dobet as a fuller awareness of many uses of God’s “ȝarde” (89–93). 
Where Wit A presents both Dowel (fear of God’s punishment) and Dobet (fear of God’s pun-
ishment tempered by faith in his protection) as future-oriented evaluations of prospective ac-
tions, he presents Dobest as a retrospective evaluation of past deeds with “clene consience” 
(89). For Wit A, then, a devotee can do no better than fearing God, hoping for mercy and 
looking back on her/his past unburdened by guilt. While he concedes that conscience must 
counsel “accordyng holy chirche” (91), Wit A’s emphasis on self-judgment implies that the 
production of ethical behavior is foremost a matter of the devotee using her/his internal un-
derstanding of God’s moral standards to deliberately fear breaking God’s law in the future 
and simultaneously judge whether s/he has done so in the past. In support of his celebration 
of the subject’s internal moral compass, Wit A cites the popular legal maxim “intencio iudi-
cat hominum” (“intention assigns moral status to the actions of a person”) (90b),90 thereby 
echoing his earlier assertion that those who do not possess “inwit” are not responsible for 
their actions since they do not sin intentionally. 
In addition to expounding the emotions that one ought to perform in order to do well, 
Wit A discusses those one ought to eschew. He insists, for example, that his audience imme-
diately staunch all anger at public slander: “Whatso men worden of þe, wraþþe þe neuere” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 For a justification of this translation see Vaughan, Piers Plowman: The A-text 185, n. 91. 
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(96). For Wit A, those who are “ywar for betyng of þe ȝarde” and therefore confident that 
divine justice will ultimately right all wrongs do not experience anger, which constitutes a 
bodily desire to redress worldly inequities.91 Instead, they patiently maintain social stasis: 
“Hold þe stable & stedfast & strenþe þiseluen / To be blissid for þi beryng, ȝe, beggere þeiȝ 
þou were” (114–15). If Wit A’s demonization of social mobility is incongruous with our 
modern values, it is not uncommon for Middle English devotional literature. Indeed, his as-
sertion that subjects ought to embrace the discomforts of their particular walk of life as so 
many acts of imitatio Christi accords well with both pain-embracing, affective piety and 
pain-consoling, Boethian stoicism, both of which helped medieval devotees better tolerate 
the throes of their oft-uncomfortable lives.92 While Wit A initially presents doing better as at 
least partially a matter of summoning consolatory hope, he goes on to explicitly associate it 
with suffering, rather than bliss: “Þus in dred liþ dowel, and dobet to suffre, / For þoruȝ suf-
fraunce se þou miȝt how soueraynes ariseþ” (118–19). Though Wit A glorifies suffering, he 
also tantalizingly insinuates that upward social mobility comes to those who do not seek it. 
Just as Wit A’s God avenges those who do not act out of anger, he elevates those who do not 
seek to elevate themselves. 
Despite his ascetic program focus on negative feelings—fear (Dowel) and suffering 
(Dobet)—its result (Dobest) is positive enough: 
And þus of dred & his dede dobest arisiþ, 
Which is þe flour & þe fruyt fostrid of boþe. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Other sections of Piers Plowman, such as the “confession of the Seven Deadly Sins” and 
“the pardon tearing scene,” seem to endorse, or at least glorify, righteous anger. See Chapter 
1 above. 
92 For a comparison of the dialectic of dread and consolation apparent in both A Pistle of 
Preire and Chaucer’s Boece see Ian Johnson, “Walton’s Heavenly Boece” 159–61. 
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Riȝt as a rose, þat red is a swet, 
Out of raggit rote and a rouȝ brere 
Springeþ & spediþ, þat sourcerus desiriþ, 
Or as whete out of weed waxiþ, out of þe erþe, 
So dobest out of dobet & dowel gynneþ springe 
Among men of þis molde þat mek ben & kynde. 
For loue of here louȝnesse oure lord ȝiueþ hem grace 
Such werkis to werche þat he is wiþ paied. (121–30) 
Just as a rose springs from a rough briar, Dobest (ethical action) springs from fear and suffer-
ing. If the devotee filters all of her/his potential actions through fear of divine punishment 
and suffers worldly indignities without anger, grace will enable her/him to perform holy 
works. Recall that A Pistle of Preier likens its tripartite program for prayer—consisting of 
fear of hell, hope for salvation and love of God—to a fruit-bearing tree (Deonise Hid Divinite 
52, ll. 15–23). In a surprisingly similar conceit, Wit A likens his tripartite program for behav-
ing well—consisting of didactic dread, suffering of worldly indignities and ethical action—to 
a rose-bearing bush. Like that of A Pistle, Wit A’s devotional program is designed to grow 
positive actions out of negative feelings. 
 For the remainder of A.10, Wit complements his discussion of the positive effects of 
holy dread with a detailed account of the negative effects of sinful love, particularly extra-
marital procreation. The conditions in which a child is conceived, he argues, have a direct 
effect on the child’s character. Where all legitimate members of the social order’s every 
echelon—“Kinges & knȝites, & alle kyne clerkis / Barouns & burgeis, & bondemen of 
tounes” (137–38)—issue through procreation in wedlock, anti-social subjects—“fals folk & 
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feiþles, þeuis & leiȝeris” (139)—are “conseyuid in cursid tyme as kaym was on Eue” (140). 
Once again, Wit carefully delegates ethical responsibility for worldly evil. He blames Adam 
and Eve for conceiving Cain “in cursid tyme” (148), holding them accountable for Cain’s 
sins, as well as those of his descendants. Extending his earlier argument that parents and 
friends are responsible for the actions of the “fauntis and folis” around them, Wit A holds 
parents responsible for the extended consequences of unsanctioned procreation (205–15). 
Nevertheless, he condemns bastards as “[v]ngracious to gete loue or any good ellis’ and ut-
terly damned unless ‘god giue hem grace here to amende” (205–15). While his stated distaste 
for bastards is certainly unsavory from a modern perspective, it was, once again, utterly con-
ventional in late medieval England.93 Wit A’s underlying rhetorical purpose, moreover, is to 
besmirch, not bastards for being themselves, but their parents for loving unlawfully.  
 In the final lines of A.10, Wit shifts back to his account of the devotional value of 
negative feelings by reiterating his definition of Dowel, Dobet and Dobest: “Þanne is dowel 
to dreden, & dobet to suffre, / And so comiþ dobest aboute, and bringeþ doun mody, / And 
þat is wykkide wil þat meny werk shendiþ” (216–18). Here, Wit A equates Dowel with the 
act of dreading, recalling his earlier portrait of Dowel as a fearful schoolmaster; Dobet with 
the act of suffering, recalling his earlier insinuation that those “ywar for betyng of þe ȝarde” 
willingly suffer worldly indignities; and Dobest as a capacity to repress wicked desires that 
endanger good works. As we have seen, his pain embracing, pleasure distrusting ascetic pro-
gram accords well with those described in other Middle English devotional texts. On the oth-
er hand, Wit A has less to say about the positive devotional value of love than many of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 See Warner, The Lost History of Piers Plowman 11–13, which points out that Langland’s 
invective against bastards has analogues in Deuteronomy and 1 Corinthians, as well as 
myriad Middle English and Anglo-Latin texts contemporary to Piers Plowman. John Ball 
purportedly condemned bastards as well.  
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contemporaries. Although Wit A does not explicitly privilege dread over love, he certainly 
focuses on the positive attributes of the former and the negative attributes of the latter.  
B.9: DREAD, LOVE, CONDEMNATION 
Like Wit A, Wit B allegorizes the Christian devotee’s struggle to behave well. Wit B, how-
ever, substantially magnifies Wit A’s penchant for denouncing those who fail to do so. For 
example, where Wit A briefly insinuates that the devil can easily control drunks, Wit B bold-
ly proclaims that gluttons worship their bellies instead of God and thereby serve Satan, who 
will soon possess their souls in hell (61–64). Although he does not explicitly say so, Wit B is 
clearly bent on stirring servile fear in womb-worshipping gluttons, thus awakening them 
from the sleep of sin. Indeed, Wit B is a good deal more preoccupied with the potential woes 
of the afterlife than Wit A. He portends, for example, that neglectful godparents will “pur-
chace penaunce in purgatorie” (79). Unlike Wit A, who outlines an ascetic program for 
dreading well by theorizing how dread ought to inform ethical action, Wit B, like Fear in 
Sawles Warde, solicits fear of hellfire in order to stifle immoral behavior. The former makes 
dread a teacher, the latter teaches through dread. Indeed, Wit B even expresses his own dread 
of the divine retribution due to both commoners and clergy for their love of jesters and their 
resultant uncharitable treatment of the poor: “The commune for hir vnkyndenesse, I dred me, 
shul abye / Bisshopes shul be blamed for beggeres sake” (91–92). Wit B’s complaint about 
Christians’ widespread indifference to poverty suggests that the agent(s) responsible for re-
vising A into B did so less to explain dread’s devotional function and more to frighten mem-
bers of an uncharitable community into helping their impoverished neighbors.  
Directly after his rant on the painful, long-term consequences of enjoying wealth and 
ignoring poverty, Wit B launches into a mid-passus definition of Dowel, Dobet and Dobest: 
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 He dooþ noȝt wel þat dooþ þus, ne drat noȝt god almyȝty, 
 Ne loueþ Salomans sawes þat Sapience tauȝt: 
 Inicium sapiencie timor domini. 
 That dredeþ god, he dooþ wel; þat dredeþ hym for loue 
 And dredeþ hym noȝt for drede of vengeaunce dooþ þerfore þe bettre. (95–98) 
Wit B, unlike Wit A, offers an Augustinian ascetic program in which painful, servile fear 
should be surpassed by a more loving, chaste fear. Despite his penchant for threatening re-
minders of hell’s fire-and-brimstone, Wit B privileges a reverential, loving dread of God over 
a tortured, servile fear of hellfire, implying that the former develops into the latter on the road 
to spiritual perfection. Unlike Wit A, therefore, Wit B locates some devotional value in posi-
tive emotion, though he by no means renounces Wit A’s focus on either the positive value of 
negative emotion or the negative value of positive emotions.  
Where Wit A offers a relatively universal psychomachia, Wit B seems to be more 
condemnatory of particular community’s particular ills. Indeed, though his mid-passus, 
Dowel-Dobet-Dobest triad is no less a devotional program for ethical living than that of Wit 
A, it is largely presented in support of a polemic on the ills of timewasting, rather than as a 
straightforward account of dread’s devotional function. According to Wit B, those who dread 
God do well, those who dread him lovingly without fearing punishment do better and those 
who do so constantly do best: “He dooþ best þat wiþdraweþ hym by daye and by nyȝte / To 
spille any speche or any space of tyme” (99–100). Where Wit A’s mid-passus triad makes 
Dobest a clean conscience, Wit B’s makes Dobest an aversion to wastefulness, thereby neatly 
complementing his vilification of japery with a valorization of thriftiness. In so doing, he 
evinces a distinct concern in the perils of time wasting largely absent from A.10. 
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In his largest elision of material from A, Wit B forgoes his predecessor’s apotheosis 
of social stasis, as well as his vision of Dowel, Dobet and Dobest as the root, briar and flower 
of a rosebush (A.10.91–130). As we’ve seen, this passage showcases A.10’s central theme: 
that ethical action grows organically out of dread and suffering. Given his embrace of an Au-
gustinian distinction between uncomfortable, servile fear (Dowel) and comfortable, chaste 
fear (Dobet), it makes sense that Wit B omits Wit A’s contention that “in dred liþ dowel and 
dobet to suffre” (118). In lieu of A’s floral metaphor, Wit B launches into a speech on the 
importance of marriage largely, though not entirely, identical to that of his predecessor. Wit 
B’s most substantial addition to Wit A’s harangue on extra-marital procreation consists of a 
preemptive rebuttal of a somewhat obvious exegetical critique of his contention, shared with 
Wit A, that Adam and Eve’s sinful, premarital conception of Cain caused the mass-
destruction effected in Noah’s flood (147–56). Where Wit A makes no mention of Ezekiel 
18.20—“the son will not bear the iniquity of the father, neither will the father bear the iniqui-
ty of the son”—Wit B incorrectly attributes the passage to the Gospel (148), only to disagree 
with it and uphold Wit A’s polemic against extra-marital procreation (150–57). If Wit B is 
more willing to advocate positive emotions than Wit A, he is equally if not more worried 
about their potential for engendering moral turpitude. 
Wit B is closest to Wit A when the latter is at his most patriarchal, as he is at the be-
ginning of A.10, and his most condemnatory, as he is at the end of A.10, in which he attrib-
utes all of the world’s evil to illicit love. Wit B, moreover, is decidedly more eager to con-
demn others, particularly timewasters, for lacking servile dread of hellfire. Nevertheless, as 
we have seen, Wit B’s ascetic program, while still dread-based, is more optimistic about the 
devotional value of positive emotions than that of his predecessor. Consequently, critics have 
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read Wit B’s theology of loving dread as an emotional middle ground between Wit A’s em-
phasis on the devotional value of dread and Wit C’s emphasis on the devotional value of 
love. Supporting this theory is the apparent fact that Wit B adds a love-oriented, Dowel-
Dobet-Dobest triad—present in C, but not A—to his reproduction of Wit A’s final, dread-
suffering-fighting-sin triad:  
Dowel, my deere, is to doon as lawe techeþ: 
 To loue and to lowe þee and no life to greue; 
 Ac to loue and to lene, leue me, þat is dobet; 
 To ȝyuen and to yemen boþe yonge and olde 
 To helen and to helpen, is dobest of alle. (202–05) 
Consequently, in modern editions of the three versions of Piers Plowman, A.10 culminates in 
a pro-dread triad, B.9 in a pro-dread triad and a pro-love triad, and C in a pro-love triad.  
Recently, however, Lawrence Warner has questioned whether modern editions of B 
accurately represent an authentic draft of Piers Plowman composed after A and before C. 
Warner upholds that an ur-B once existed as an intermediary between A and C, but claims 
that there is little evidence that it circulated nearly as widely as did its predecessor and suc-
cessor.94 Kane and Donaldson’s Athlone edition of B is based on two extant manuscript 
families, W~M and RF, both of which are based on the now-lost Bx. Several lines—among 
them Wit’s final, pro-love triad—that are contained in Kane and Donaldson’s edition of B 
are extant in W~M,95 but not in RF.96 Warner argues that these lines were not in Bx, but were 
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Burrow and Turville-Petre 153, n. 38.  
95 See Langland, The Piers Plowman Electronic Archive, vols 2 (W.9.213–16) and 5 
(M.9.213–16). 
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added to the W~M family from an early version of C.97 If Warner is correct, Langland origi-
nally wrote these lines while composing C and, years later, a scribe copying Bx with recourse 
to an early version of C (or at least loose pages thereof) —call him the post-C redactor—
made the decision to include Wit C’s pro-love triad in his version of B without excluding 
Bx’s pro-dread triad. It is highly unlikely that Langland himself performed this editorial move 
after composing the pro-love and relatively dread-less C.10. Through his combinatory edit-
ing, the post-C redactor cleverly aligned the affective theology espoused at the end of Wit 
B’s speech with that espoused by his mid-passus triad, thereby not only influencing Piers 
Plowman as we know it today, but also inadvertently strengthening the commonly held con-
tention that modern editions of A.10, B.9 and C.10 chronicle one man’s gradual shift from 
dread to love.98 Taking seriously the acts of extra-authorial agents like the post-C redactor 
advances our understanding of Piers Plowman’s production beyond ‘the romantic idea of 
Langland’s process of poetic composition as a long, sustained act of passion over many 
years’,99 to a more nuanced account of the vast network of author(s), patrons, scribes and edi-
tors responsible for producing Piers Plowman.100  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 See Langland, The Piers Plowman Electronic Archive, vols 1 (F. 9.198–99) and 7 
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97 Warner, The Lost History of Piers Plowman 27–28. 
98 Of course, Langland could have retroactively made Wit B a more definite intermediary 
between Wits A and C, as long as he was comfortable, as he may well have been, with 
multiple, emotionally dissonant versions of Piers Plowman circulating simultaneously. 
99 Trigg, “Langland’s Tears” 44. 
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“Making a Good End.” 
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Like the pro-love triad, most of Wit B’s additions to Wit A’s conclusion are those that 
Warner attributes to a scribe copying Bx with access to an early version of C.10.101 These 
tend to be of a less condemnatory and more amorous nature. In addition to appending the 
above-quoted, pro-love triad to the pro-dread triad carried over from A.10 into Bx, the post-C 
redactor also enjoins young people to enjoy marital sex while they can (182–88). While this 
passage does not deviate from Wit B’s condemnatory tone, it balances Wit B’s condemnation 
of unlawful enjoyment with a celebration of virtues of love borrowed from Wit C. Once 
again, the post-C redactor drew from C.10 to balance, rather than undermine, Wit B’s theo-
logical agenda. Just as Wit B makes loving dread the Dobet to dread’s Dowel, this passage 
lauds subjects who lawfully love each other out of fear of extra-marital sex’s intergeneration-
al repercussions. Although an edition of Bx without these post-C additions would not be radi-
cally different than the Athlone edition of B, it would be substantially less celebratory of law-
ful love, suggesting that Langland’s actual middle draft between A and C (if such a thing ev-
er existed) was much more like A and less like C than we have hitherto supposed.  
C.10: LOVE, FEARLESSNESS, EVANGELISM 
Wit C’s brand of emotional asceticism is quite a bit simpler than those of his supposed pre-
decessors due mainly to the fact that he replaces much of the pro-dread rhetoric of A.10 and 
B.9 with new content emphasizing the devotional value of love, which segues neatly into his 
complementary harangue about the dangers of sinful love. While Wit C does add some for-
mal coherence to his speech by limiting his discussion of affective theology to love, in so do-
ing he foregoes Wit A’s nuanced allegory of dread’s organic growth into ethical action and 
Wit B’s proclamation that those who pay for entertainment while poor people are hungry 
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lack sufficient dread of God. On a pedagogical level, Wit C’s simplicity is troubling: by con-
flating living well and loving well, he leaves no room for negative feelings in spiritual life. 
As we’ve seen, however, a great deal of Middle English devotional ideology is designed to 
transform the negative feelings that are always abundant in human life into spiritually pro-
ductive action. Wit C, on the other hand, mandates compulsory love. In some respects, then, 
Wit C, who neglects to sanction negative emotions, seems markedly uncompassionate, com-
pared to Wits A and B, both of whom teach their audience to turn bad feelings into good be-
havior. 
C.10 does not begin with Wit’s speech, as do A.10 and B.9, but with material analo-
gous to A.9 and B.8: the beginning of the Vita. After bickering with some friars, Will falls 
into a dream in which Thouhte introduces him to the Dowel, Dobet and Dobest triad for the 
first time. While the beginning of C.10 is largely analogous to A.9 and B.8, it includes two 
unique lines concerning dread. First, when describing Dobest—who, for Thouhtes A, B and 
C, bears the “bisshopis crose” that guides men to good with its hooked end and punishes sin-
ners with its pointed end—Thouhte C insists that Dobest must not dread the sinners he pun-
ishes: “Ac dobest sholde drede hem nat but do as god hihte: Nolite timere eos qui possunt 
occidere corpus &c” (99). Although he quotes only the beginning of Matthew 10.28 (“Do not 
fear those who kill the body . . .”), the passage’s oft-cited conclusion (“. . . but cannot kill the 
soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell”) expressly commands 
devotees to fear God. Like Augustine (not to mention Wits A and B), Thouhte C does not 
associate doing well with a lack of fear, but with appropriately directed fear. In addition to 
citing Matthew 10.28, Thohte C beseeches Wit C to explain what Dowel, Dobet, Dobest 
“drede and doute” (127). While Wit C never explicitly answers Thohte C’s question, his reit-
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eration of Wits A and B’s fearful descriptions of the dire consequences of unloving marriages 
and extra-marital love can easily be read as indicative of Wit C’s opinions regarding the ap-
propriate objects of dread for devotees.   
 Despite his undeniable focus on love, Wit C is bitterly condemnatory. Although he 
initially lauds humanity’s Godliness—“Man is [Kynde] most lyk of membres and of face / 
And semblable in soule” (157–58)—he warns that sin obscures it like clouds obscure the sun: 
 And as thow seest the soone sum tyme for cloudes 
 May nat snyne ne shewe on schalkes on erthe, 
 So let lecherye and other luther synnes 
 That god seweth nat synnefole men and soffreth hem mysfare, 
 As somme hangeth hemsulue and oþerwhile adrencheth. 
 God wol nat of hem wyte bute lat hem yworthe, 
 As þe sauter sayth by bynnefole shrewes: 
 Et dimisi eos secundum deideria eorum. (159–65) 
In a horrifying inverse of an affective theology that prompts devotees to feel compassion for 
Christ’s suffering, Wit C paints a picture of a horrifyingly unsympathetic God idly watching 
as sinful men hang and drown themselves. For Wits A and B, dread is a bodily agent of mor-
al regulation: it keeps devotees close to God and away from sin. Wit C, on the other hand, 
focuses on sin’s capacity to obscure divinity’s light. Although he focuses on positive feel-
ings, Wit C is hardly more optimistic than his predecessors. 
Continuing his rant against those undeserving of their Godliness, Wit C condemns 
sinners who are rich in material wealth, but lacking “goddes grace” (167). They love “catel” 
(i.e., material goods) more than Kynde “that alle kyne thynges wrouhten / The which is loue 
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and lyf þat last withouten ende” (168–70). Just as Thohte C uses Matthew 10.28 to express 
exactly how (not) to fear, Wit C expresses how (not) to love by condemning those who love 
worldly goods and lauding those who love Kynde (i.e., God’s eternal love). Although Wit 
C’s preferred mode of affective devotion is love, rather than fear, his discourse on bad lovers 
(lovers of material wealth) is as condemnatory as anything Wit B has to offer. 
Unlike Wit B, who demands that the church care for “[f]auntes and fooles” (68–73), 
Wit C follows Wit A in attributing responsibility for “fauntokynes” and “foles” to both 
“frendes” and “holy churche” (C.10.183–85; cf. A.10.58–70), though he does not specify, as 
does Wit A, that the church should step in where friends and family fail (A.10.68–70). Omit-
ting Wit B’s elaborate attempt to shame uncharitable Christians by unfavorably comparing 
them to Jews (84–90), Wit C stitches his discourse on “fauntokynes” and “foles” directly to a 
reproduction of Dobest in Wit B’s mid-passus triad (B.9.99–100), which Wit C recasts as 
Dowel:  
 Ac fauntokynes and foles þat fauten inwit 
 Frendes shal fynde hem and fram holye kepe 
 And holy churche helpe to, so sholde no man begge 
 Ne spille speche ne tyme ne myspende noyther 
 Meble ne vnmeble, mete noþer drynke. 
 Ac thenne ded we alle wel, and wel bet ȝuy, louye 
 Oure enemyes enterely and helpe hem at here nede. 
 And ȝut were best to be aboute and bryng hit to hepe 
 That alle landes loueden and in on lawe bileuede. (183–91) 
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Initially, Wit C’s statement at 185b, “so sholde no man begge,” seems to optimistically 
prophesize that poverty will fade into the past when friends and holy church take responsibil-
ity for those lacking “inwit.” The subsequent lines, however, retroactively reinterpret this 
statement as the first in a string of imperatives directed at those hoping to do well. According 
to Wit C, Dowel, like Wit B’s Dobest, is to “spille” neither speech, nor time, nor goods; 
Dobet is to love enemies; and Dobest is to evangelize. Wit C’s ascetic program, therefore, is 
markedly more focused on the devotional value of love-driven social action than either Wit A 
or Wit B, especially if Warner is correct that modern editions of B.9 contain several particu-
larly loving lines that the post-C redactor added to Bx from C. 
 Wit C expressly insists that Dobest entails evangelizing fearlessly. Just as Christ was 
“robbed and ruyfled or he on rode deyede / And seth he les his lyf for lawe sholde loue 
wexe” (195–96), Bishops—who, according to Wit C, are responsible for carrying out 
Dobest’s evangelical mission—must risk bodily integrity to proliferate the law of love: 
 Prelates and prestes and princes of holy churche 
 Sholde doute no deth ne no dere ȝeres 
 To wende as wyde as þe worlde were 
 To tulie þe erthe with tonge and teche men to louye. (197–200) 
Dreading neither death nor poverty, Wit C’s churchmen are obligated, not only to love well, 
but also to teach others to do so. We cannot characterize Wit C, however, as completely 
against dread, but only against the fear of bodily death. In this, he is ideologically aligned 
with Thohte C’s citation of Matthew 10.28, though he neglects to mandate fear of the Lord. 
Wit C, therefore, is interested in neither advancing nor refuting a fear-based devotional pro-
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gram, but in advancing an alternate, love-based program designed to produce a self-
expanding community of fearless, evangelizing lovers.  
Wit C’s re-fashioned mid-passus triad segues quite neatly into his diatribe on the im-
portance of marrying for love: “Hoso lyueth in lawe and in loue doth wel / As this wedded 
men þat this world susteyneth” (203–04). After following Wit B in misattributing Ezekiel 
18.20 to “the gospel” only to argue against it, Wit C favorably alludes to the “contemporary 
legal practice [. . .] of escheating to the crown the goods of convicted felons and denying in-
heritance”: “For though þe fader be a frankeleyn and for a felon be hanged / The eritage þat 
þe eyer sholde haue is at þe kynges wille” (240–41). Despite his penchant for touting love’s 
devotional value, Wit C’s insistence that the children of sinners inherit their parents’ sinful 
attributes just as the heirs of criminals are forcefully deprived of their land is undeniably cru-
el. Despite omitting Wit B’s condemnations of uncharitable Christians, moreover, Wit C ex-
pands Wit B’s condemnation of those who marry for money rather than love: 
And thogh he be louich to loken on and lossum abedde, 
A mayde and wel ymanered and of gode men yspronge, 
Bote he haue oþer goed haue wol here no ryche. 
Ac lat her be vnlouely and vnlofsum abedde, 
A bastard, a bond oen, a begeneldes dohter 
That no cortesye can, bute know late here be 
For riche or yrented wel, thouh he be reueled for elde 
Ther ne is squier ne knyhte in contreye aboute 
That he ne wol bowe to þatbonde to beden here an hosbonde 
And wedden here for here welthe and weschen on þe morwe 
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That his wyf were wexe or a walet ful of nobles. (259–69)    
Wit C condemns men who neglect attractive but poor maidens of good stock in favor of 
wealthy but loathsome bastards and bondwomen. His attacks on those who subvert social or-
der by marrying across class lines recalls both Wit A’s social conservatism and Wit B’s con-
demnatory tone. Despite his increased emphasis on love’s devotional value, Wit C maintains 
and expands the critiques of sinful love launched by his predecessors with one exception. 
Perhaps Langland’s advanced age while composing C accounts for the fact that Wit C does 
not proclaim, as do Wits A and B, that “[i]t is an vncomly couple, by crist! as me þynkeþ, / 
To yeuen a yong wench to a yolde feble” (A.10.186–87; B.9.165–66).  
According to Warner’s hypothesis that Bx lacked a final pro-love triad, that triad orig-
inally appeared at the end of C.10: 
And thus is dowel, my frende, to do as lawe techeth: 
To louye and to loue the and no lyf to greue; 
Ac to louye and to lene, leef me þat is dobet; 
To ȝeue and to ȝeme bothe ȝonge and olde, 
Helen and helpen, is dobest of alle. 
For þe more a man may do, by so þat a do hit, 
The more he is worthy and worth, of wyse and goed ypresed. (301–07) 
Wit C’s final triad is emphatically extroverted: social at every level. Dowel is to love others 
and to avoid grieving them, Dobet is to love and help others, and Dobest is to give and tend 
to young and old. On the one hand, Wit C’s love-based devotional program seems preferable 
to the dread-based programs of his predecessors. After all, Wit C mandates only positive 
emotions. On the other hand, Wit C has little to say about devotional value of negative emo-
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tions. As we have seen, Wits A and B do not mandate negative emotions out of sadism, but 
in order to help devotees make sense of and properly direct the negative feelings. By forgo-
ing their discourse on dread and valorizing fearless love, Wit C leaves no room for negative 
emotions in Christian devotion.  
CONCLUSION: THE BODIES OF PIERS PLOWMAN A.10, B.9 AND C.10 
Each of Piers Plowman’s Wits presents a distinct ascetic program detailing those emotions 
that the devotee ought to perform and those s/he should eschew in order to cultivate ethical 
behavior. To summarize briefly: Wit A emphasizes the devotional value of negative feelings 
like dread and suffering, as well as the negative consequences of seemingly positive, but sin-
ful feelings like illicit love. According to Warner’s hypothesis, the next version of Piers 
Plowman to be produced was Bx (i.e., B as we now know it, excluding the lines from C add-
ed by the post-C redactor). Wit Bx omits much of Wit A’s emphasis on the devotional value 
of suffering and alters his mid-passus triad to advocate an advancement from servile fear to 
chaste dread à la Augustine, but does not temper his final pro-dread triad with a correspond-
ing pro-love triad, as does Wit B. In many ways an inverse of Wit A, Wit C emphasizes the 
devotional value of love, as well as the dangers posed by cowardly dread. Though they are all 
different, the emotional proclivities expressed by each version of Wit has analogues within 
medieval England’s rich ecosystem of dread- and love-based ascetic theologies. 
As mentioned above, the apparent progression from dread to love across A.10, B.9, 
and C.10 has been cited to support the theory that Piers Plowman A, B and C as we know 
them today represent one author’s poem in three consecutive drafts (Lawler 96). During the 
late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries alone, however, a host of scribes copied all three 
versions of Piers Plowman, often deliberately amalgamating them and even adding to them 
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on occasion. As we have seen, the post-C redactor drew from Wit C to fashion Wit Bx into 
Wit B. Presumably Langland (if such a person even existed) was not responsible for these 
changes, since he had long since converted his theology of dread to one of love. The post-C 
redactor had access to and knowledge of Bx.9 and C.10. He intentionally instilled C.10’s lov-
ing theology within Bx.9 without giving up the latter’s Augustinian discourse on dread. In so 
doing, he personalized Piers Plowman, inscribing his own bodily leanings into a small sec-
tion of the poem’s material body—its manuscripts. Although Piers Plowman’s extant body 
probably bears the trace of the monumental effort that one historical body poured into writing 
and rewriting it hundreds of years ago, it also bears the trace of a great deal of extra-authorial 
labor through which the poem’s scribes synchronized Piers Plowman with their bodies and 
vice versa. We need not abandon belief in Langland to celebrate the efforts of those equally 
historical bodies that continued to alter the body of Piers Plowman long after his death.    
Turning from authorship to audience, matters become infinitely more complex.102 It is 
impossible to speak with much certainty about the kind of “emotional community,” or even 
the “emotional communities,” that Piers Plowman produced.103 Nevertheless, a multitude of 
medieval devotees certainly read and copied the various versions of Wit’s psychomachia and 
it is equally impossible to imagine them doing so without Wit’s allegory of the body influ-
encing the way they conceptualized and conducted their own ascetic battles against Sire prin-
ceps huius mundi. It is likely, moreover, that at least some of Piers Plowman’s earliest read-
ers were, like its scribes, familiar with multiple versions of the poem and could therefore read 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 For the early audience of Piers Plowman see Middleton, “The Audience and Public of 
Piers Plowman”; and Horobin, “Manuscripts and Readers of Piers Plowman.” 
103 Rosenwein defines “emotional communities” as “social groups whose members adhere to 
the same valuation of emotions and their expression” (“Problems and Methods” 1). 
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the affective theologies of several Wits against one another as we have in this essay.104 Since 
their conception, the ascetic theologies of dread and love endorsed by the various Wits of 
Piers Plowman have coexisted in a center-less network of difference and deferral, governed 
by the laws of mouvance.105 Consequently, the most we can say with certainty about Piers 
Plowman’s impact on the bodies of its audience members is that it was and continues to be 
characterized by the same play of différance that governs the poem’s textual body.106  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Justice and Kerby-Fulton, ‘Langlandian Reading Circles and Civil Service’. 
105 For mouvance see Zumthor, Toward a Medieval Poetics 40–76. 
106 For “différance,” an amalgamation of ‘difference’ and ‘deferral’, see Derrida, 
“Différance.” 
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CHAPTER 4: 
ENVYING HEAVENLY BLISS IN FITT 7 OF PEARL 
INTRODUCTION 
While medievals were unfamiliar with the term “emotional intelligence” (Goleman 3–12),107 
they nevertheless were acutely invested in the ethical project of helping themselves and oth-
ers cultivate a “healthy” emotional disposition through willful acts—a project that undergirds 
the modern “emotional intelligence movement.”108 Of course, any standard of “emotional 
intelligence,” whether tacit or explicit, is a cultural construct and therefore biased towards the 
ideals of those with the privilege to construct culture. Indeed, medieval scholastic theologians 
(not unlike modern theorists of emotional intelligence) jealously guarded their privilege, not 
only to imply when and where their audience ought to experience a given emotion, but also 
to define emotion itself, as well as its role in the psychomachia of everyday life.109 In the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, scholastic theologians such as John Duns Scotus and Wil-
liam of Ockham increasingly espoused a voluntarist theology according to which emotions 
are indirectly controllable and, consequently, “one can learn to feel them in a proper manner 
by forming habits which change the conditions of the passions.”110 For voluntarists, acts of 
volition are capable not only of managing involuntary emotional reactions, but also of chang-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 According to Goleman’s mixed model, “emotional intelligence” is a complex network of 
competencies involving self-awareness, self-regulation, social skill, empathy and motivation. 
Although it has gained considerable popularity in both academic and popular circles, the 
concept of emotional intelligence has met with substantial criticism. See, for example, Edwin 
A. Locke 425–31.  
108 See Rosenwein, Emotional Communities 1–31; McNamer, Affective Meditation 119–206; 
and Somerset, “Excitative Speech” 59–79. 
109 Knuuttila 177–255.  
110 Knuuttila 256–86. 
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ing the subject’s emotional disposition and, resultantly, her subsequent emotions. In this re-
gard, their ideas live on to this day. Modern psychologists, for example, often treat phobia by 
prompting patients to willfully confront feared objects in order to gradually reduce their emo-
tional aversion thereto.111   
In medieval England, of course, explorations of the relationship between the will and 
emotion were certainly not the sole province of lofty, Latinate scholastics. With the skyrock-
eting of literacy rates in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a new brand of devotional 
literature—Nicholas Watson’s “vernacular theology”—flourished throughout England, much 
of which directly assesses the extent to which willful acts can dictate one’s emotional dispo-
sition.112 Given the prominence of voluntarist ideas in late medieval England, I understand 
Cotton Nero A.x—containing Pearl, Patience, Cleanness and Sir Gawain and the Green 
Knight (SGGK)—as a series of exemplary narratives designed to help their audience willfully 
construct an ethical emotional disposition. Yet these narratives tend to portray, not characters 
who un-problematically emote ethically, but ones who struggle to emote well: Pearl’s 
dreamer erratically swings from melancholia, to bliss, to dread, to envy and back to melan-
cholia; characters in Cleanness are violently punished for their “unlawful” enjoyment; Jonah 
learns that patience amounts to willfully enduring anger at God; and Gawain is compelled by 
a love of his own life, and concomitant fear of losing it, to withhold the green girdle from 
Bertilak on the third and final day of their “exchange of winnings game,” though he eventual-
ly re-ingratiates himself both to Bertilak and denizens of his own homo-social habitus, Ar-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Parsons and Rizzo 250–61.  
112 For vernacular theology see Watson, “Introduction: King Solomon’s Tablets,” 1–14; and 
Gillespie 401–20.  
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thur’s court, through two public displays of shame.113 According to these narratives neither 
positive feelings (bliss, mirth and love), nor uncomfortable feelings (envy, fear, anger and 
shame) are extraneous bodily conditions to be avoided, obfuscated or repressed. Instead, they 
are valuable—if potentially dangerous—ecstasies and adversities to be worked through in 
order to achieve a more finely tuned emotional disposition. In compiling these narratives, 
Cotton Nero A.x vies to teach us, not only how (not) to willfully craft emotional relationships 
with terrestrial and celestial others, but also that the capacity to emote ethically is not an in-
nate character-trait, but an art-form that we must deliberately cultivate through a lifelong 
process of trial-and-error. The pedagogical character of these narratives, therefore, accords 
well with scholastic and voluntarist devotional programs that hold willful acts capable of ha-
bituating the passions.114  
The process of trial-and-error through which Cotton Nero A.x’s characters struggle to 
emote well is nowhere more pronounced than in Pearl, much of which is spent detailing ei-
ther the dreamer’s mercurial emotional state or the pearl-maiden’s critique thereof. Some 
critics argue that the dreamer successfully accomplishes the work of mourning over the 
course of Pearl (e.g., Astell, “Mourning and Marriage” 121, 134–35). Others read him as ob-
stinately refusing, right up until the end of the poem, to auto-affect an identificatory shift 
from a melancholic, courtly lover of the pearl-maiden to a universalist, Christian lover of the 
corporate church (e.g., Aers, “The Self Mourning”). While in some ways opposed, these two 
critical strains both presuppose that the pearl-maiden’s didactic agenda is to coax the dreamer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 For in-depth analyses of the political uses of misogyny in SGGK, see Ingham, Sovereign 
Fantasies 107–36; and Schiff 72–99. 
114 For Thomas Aquinas’ scholastic account of the relation between passions and habit, see 
Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 59. a. 1–5.  
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from a melancholic obsession with his lost love-object to an acceptance of his loss. To the 
contrary, I argue below that the dreamer evinces exactly this brand of acceptance in the po-
em’s seventh fitt and that the pearl-maiden subsequently does everything in her power to 
render the dreamer desirous, even envious, of her existence in a celestial world characterized, 
ironically enough, by a complete lack of envy. Envy, according to medieval preaching manu-
als, consists of “sadness about someone else’s happiness and glee about someone else’s ruin 
or adversity” (Fasciculus morum 149). Of course, the pearl-maiden neither explicitly tells the 
dreamer to be sad at her happiness, nor implies that he ought to be. On the other hand, she 
neither tells him to be happy for her happiness, nor implies that worldly subjects are capable 
of such a sympathetic identification with heavenly bliss. Instead, she implies that terrestrial 
subjects ought to endure, or work through, their inevitable envy of the endless, communal 
bliss enjoyed by celestial subjects in order to comprehend, rather than transcend, the ontolog-
ical gap between a worldly life replete with envious desires and a heavenly afterlife entirely 
bereft thereof.  
Where jealousy involves “the sense that someone else is receiving more attention and 
affection from one’s love object” (Akhtar 155), envy entails discomfort with another’s good 
fortune and is therefore a sort of anti-love. Unlike preaching manuals which unequivocally 
condemn envy, Pearl does not outlaw this anti-love and even encourages it insofar as it fuels 
a desire to perform the requisite good behavior in order to get to heaven. Rather than casti-
gating envy as a necessarily sinful hatred of the good, Pearl proposes a point of identity be-
tween discomfort with another’s good and the ethical project of eschewing sin. In Pearl, en-
vy can be ethical. Envy, from the Latin in-videre, signifies a negative form of vision. Hence, 
the eyes of Dante’s envious are sewed shut with iron wire (Canto XIII, ll. 67–72). Since 
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Pearl characterizes the envy felt by a terrestrial, Christian devotee towards those already en-
shrined in heaven as potentially productive, we might therefore read the overt and complex 
visual aesthetics of Pearl’s depiction of the New Jerusalem as designed to overcome the lo-
gistical difficulties of envying celestial and therefore invisible others.115  
COMMENTARY PART I: THE DREAMER SPEAKS 
By the beginning of Pearl’s seventh fitt, the dreamer has already been twice rebuked by his 
interlocutor, the pearl-maiden: first for presuming to be permanently, rather than temporarily, 
united with his lost object (257–76), and again for his melancholic reaction to her first re-
buke, which she condemns as blasphemous (289 – 324). Fittingly, then, the sixth fitt’s con-
catenation word is “deme,” which can alternately mean judge, consider, ordain or condemn 
(MED, s.v. “demen”). As with the poem’s other fitts, the seventh begins by echoing the pre-
vious fitt’s concatenation word:   
Thenne demed I to þat damyselle:    
“Ne worþe no wraþe vnto my Lorde, 
If rapely I raue, spornande in spelle.” (361–63)116   
Although the pearl-maiden assigns the right to make judgments exclusively to God in the fi-
nal line of the sixth fitt—“Al lys in Hym to dyȝt and deme” (360)—, in the first line of the 
seventh fitt the dreamer adopts the position of the judge (“demed I”). Of course, his some-
what presumptuous judgment could certainly be taken as an example of the dreamer’s con-
tinual misapprehension of the pearl-maiden’s lessons, which A.C. Spearing and his followers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 I am deeply indebted to Nicola Masciandaro for many of the points in this paragraph. 
116 All quotes from the poems of Cotton Nero A.x are taken from the fifth edition of Malcolm 
Andrew’s and Ronald Waldron’s The Poems of the Pearl Manuscript: Pearl, Cleanness, 
Patience, and Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. 
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find comic (Spearing 149–52). On the other hand, it can just as easily be read as an assertion 
of the categorical difference between the ontological position of the pearl-maiden, who open-
ly speaks as God’s proxy and can therefore easily respect his rightful place as universal 
judge, and the dreamer, whose distance from divinity forces him to constantly engage in a 
speculative, if not blasphemous, evaluations of God’s will.  
The dreamer’s judgment is often translated into the jussive mood: “Let the Lord not 
be wrathful / If I hastily speak foolishly, stumbling in speech.”117 Such constructions are fre-
quent enough in Middle English to amply justify this translation. It is possible, however, to 
read the statement in the deductive mood, signifying something like: “It is not worth my 
Lord’s wrath . . . .” According to the former translation the dreamer meekly beseeches God 
not to be angry with him; according to the latter he confidently declares that God will not. 
This ambivalence is emblematic of the dreamer’s terrestrial predicament. God monopolizes 
the right to “to dyȝt and deme,” but often opts against making either the grounds or results of 
his judgments readily apparent to terrestrial subjects, leaving the dreamer to simultaneously 
speculate that God would not be angry with him for speculating and enjoin God not to be an-
gry with him for speculating. The wrath of God, of course, is a recurring theme throughout 
Cotton Nero A.x, especially in Cleanness and Patience. Eric J. Johnson brilliantly argues that 
Cleanness and Patience equip their audience with a modus timendi (mode of fearing) accord-
ing to which worldly subjects ought to perpetually dread God’s judgment without presuming 
to know exactly what that judgment entails (65–90 for modus timendi, 91–206 for Cleanness 
and Patience). Likewise, Lawrence Clopper, David Wallace and David K. Coley all argue 
that the God of Cotton Nero A.x, for all his apparent anthropomorphism, is utterly foreign to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 See, for example Casey Finch’s translation in The Complete Works of the Pearl Poet (3rd 
ed.) 361, ll. 367–69. 
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the humans whose fate he controls entirely.118 Clopper, for example, argues that Cotton Nero 
A.x deliberately mis-anthropomorphizes God in order to demonstrate “that those who imag-
ine God to be an irrational or arbitrary being suffer from a profound misconception of the 
absoluteness and otherness of God at the same time that they fail to recognize God’s merci-
ful, covenental relationship with mankind” (Clopper 1). Whether or not Cotton Nero A.x as a 
whole inspires hope that it is possible to either understand or predict God’s oscillation be-
tween wrath and mercy, it certainly depicts terrestrial existence as a continual and dangerous 
effort to do so, an effort in which the dreamer partakes through his speculative judgment.  
The dreamer excuses himself for his potentially unwise speech by describing the 
emotional condition from which it arose:  
“My herte watz al wyth mysse remorde, 
As wallande water gotz out of welle. 
I do me ay in Hys myserecorde.” (364–66)  
When read in tandem, the first two above-quoted lines constitute a simile through which the 
dreamer accounts for his melancholic disposition: Emptiness (“mysse”) afflicted his heart 
with remorse (“remorde”), which flowed out uncontrollably through his speech, just as rush-
ing water flows out of a well. Interestingly, however, the second two above-quoted lines 
make a very different simile: Just as rushing flows out of a well, the dreamer throws himself 
at God’s mercy. Once again, the ambivalence of these lines expresses the maddening inde-
terminacy of all the dreamer’s worldly actions. His emotional state compels him to simulta-
neously revel in sadness at worldly loss and to abandon himself to God’s mercy. For the 
dreamer, however, this coincidence is by no means paradoxical—as long as his expressions 
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of grief end in an appeal for God’s mercy they cannot be sinful, since, according to his un-
derstanding of Christian soteriology at this point in the poem, it is better to have sinned and 
repented than to have never sinned at all.119  
Malcolm Andrew and Ronald Waldron posit that these lines allude to Ps. 21:15: “I 
am poured out like water; and all my bones are scattered. My heart is become like wax melt-
ing in the midst of my bowels.” Just as Pearl’s dreamer alternately complains of his internal 
emptiness and entreats God to mercifully forgive the hasty speech his suffering engenders, 
the narrator of Ps. 21 oscillates between desperate complaints that God has forsaken him and 
dogged faith that the same God will deliver him from peril. Both narrators dramatize a world-
ly wavering between sinful despair at God’s incomprehensibility and penitential faith in 
God’s mercy. Indeed, Middle English devotional writings frequently associate both sinful 
and penitential emotions with effusive wells. The author of Jacob’s Well, for example, likens 
the pre-penitential subject’s body to “a schelde pytt” (a shallow pit), filled with “þe dedly 
watyr” of sin, and proposes to render it, through “long labour,” a “deepe welle,” flowing with 
the waters of God’s grace (1–3). According to Jacob’s Well, therefore, the heart-well can ei-
ther gush penitential desires or Deadly Sins. The dreamer’s problem in Pearl is that he has no 
way of being certain exactly what gushes out of him when he emotes.    
After throwing himself at God’s mercy, the dreamer segues somewhat abruptly from 
his declarative, perhaps even performative, display (“I do me ay in Hys myserecorde”), to an 
imperative address directly to the pearl-maiden, enjoining her to stop rebuking him, comfort 
him and pitifully reflect on her culpability for his melancholic state: 
“Rebuke me neuer wyth wordez felle 
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Þaȝ I forloyne, my dere endorde, 
Bot kyþez me kyndely your coumforde, 
Pytosly þenkande vpon þysse: 
Of care and me ȝe made acorde, 
Þat er watz grounde of alle my blysse.” (367–72) 
According to the Middle English Dictionary (MED), the dreamer’s use of the adjective 
“felle” marks the pearl-maiden’s “wordez” as violent, angry or cruel (MED, s.v. “felle”). Un-
der the same sub-definition (5b), the MED lists a line of Cleanness in which Daniel refers to 
the damning figures written on Belshazzar’s wall as “felle saȝes” (1737), which suggests that 
the dreamer—like Daniel and unlike Belshazzar—has a sense of the damning nature of the 
celestial message that he receives, though he—unlike Daniel and like Belshazzar—seems to 
have no desire to heed it. Instead, he rearticulates his melancholic grief by defending his right 
to “forloyne,” or wander astray. To exemplify its entry on “forloinen,” the MED can only 
muster the above-quoted usage and two from Cleanness: The first describes God’s 
knowledge that the antediluvian humans “forloyned fro þe ryȝt wayez” (282), which causes 
him to flood the world; and the second describes God’s wrath at the Jews of Jerusalem who 
“forloyn her fayth and folwȝed oþer goddes” (1165), which causes him to allow Belshazzar’s 
father, Nebuchadnezzar, to ransack Solomon’s temple (MED, s.v. “forloinen”). For the 
Pearl-poet, it seems, “forloyn”-ing can and often does mark an unforgivable crime worthy of 
God’s wrath. Despite this ominous valance, Pearl’s dreamer tries to have his cake and eat it 
too, so to speak, when he asks to “forloyn” without being rebuked by “wordez felle.” If these 
lines, once again, can be taken to signify the dreamer’s aloof misapprehension of his relation 
to celestial others, they can also be read as a tacit admission of his grief’s illegality and a not 
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un-humble request that the pearl-maiden allow him to work through his grief, rather than es-
chew or repress it for fear of divine retribution.  
 The dreamer asks-demands for the pearl-maiden to comfort him “kyndely.” The se-
mantic valance of the Middle English “kynde,” of course, is much wider than that of its mod-
ern counterpart, “kind.” In addition to benevolence, it also signifies nature and the natural 
order (MED, s.v. “kynde”). In fact, “kynde” can even be used, as it is in Piers Plowman, as a 
name for God.120 The dreamer’s appeal to the pearl-maiden’s kindness, then, suggests that 
the natural, even God-like, thing for the pearl-maiden to do is to give him the comfort he 
feels he deserves. Extending his request-injunction, he asks her to meditate with pity 
(“[p]ytosly”) on the fact that she, who once was the “grounde” of all his bliss, has accorded 
him with “care,” which can mean, among other things, sorrow, pain, fear, grief or lovesick-
ness. The dreamer’s ostensibly theological call for pity recalls the rhetoric of courtly love: If 
the male lover is tortured by lovesickness, it is only right that the female object show him 
pity by reciprocating his love, be she willing or not, dead or alive. This is, of course, insidi-
ous logic. As David Aers points out, it is precisely through this courtly logic that Troilus at 
once ensnares Criseyde in the ethical responsibility to love him and eschews his own respon-
sibility for his love-afflicted actions: 
[J]ust as Troilus blamed the imprisoned Criseyde for his grief, telling her she remains 
responsible for his survival, or for his death, even so the narrator in Pearl blames the 
dead human being, the ground of all his bliss, for abandoning him to his lonely 
mourning . . . . In this familiar courtly language the lost object fulfills the traditional 
feminine role of nurturing life source; she is the man’s essential physician without 
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whom his life becomes a disease, a nightmare of emptiness and tormented dreams, 
the state which was explored by Chaucer in Troilus and Criseyde and in the Book of 
the Duchess and, in its more self-righteously violent outcomes, by Shakespeare in 
Othello. (Aers, “The Self Mourning” 57) 
The dreamer tries to force the pearl-maiden opposite himself in an uneven gender binary in 
which the lady is ethically obligated to auto-affect love for the male courtly lover, who is free 
to “forloyn” to his heart’s content, ethically responsible for neither his own actions, nor, even 
more alarmingly, their effect on the lady’s existence. But does he succeed in doing so? 
 Continuing his project of assigning the pearl-maiden culpability for his emotional 
state, the dreamer characterizes her as a source of intermittent and unpredictable pleasure and 
pain, not unlike the Boethian world:  
“My blysse, my bale, ȝe han ben boþe, 
Bot much þe bygger ȝet watz my mon; 
Fro þou watz wroken fro vch a woþe, 
I wyste neuer quere my perle watz gon. 
Now I hit se, now leþez my loþe.” (373–77)  
The dreamer’s “blysse”/”bale” dichotomy anticipates SGGK’s narrator’s description of Brit-
ain’s constant oscillation between “blysse and blunder” (18). Despite her heavenly status, the 
dreamer continues to conflate the pearl-maiden with his worldly emotions about her. Indeed, 
he calls her neither “the source of my bliss and bale,” nor “the object of my bliss and bale,” 
but simply “my bliss and bale.” In so doing, the dreamer recalls The Book Duchess’ equally 
melancholic black knight, who identifies his lost love as “my worldes blysse” (The Riverside 
Chaucer 333, l. 209). Unlike Chaucer’s black knight, however, the dreamer finds (tempo-
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rary) happiness in being reunited with his lost love. While Aers reads the dreamer as obsti-
nately clinging to a courtly worldview for his entire dream, the above-quoted lines hint at 
progress: “From the time you were delivered (‘wroken’) from each and every torment (‘vch a 
woþe’),” the dreamer says, “I was unaware where my pearl had gone.” He initially did not 
know that the pearl-maiden had found such blissful relief, though he now does. When he ex-
presses his own relief, then, the dreamer is not just reveling in being temporarily reunited 
with his lost love, but also in finally knowing something about where his lost pearl had gone. 
If he sometimes speaks as a courtly lover, utterly unconcerned with his lady’s subjectivity 
beyond whether or not she assuages his discomfort, the dreamer struggles to establish a less 
self-centered, un-envious relation to the lady by expressing his happiness at hers.    
 Equipped with his newfound optimism, the dreamer tries to end his argument with the 
pearl-maiden. He does not exculpate her for her role in producing his worldly pain, but he 
reiterates his call for comfort in a manner simultaneously courtly and theologically astute:   
“And quen we departed we wern at on; 
God forbede we be now wroþe; 
We meten so selden by stok oþer ston.  
Þaȝ cortaysly ȝe carpe con, 
I am bot mol and manerez mysse; 
Bot Crystes mersy and Mary and Jon, 
Þise arn þe grounde of alle my blysse.” (378–84) 
Although he begins by recalling the past, worldly love that he once shared with the pearl-
maiden (“we wern at on”), the dreamer employs this recollection to justify his present desire 
for both parties to abandon their anger and accomplish something productive in the immedi-
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ate future of their rare, even miraculous, meeting. As we’ve seen, in Cotton Nero A.x, wrath 
is a judgment of guilt, occurring when a subject—be it man or God—recognizes a transgres-
sion. When he calls for himself and the pearl-maiden to mitigate their anger, therefore, the 
dreamer expresses, at the least, his desire to stop blaming the pearl-maiden for the sadness 
her absence has caused. Despite this un-Troilus-like ambition, the dreamer does not abandon 
his courtly parlance. To the contrary, he acts most Gawain-like when he modestly declares 
himself deficient in both speech (“mol”) and manners. Just as Gawain repeatedly declares 
himself rhetorically inept to Bertilak’s lady (1241–47), the dreamer employs a hyperbolic 
self-deprecation in order to enjoin the pearl-maiden to expand his worldview by speaking her 
mind. If only Troilus, Palamon and Arcite did the same.   
 Having already opened himself up to his lady’s sovereign discourse, the dreamer 
strikingly designates Christ’s mercy, Mary, and John, rather than the pearl-maiden, as the 
ground of all his bliss. These lines (383–84) present a challenge both to critics who read the 
dreamer as comically doltish and theologically obtuse and to those who read him as progress-
ing, over the course of Pearl, from a courtly lover to a corporate Christian. Falling some-
where in between these two views, Aers writes off the dreamer’s act of re-grounding his bliss 
in Christian icons as “a purely tactical concession, a formulaic compromise to facilitate both 
the continuation of the conversation and his own concerns within it. Nevertheless,” Aers 
concedes, “it does lead into a question that did not occur to Troilus, to Palamon and Arcite, to 
Othello, or to Leontes: a question about her life” (“The Self Mourning” 64). Although Aers 
pays too short shrift to the potential causal connection between the dreamer’s invocation of 
John and his later vision of the New Jerusalem (culled, as it is, directly from John’s account 
thereof in Revelation), he recognizes that, at this point in the poem, the dreamer makes a 
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most un-Troilus-like acknowledgement of his lover’s interiority by asking her to recount her 
personal history. But does this make the dreamer less a courtly lover than Troilus, or simply a 
more ethical courtly lover than Troilus, one capable of willfully forging a more egalitarian, 
inter-subjective love? As scholars of romance and hagiography often note, courtly discourse 
and Christian ideology are rarely, if ever, mutually exclusive in medieval texts (Smith, Eliza-
beth 1–36). While the dreamer’s act of re-grounding his bliss in Christ, Mary and John can be 
read as a means to prolong his lavishly polite, almost flirtatious, conversation with the pearl-
maiden, could not it also be understood as a sublime moment, albeit a rare one in Pearl, in 
which courtliness and holiness complement, rather than contradict, each other? Can we read 
the dreamer as neither clinging to a courtly ethos, nor transitioning to devotional one, but 
struggling to love the pearl-maiden in manner satisfactory to both? Do his efforts signify his 
desire (or the poet’s) to un-problematically conflate these two distinct yet inextricably inter-
twined ideologies?121 
  If the dreamer evinces progress by trying to reconcile his courtly leanings with Chris-
tian devotion, he cannot easily disregard the emotional dissonance between himself and the 
pearl-maiden: 
“In blysse I se þee blyþely blent, 
And I a man al mornyf mate. 
Ȝe take þeron ful lyttel tente, 
Þaȝ I hente ofte harmez hate.” (385–88)  
Here the dreamer back-peddles, even regresses, to a courtly complaint about the pearl-
maiden’s heavenly indifference to his worldly struggles. He cannot help but read within her 
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over-determined happiness—she is blithely blended with bliss—a lack of compassion (“ful 
lyttel tente”) for his burning pains (“harmes hate”). Yet he goes on to soften his accusation 
by reiterating his desire to avoid quibbling with her and learn from her instead: 
 “Bot now I am here in your presente, 
I wolde bysech, wythouten debate, 
Ȝe wolde me say, in sobre asente 
What lyf ȝe lede erly and late, 
For I am ful fayn þat your astate 
Is worþen to worshyp and wele, iwysse; 
Of alle my joy þe hyȝe gate, 
Hit is in grounde of alle my blysse.” (389–96)  
Despite the pearl-maiden’s apparent inability or unwillingness to share his pain, the dreamer 
dramatically asserts his happiness (“I am ful fayn”) at her heavenly “astate.” Though he 
makes no explicit mention of envy, the spectral possibility that he might be sad at the pearl-
maiden’s happiness lurks behind his assurances to the contrary. Indeed, his earlier distinction 
between his own mourning and the pearl-maiden’s un-compassionate bliss arguably provokes 
his later insistence that he is gladdened by her high estate. If the latter statement of shared 
bliss partially offsets the former statement of emotional dissonance, it does not completely 
negate the dreamer’s initial complaint. Indeed, the question remains: If he can be happy with 
her celestial happiness and sad at her terrestrial absence, why can’t she be happy with her 
celestial happiness and sad at his terrestrial sadness? This is the dreamer at his most vola-
tile—he swings from utterly dejected and introverted (“mornyf mate”) to joyously blissful 
and extroverted in eleven lines flat (385–96). And yet his mood-swing is more willful than 
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erratic. It is as if he insists on their shared happiness in a voluntarist effort to actualize it.    
COMMENTARY PART II: THE MAIDEN SPEAKS 
Although he tends to eschew culpability for his grief, the dreamer nevertheless makes willful 
efforts to mitigate the pearl-maiden’s anger, as well as his own, through courtesy; efforts that 
she vocally appreciates:  
“Now blysse, burne, mot þee bytyde,” 
Þen sayde þat lufsoum of lyth and lere, 
“And welcum here to walk and byde, 
For now þy speche is to me dere.” (397–400) 
The maiden begins by wishing for the dreamer to encounter bliss, or, more precisely, for bliss 
to encounter him. However ostensibly positive, her blessing (or blissing) is not the ringing 
endorsement it at first seems. First of all, it implies that the dreamer’s best, if not only, hope 
for obtaining worldly bliss is pure luck—if bliss finds him. Second, it curiously trivializes, or 
at least temporalizes, the dreamer’s immediately prior declaration that his bliss is grounded in 
her heavenly status. Through her vocalized hope for his future happiness, the pearl-maiden 
gently reminds the dreamer that, as a terrestrial subject, he cannot simply ground his bliss in 
her celestial status to ensure its permanence. Likewise, in welcoming the dreamer based on 
her appreciation of his “speche,” she implies that his current bliss too is not only precarious, 
but also contingent upon her continued approval. Far from offended by the dreamer’s courtly 
rhetoric, the pearl-maiden mandates that he sustain it. 
 Extending her rather passive-aggressive acclamation of the dreamer’s apologetic pro-
posal, the pearl-maiden praises his newfound meekness and retroactively diagnoses their pre-
vious antipathy as rooted in his pride:   
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“Maysterful mod and hyȝe pryde, 
I hete þee arn heterly hated here. 
My Lorde ne louez not for to chyde 
For meke arn alle þat wonez Hym nere.” (402–04) 
The pearl-maiden’s warning that a tyrannical mindset (“[m]aysterful mod”) and high pride 
are hated in heaven all too clearly implies that the dreamer is in constant danger of evincing 
these attributes, even as it congratulates him for ceasing to do so. Through it, she recalls her 
previous scathing, even mean-spirited, tripartite rebuke of the dreamer’s desire to cross the 
water separating them and live with her happily ever after (289–324). Spearing justifies the 
pearl-maiden’s sharp retorts as characterized by “deliberate and necessary harshness,” hold-
ing that the dreamer “has no hope of gaining further understanding unless he can be shocked 
out of his fool’s paradise” (Spearing 150–51). Of course, such harsh didacticism is every-
where in Cotton Nero A.x. Even so, if we consider her primary rhetorical agenda to guide the 
dreamer to a state of meek acceptance, it is difficult to explain why, after he has painstaking-
ly evinced just such an acceptance, the pearl-maiden continues to lecture him that God hates 
pride. After all, she does so in the process of ostensibly praising him for finally exiting his 
prideful “fool’s paradise.” It is equally difficult, moreover, to miss the blatant hypocrisy in 
her warning that God does not love those who “chyde,” which can mean criticize, complain 
or grumble, but also rebuke—an action quite integral to her own didactic modus operandi.  
Yet if we consider the pearl-maiden’s rhetorical aim to stoke the dreamer’s envy by repeated-
ly, if implicitly, highlighting the radical difference between the temporariness and contingen-
cy of his bliss with the permanence and certainty of her own, these rhetorical choices become 
much more explicable.  
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 If the pearl-maiden’s reply contains plenty of scornful undertones, it also conveys a 
tantalizing promise that the dreamer will be rewarded with further revelations for his good 
behavior. Once again, however, she stresses that his mystical experience and perhaps even 
the state of his soul depends on his adopting the diminutive, passive and eerily blank emo-
tional posture that is meekness: 
“And when in Hys place þou schal apere, 
Be dep deuote in hol mekenesse. 
My Lorde þe Lamb loues ay such chere; 
Þat is the grounde of alle my blysse.” (405–08)  
Of course, the pearl-maiden’s mandate that the dreamer adjust his emotional disposition 
(“chere”) to one of meekness is perfectly in line with Christian ideology, as is her opposition 
of meekness to pride: Following their Latin antecedents, Middle English preachers’ manuals 
frequently cast “mekenesse” as the affective antidote for pride.122 While her theology is per-
fectly doctrinal, in recalling a pride/meekness binary reminiscent of those contained in man-
uals used by confessors to prescribe certain behaviors and proscribe others, the pearl-maiden 
is perhaps more authoritarian than consolatory. For George Edmondson, the cumulative ef-
fect of the pearl-maiden’s doctrine “is to underscore the radical incommensurability between 
the mediated, language-bound world of the dreamer and the realm of limitless jouissance be-
yond the river” (55). Hence, her injunction that the dreamer must continually affect meekness 
and repress pride carries with it the implicit reminder that she, who has already achieved 
heavenly bliss, need not worry about such tricky cognitive and emotional adjustments. Ac-
cording to the vice/virtue system that opposes pride to meekness, the dreamer’s relation to 
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the pearl-maiden ought not be one of envy, but one of charity (caritas).123 Yet how can he 
feel charitably towards an interlocutor who ceaselessly reminds him of that he is not even 
capable of comprehending her bliss and status? 
 For Edmondson, the pearl-maiden exemplifies Jacques Lacan’s S(Ø): the signifier of 
the Other’s desire. The Lacanian subject desires nothing more than to fulfill the desire of 
some Other, be it God, Justice or, for the courtly lover, the Lady. S(Ø), not unlike the related 
“objet a,” signifies that unknown entity with which the subject could sate the Other’s desire 
(46–48). Hence, Pearl begins with a prince deriving pleasure from enclosing a pearl in gold 
(40–43). The syntax of the pearl-maiden’s description of her heavenly predicament exempli-
fies the primal fantasy of finding completion in completing the Other. Her bliss is grounded 
in the fact that her lord the lamb loves when his subjects evince devout and meek cheer. Her 
happiness is therefore based in God’s reciprocal happiness with her meekness. Together, they 
form a closed circuit in which meekness motivates love, love motivates bliss, and bliss moti-
vates meekness. Across the river, however, the dreamer remains in a world where meekness 
often leads to immense physical suffering and bliss often leads gluttony or lust. By enjoining 
the dreamer to be meek when he enters the lamb’s presence, however, the pearl-maiden hints 
that he will someday cross the river into the land of plentitude and jouissance. Of course, the 
game of evoking a sublime afterlife in order to mandate earthly meekness and passivity—so 
reviled by Friedrich Nietzsche—is fundamental to Christian ideology.124 The pearl-maiden’s 
rhetoric is striking, not for its ingenuity, but for the uncompassionate coolness with which 
she juxtaposes her bliss to the dreamer’s pain.    
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 After laying down the law to the dreamer, the pearl-maiden begins to satisfy his re-
quest by recounting the details of her life after death:  
“A blysful lyf þou says I lede; 
Þou woldez knaw þerof þe stage. 
Þow wost wel when thy perle con schede 
I waz ful ȝong and tender of age.” (409–12)  
The maiden begins her account firmly entrenched in a first person/second person dynamic 
with the dreamer, oscillating between “you” and “I.” In so doing, she recalls the closed iden-
tificatory circuit between father and daughter in worldly life, but also emphasizes the onto-
logical split currently separating them. Curiously, however, at the moment when she most 
clearly identifies herself as the dreamer’s dead daughter, she names herself, not in the first 
person, but in the third (“thy perle”), suggesting both that she is currently a categorically dif-
ferent entity than that the dreamer mournfully remembers and that she is no longer his pearl. 
Used repeatedly throughout Cotton Nero A.x, “scheden” signifies splitting or sundering 
(MED, s.v. “scheden”). While it is most frequently employed to denote the separation of rain 
or snow from clouds, it is also used to describe Gawain’s axe sundering the “schyire grece” 
between the skin and bone of the green knight’s neck (425). The sudden violence of the 
green knight’s decapitation recalls that which separated the infantile pearl-maiden from her 
father. Like the latter violence, moreover, the former proves to be temporary—what was 
“schede” will be made whole again. 
 Despite the opaque causality characterizing her initial description of the rupture that 
separated father from daughter (“thy perle con schede”), in the following lines we learn that 
the pearl-maiden is not severed by an unknown agency, but taken to marriage by the lamb:  
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“Bot my Lorde þe Lombe, þurȝ Hys godhede, 
He toke myself to Hys maryage, 
Corounde me quene in blysse to brede 
In lenghe of dayez þat ever schal wage.” (413–16)  
Here, the I/you dynamic of the previous lines gives way to a him/me dynamic that details the 
mystical marriage between the lamb and pearl-maiden. Of course, images of crowned virgins 
married to Christ in heaven are fairly frequent in Middle English literature. The Early Middle 
English treatise on virginity, Hali Meiðhad, for example, displays heavenly virgins forming a 
circle around the Godhead, surrounded by a larger circle of chaste widows and a still larger 
circle of faithful wives. While the dreamer’s account of his vision of the New Jerusalem 
(721–1153)—in which the pearl-maiden is one of 144,000 virgins surrounding the lamb—is 
certainly reminiscent of Hali Meiðhad’s account of Christ’s polygamous marriage to all the 
women of heaven, the pearl-maiden’s earlier description of her mystical marriage to Christ is 
strikingly monogamous. Indeed, when she relates that the lamb crowned her queen “in blysse 
to brede / In lenghe of dayez that ever schal wage,” she might be saying, as the MED sug-
gests, that she is to remain in a state of eternal, marital bliss, though she also might be saying 
that she and the lamb procreate (“brede”) in heaven for eternity (s.v. “breden”). While I don’t 
want to suggest that the pearl-maiden copulates with the Lamb of God in heaven, I do find 
her choice of words telling, especially given her familiarity with the literalist and materialist 
hermeneutic with which the dreamer has approached his vision thus far.  
 Having forced the dreamer into the margins of his own narrative, the pearl-maiden 
continues to describe her mystical union with the lamb, further blurring the ontological line 
between herself and God and emboldening that between herself and the dreamer:  
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“And sesed in alle Hys herytage 
Hys lef is. I am holy Hysse. 
Hys pyese, Hys prys; and Hys parage 
Is rote and grounde of alle my blysse.” (417–20)  
Upon marrying the lamb, the pearl-maiden is put in possession (“sesed”) of his entire inher-
itance (“herytage”). Here, legal language is employed to describe the pearl-maiden’s trans-
formation into heaven’s queen. Patricia Margaret Kean notes that the legality with which the 
innocent pearl-maiden is saved contrasts the surplus grace required to save those stained by 
sin, suggesting to both audience and dreamer, once again, a categorical difference between 
the dreamer and herself (187–88). Inverting her earlier, third-person self-identification as the 
dreamer’s pearl, the pearl-maiden now refers to herself as the lamb’s loved one (“[h]ys lef”). 
She then asserts that she is “holy Hysse,” a punning phrase that implies both that she is en-
tirely (wholly) in his possession and that she is sanctified (holy) as a result. The next line—in 
which she evokes the lamb’s value (“pyese”), nobility (“prys”) and inheritance (“parage”)—
can be read in apposition to the prior line, meaning that the pearl-maiden herself constitutes 
God’s value, nobility and inheritance. On the other hand, it can also be read as the subject of 
the final line of her speech, meaning that the lamb’s value, nobility and inheritance are the 
ground of all her bliss. Following Edmondson, I would argue that neither meaning is correct, 
but that, in evoking both together, the pearl-maiden once again enacts the potent fantasy in 
which the subject finds completion and bliss in providing the lacking Other that which he 
lacks. But the subject for whom this fantasy is realized is the pearl-maiden and, by explaining 
how the dreamer’s worldly loss is tantamount to her heavenly marriage, she renders the 
dreamer’s tragic narrative of which he is the protagonist a comedy of which she is the pro-
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tagonist and he plays an inferior male lover that she casts off for a better man . . . or lamb. If 
the pearl-maiden’s account of her death and mystical marriage does not explicitly enjoin the 
dreamer to envy her, it offers him no clear route to finding charitable happiness in her bliss. 
To the contrary, it brings him face-to-face with the fact that his bliss was sacrificed for hers 
and God’s superior bliss—both incomprehensible and unavailable to him—even after he has 
already made vocal attempts to move on by grounding his bliss, first in Christ, Mary and 
John and then in her incomprehensible heavenly estate. To put the matter colloquial, the 
pearl-maiden, at least as I read her, deliberately rubs it in—“it” being her static, eternal bliss.  
CONCLUSION 
Whether or not she does so in an effort to rouse the dreamer out of a state of acceptance and 
into one of envy, her speech has exactly that effect on him. In the beginning of the eighth 
fitt—whose perhaps ironic concatenation word is “cortayse”—the dreamer explicitly ex-
presses his dissatisfaction, or at least disbelief, that the pearl-maiden has usurped Mary as the 
queen of heaven (421–32). This, in turn, inspires the pearl-maiden to launch into the parable 
of the vineyard in order to once again draw attention to the ontological chasm between earth-
ly subjects, like the dreamer, who cannot help but experience envy and heavenly subjects, 
like herself, whose bliss multiplies with the recognition of the bliss of others (501–72). In-
deed, the dreamer glimpses the pearl-maiden for the last time immersed in a huge crowd of 
pearl-laden virgins (1129–52). His vision of the New Jerusalem offers the dreamer, as Sarah 
Stanbury brilliantly argues, a fantasy of returning to the female body, which promptly evapo-
rates the moment he tries to actualize it (33). As Aers reminds us, the dreamer causes his vi-
sion to collapse around him by acting on a literalist interpretation thereof (“The Self Mourn-
ing” 58). I am less eager than Aers and Spearing to blame the dreamer for his hermeneutic 
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shortcomings and I think Pearl itself is too. The lesson that the pearl-maiden ultimately be-
stows on the dreamer is that life is an ever-fluctuating series of thoughts, experiences and 
emotions. The terrestrial subject cannot simply choose not to be envious because she 
“knows” envy is a sin, but she can practice, again and again, working through her sinful emo-
tions and thoughts in an effort to produce more positive ones. There is no end to this struggle 
except in death and no skipping directly thereto. In the end, then, the pearl-maiden does not 
teach the dreamer how to feel, but forces him to develop the ability to willfully learn from his 
feelings and, in so doing, to take responsibility for them. 
 The difficulty of emotional life is omnipresent in Cotton Nero A.x, as is a profound 
appreciation of bliss, be it worldly or heavenly. Just as Pearl’s dreamer oscillates between 
“blysse and bale” and SGGK’s narrator describes Britain as a bastion of “blysse and blun-
der,” the narrator of Patience instructs us to “[b]e preue and be pacient in payne and in joye” 
(525), calling patience “a nobel poynt þaȝ it displese ofte” (531). Amidst all its graphic de-
pictions of human suffering, there is even bliss in Cleanness, though the bulk of it is either 
prelapsarian (260) or paradisiacal (177–79). In Cotton Nero A.x, the project of living well is 
reducible to neither a pure pursuit of pleasure, nor a world-denying abstinence therefrom. 
Living well involves working through emotions, negative or positive, strategically. Had 
Pearl’s dreamer awoken immediately after grounding his bliss in Christian ideology and 
knowledge of his lost loved one’s celestial bliss, it would be easy enough to read the poem as 
a sort of morality play in which the dreamer exemplifies how to grieve well. The pearl-
maiden, however, is more interested in keeping the dreamer grieving, envious and altogether 
upset than alleviating his grief. Ironically enough, it is by vividly depicting a world beyond 
emotional fluctuation that the pearl-maiden keeps the dreamer’s moods swinging.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
SHAME AND CHIVALRY IN SIR GAWAIN AND THE GREEN KNIGHT 
Shame need not crouch 
In such an Earth as Ours — 
Shame — stand erect — 
The Universe is yours. 
 
              —Emily Dickinson 
 
Recent years have seen an explosion of critical interest in medieval emotionality. Barbara 
Rosenwein’s work, for example, explores how a common ideology of emotion produces psy-
chosomatic synchronization in groups. In order to better discuss medieval cultures of emo-
tion, Rosenwein coined the influential term “emotional communities,” which she defines as 
“social groups whose members adhere to the same valuation of emotions and their expres-
sion” (“Problems and Methods” 1).125 Likewise, Sarah McNamer demonstrates that perfor-
mances of compassion, particularly for Christ’s suffering body, were vital to various devo-
tional communities throughout medieval Europe (Affective Meditation 11–14).126 These 
communities considered compassion and the will to be mutually informative—compassion 
communicates the suffering of others to the will, and the will performs compassion through 
ascetic, meditative acts. Building on this important work, I argue that a great deal of the 
flourishing of Middle English literature produced in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Eng-
land is profoundly invested in producing, maintaining and critiquing a wide variety of emo-
tional communities, including the imagined, chivalric community of knighthood. In addition 
to ideologies of love, fear and anger, a common ideology of shame banded medieval knights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 cf. Rosenwein, Emotional Communities 23–27, 164–67, 188–89.    
126 McNamer convincingly argues “affective meditation originally was a woman’s genre” 
(Affective Meditation 18, 86–115). 
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together. In this chapter, I argue that the chivalric romance Sir Gawain and the Green Knight 
(hereafter SGGK) portrays shame as a reparative emotion, essential to the process of sociali-
zation through which the denizens of Camelot produce and maintain the fragile bonds hold-
ing together Arthur’s court. 
I. RETROSPECTIVE, PROSPECTIVE AND COMMUNICATIVE SHAME 
Packed with emotion-words from “blysse” to “wrathe,” Middle English romances portray 
emotions as psychosomatic, ethical judgments that compel characters to either exemplify or 
deviate from a socially constructed standard of chivalric behavior. In Middle English ro-
mance, emotion is not only evidence of moral exemplarity (or lack thereof), but also a crucial 
component of the psychosocial process of becoming-moral. Rather than simply portraying 
emotionally literate heroes battle emotionally illiterate anti-heroes, these medieval “pulp fic-
tions” often depict characters learning to behave ethically through a highly emotional process 
of trial-and-error.127 Crucial to this learning process is shame: the uncomfortable experience 
of perceiving oneself or another outside of the confines of social acceptability (OED, s.v. 
“shame,” Def. 1a).128 As Mary C. Flannery points out, the semantic valence of the Middle 
English schame, like that of its Modern English descendent, is exceptionally wide: “as well 
as describing dishonor itself, it can refer either to the emotion resulting from an awareness of 
dishonor or disgrace, or to the anticipation of dishonor” (166). Schame, therefore, denotes 
both “retrospective shame” (Latin: pudor, rubor)—the experience of a perceived breach in 
social acceptability (MED, s.v. “shame,” Def. 3)—and “prospective shame” (Latin: verecun-
dia): the perpetual, mind-body process of avoiding future shame (MED, s.v. “shame,” Def. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 For a discussion of failure’s role in Arthurian romance, see Haught, especially her chapter 
on SGGK, 17–76. See also, Nicola McDonald’s “Polemical Introduction” 1–21.  
128 cf. MED, s.v. “shame,” Def. 3. 
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2). As distinct as they are, these two aspects of shame are profoundly intertwined in lived ex-
perience. After all, our shameful memories always already inform our decisions regarding 
how best to avoid future shame (Deonna 10–12). Of course, sometimes avoiding future 
shame is, or ought to be, more a matter of extricating oneself from an oppressive social group 
than one of conforming to that group’s rigid behavioral strictures. Nevertheless, we often 
want to maintain our membership in the emotional communities to which we belong and our 
capacity to recall past shame in order to avoid future shame is essential for doing so.  
Shame’s functionality, however, is by no means limited to the Pavlovian conditioning 
through which retrospective shame informs prospective shame. Shame also maintains and 
defends our social bonds by communicating our dismay to others, or the dismay of others to 
us. For Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, shame is rooted in infantile experience, particularly at:  
the moment when the circuit of mirroring expressions between the child’s face and 
the caregiver’s recognized face [. . .] is broken: the moment when the adult face fails 
or refuses to play its part in the continuation of the mutual gaze. [. . .] The protoaffect 
shame is thus not defined by prohibition [. . .]. Shame floods into being as a moment, 
a disruptive moment, in a circuit of identity-constituting identificatory communica-
tion. Indeed [. . .], shame is itself a form of communication. Blazons of shame, the 
“fallen face” with eyes down and head averted—and, to a lesser extent, the blush—
are semaphores of trouble and at the same time of a desire to reconstitute the interper-
sonal bridge. (36) 
Though it enforces social prohibitions later in life, shame is originally a distress signal de-
signed to maintain vital, communicative bonds that we perceive to be threatened. Following 
Sedgwick, this chapter argues that SGGK repeatedly depicts shame, not only conditioning 
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characters’ actions through a process of negative reinforcement, but also bolstering commu-
nal bonds by conveying the shamed character’s personal discomfort to the other members of 
his emotional community. SGGK, therefore, is underwritten by a multi-faceted, social psy-
chology of shame that anticipates and amalgamates the insights of behavioral psychology, 
attachment theory and affect theory.129  
While its prescience is certainly remarkable, SGGK’s psychology of shame also par-
ticipates in a “vernacular voluntarism”: my term for the surge of interest in the complex in-
terplay between emotion and volition traversing several genres of Middle English literature. 
SGGK portrays shame as neither purely intentional, nor purely unintentional. Instead, it of-
fers a nuanced, narrative account of the complex interaction of volition—both subjective and 
sovereign—and shame in the process of chivalric socialization that constitutes and maintains 
Arthur’s court. For the Gawain-poet, the chivalric subject can neither completely avoid 
shame, nor completely control its impact on his identity, though he can publically perform 
shame as a reparative request to re-socialize in the wake of a social trauma. I read Gawain’s 
shameful confession to the court at the end of the poem, therefore, as a rhetorically success-
ful, symbolic-semaphoric performance through which Gawain re-integrates himself into his 
imagined, emotional community. Far from alienating him from his king and fellow courtiers, 
Gawain’s shame ultimately strengthens the communicative and identificatory bonds connect-
ing him to Camelot. 
II. COURTING WONDER, COURTING SHAME 
For Sedgwick, positive feelings of interest-enjoyment and negative feelings of shame are two 
faces of our unified desire to commune with others: “Without positive affect, there can be no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 For the difference between behavioral psychology and attachment theory, see Bowlby. 
For a compelling introduction to affect theory see Gregg and Seigworth.  
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shame: only a scene that offers you enjoyment or engages your interest can make you blush” 
(116). SGGK depicts three moments in which blood shoots to a character’s face for shame, 
all of which occur when the subject’s enjoyment and interest in communal belonging are 
threatened: after Arthur hears the Green Knight’s scornful assessment of his court (317–18), 
after Gawain finds out the Green Knight is aware of his chivalric transgression at Hautedesert 
(2371–72), and directly before Gawain launches into his tortured account of that transgres-
sion to Arthur’s court (2503–04). For Valarie Allen, shame is always already social in 
SGGK:  
Each blush in SGGK [. . .] occurs before the gaze of another. Shame requires an audi-
ence, occurring only once one sees that one is being looked at. It forms a crucial stage 
in the construction of self-awareness, an abysmal moment in which one sees oneself 
being seen being seen; reflections are reflected in the reflections of eyes. Shame con-
structs subjective identity not as autonomous entity but as being-in-relation. (198)  
SGGK certainly depicts shame as the traumatic, “abysmal moment” that Allen describes—
one in which society gets under our skin, making pure individuality impossible. Anticipating 
Sedgwick, however, the poem also depicts shame as social in the sense that its discomfort 
spreads to those who have witnessed another’s disgrace. Consequently, shame often solicits 
recuperative compassion from such onlookers, thereby re-establishing imperiled bonds of 
social communion. As Allen puts it, “a blush puts back together a body shamed by having 
lost its honorable integrity” (196). In SGGK, shame is traumatic and reparative, conditioning 
and communicative.  
Prior to shame’s eruption into the poem, SGGK carefully attends to both the embod-
ied nature of chivalric politics and the central role of wonder—an amalgam of interest and 
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enjoyment—therein. Indeed, the poem self-identifies as an “outtrage awenture of Arthurez 
wonderez” (129). Etymologically, both “outtrage” and “awenture” signify an encounter with 
otherness, a movement into the unknown.130 Likewise, “wonder” constitutes a psychosomatic 
enchantment with the unknown. Medieval philosophers considered wonder a profoundly 
generative awareness of unawareness that provides “a stimulus and incentive to investiga-
tion” (Bynum 3).131 In addition to casting the story to come as a fount of wonder, SGGK’s 
narrator sets his scene in a Britain replete with “warre, wreke and wonder” since Brutus’ 
founding thereof, thereby marking wonder’s centrality to the arch-history of British politics 
after Troy.132   
After alluding to the mythic originator of British rule, Brutus, SGGK’s narrator opens 
on Brutus’ most famous descendent, Arthur, in his “first age,”133 brimming with youthful en-
ergy and wonder-lust: 
He watz so joly of his joyfnes, and sumquat childgered. 
His lif liked hym lyȝt; he louied þe lasse 
Auþer to longe lye or longe sitte, 
So bisied him his ȝonge blod and his brayn wylde. (86–89) 
[He was so merry in his mirth and somewhat childlike in his manner; his life pleased 
him well; he loved little either to lie long or to sit long, so busied him his young blood 
and wild brain.]134 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 MED, s.v. “outtrage,” Def. 1b; “aventure,” Defs. 4 and 5. 
131 cf. Plato’s notion that wonder is “the beginning of philosophy” (155). 
132 For an account of SGGK’s allusions to Troy, see Federico 34–47. 
133 For the medieval discourse on the three ages, see the earlier, alliterative work The 
Parlement of Thre Ages. See also Schiff 96–97. 
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SGGK’s Arthur is certainly young and more than a bit hyperactive, but that does not neces-
sarily make him a bad sovereign. Refuting critics who read the narrator’s description of Ar-
thur as pejorative, Aisling Byrne suggests “Arthur’s disinclination to ‘longe lye or to longe 
sitte’ may bespeak a refusal to rest easy in the comforts offered by the court and could point 
to the sort of vitality that is a necessary part of chivalric life” (69). In addition to indulging in 
displays of conspicuous consumption, SGGK’s Arthur solidifies his sovereignty by delaying 
hedonistic feasts and their soporific aftereffects until his boyish hunger for amazement has 
been satisfied. He therefore refuses, not only to eat until everyone has been served, but also 
to begin major feasts until he is informed of some “mayn maruayle” (94). A commonplace in 
Arthurian romance, this biopolitical power play forges a link between Arthur’s body and the 
body politic of which he is the head by rendering his own youthful hunger for wonder tanta-
mount to the court’s mundane but altogether pressing hunger for food and drink. In SGGK, 
however, the enjoyment that stems from political belonging proves both fragile and danger-
ous, and heads of political bodies and body politics are rarely as secure as they seem.  
As L.O. Aranye Fradenburg points out, the Green Knight far exceeds Arthur’s modest 
desire to hear talk of the marvelous, leaving king and court firmly enrapt in wonder (23). In-
deed, the Green Knight makes the court suddenly aware of their unawareness of the meaning 
behind his hue—“vch mon had meruayle quat hit mene myȝt such a hew lach” (233) [“eve-
ryone marveled what it might mean that a knight and a horse could have such a color”]—and 
of the nature of his errand: “Al studied þat þer stod, and stalked hym nerre / Wyth al þe won-
der of þe worlde what he worch schulde” (237–38) [“All were amazed who stood there, and 
stalked nearer to him with all the wonder in the world what he would do”]. After the Green 
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Knight asks to speak to Camelot’s governor, the court’s stunned amazement at his hue runs 
the risk of being reinterpreted as fear, which is antithetical to the courage for which the 
knights of Camelot are already famous. A deft affective politician, the Green Knight deprives 
the court of the luxury of continued, passive wonder by challenging its denizens to “the be-
heading game,” which forces them to either live up to their reputation for pride (“sour-
quydrye”), ferocity (“gryndellayk”) and resentment (“greme”) or suffer shame for failing to 
do so (311–12).  
III. FIRST BLUSH: BODY POLITICS 
SGGK’s first blush occurs after the Green Knight interprets the king and court’s astonished 
silence at his challenge as a dearth of knightly courage: “al dares for drede withute dynt 
schewed!” (315) [“all tremble with dread before a blow is delivered”]. His damning critique 
of the court’s emotional atmosphere, which he caps off with a thunderous laugh, solicits a 
whirlwind of emotions from Arthur and his courtiers:  
Wyth þis he laȝes so loude þat þe lorde greued; 
Þe blod schot for scham into his schyre face 
and lere; 
He wex as wroth as wynde, 
So did alle þat þer were.  
Þe kyng, as kene bi kynde, 
Þen stod þat stiff mon nere. (316–322) 
[With this the Green Knight laughed so loud that Arthur grieved. The blood shot for 
shame into his fair face and cheek. He waxed angry as wind, as did all that were 
there. Naturally bold, the king then approached that haughty man.]   
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The Green Knight’s traumatic rhetoric leaves both Arthur and the court grieved, blushing and 
angry. For McNamer, the court comically shadows the young king’s elaborate mood swing, 
thereby demonstrating Arthur’s biopolitical control over his courtiers: “The striking image of 
the collective face of the court instantly flushing red in shame and anger in imitation of their 
king exposes a top-down model of affective production as one of Camelot’s primary fictions. 
Here in Camelot, emotions are produced by fiat” (“Feeling” 252). While SGGK’s narrator 
certainly shows deference to Arthur’s sovereignty by recounting his emotional reaction to the 
Green Knight’s slight first, he does not explicitly state that the courtiers become angry be-
cause Arthur does. Arthur’s blush is clearly communicative of his distress, but it is not neces-
sarily the only reason the court partakes therein. Indeed, the Green Knight does not direct his 
attack at Arthur personally, but at “Arþures hous” and “þe Round Table” to whom he issues 
his challenge (309, 313). Since the Green Knight addresses the court as a unified community, 
it stands to reason that they would respond as such. Instead of depicting a comically dicta-
torial Camelot in which top-down political unity manufactures a top-down emotional unity, 
SGGK’s narrator depicts a de facto emotional community, bonded together by common anger 
and shame, undergirding and buttressing Camelot’s top-down political system. Indeed, Cam-
elot’s foremost metonymy, “þe Round Table,” facilitates an egalitarian, rhizomatic emotional 
politics in which every knight can see, and be seen by, every other knight’s face. Surely a 
rectangular table at which all subordinates look to the head better befits an arboreal, top-
down model of affective production.135  
Driven by anger, Arthur rejects the Green Knight’s indictment that the court is para-
lyzed by fear of his challenge—“I know no gome þat is gast of þy grete wordes” (325) [“I 
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25. 
   
	  
	   171	  
know no man that is afraid of your great words”]—and takes up the ax himself. Visibly un-
impressed, the Green Knight strokes his beard and adjusts his coat “wyth countenaunce 
dryȝe” (335)  [“with cool countenance”]. In her study of gesture in SGGK, Guillemette 
Bolens points out:  
The Green Knight’s gestures [in the wake of Arthur’s acceptance] are remarkably ba-
nal. In their banality lies their force. [. . .] The Green Knight expresses kinesically that 
King Arthur does not represent any danger. [. . .] In the social script operating in 
[SGGK] this attack is more detrimental than a deathblow, since it strikes at the heart 
of a society that grounds its legitimacy in the value of its king. (127)  
By acting cool, collected and perfectly unthreatened by Arthur’s visibly emotional ac-
ceptance of his challenge, the Green Knight flouts Arthur’s sovereignty, as well as the pre-
vailing ideals of all of those who derive their sense of political identity by subjecting them-
selves to it. Though the Green Knight’s gestures contradict the biopolitical fiction that Ar-
thur’s blood, like that of his relative Brutus, is infused with the right to rule, Gawain soon 
heeds the distress signal conveyed in the young king’s blush by rhetorically re-asserting the 
sovereignty innate in Arthur’s blood. In a tour de force of modesty and flattery, Gawain po-
litely pleads that, since he is the weakest and least intelligent knight at court, he ought to ac-
cept the Green Knight’s challenge in his infinitely more valuable sovereign’s stead (341–61). 
He goes on to proclaim that he is only valuable insofar as he is related to Arthur: “for as 
much as ȝe ar myn em I am only to prayse; / No bounté but your blod I in my bodé knowe” 
(366–67) [“I am only to praise forasmuch as you are my uncle. I know no other nobility than 
your blood in my body”]. Gawain derives his self-worth from the fact that he shares Arthur’s 
blood—the very blood that, moments ago shot to the sovereign’s face for shame. In his re-
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quest that Arthur allow him to play the beheading game, a political rhetoric of blood answers 
the semaphoric display of blood in Arthur’s blush. Blood calls; blood answers. 
While the beheading game initially appears to be a suicide mission, the Green Knight 
proves capable of a miraculous re-capitation that gives Arthur another dose of the astonish-
ment for which he hungered and sends Sir Gawain on an (apparent) suicide mission of his 
own. For Mary F. Godfrey, the Green Knight’s ability to survive after being decapitated has 
important political implications: “the Green Knight calls into question the fabric of all court 
societies: their dependence on their kings and the positions meted out to the courtiers in at-
tendance. This critique reaches its apogee in his paradoxical beheading—the spectacle of the 
mutilated, yet still empowered body” (69–70). For Godfrey, the Green Knight’s spectacle 
metaphorically undermines, not only the efficacy of one of medieval sovereignty’s favorite 
forms of deadly violence, decapitation, but also the top-down model of politico-emotional 
sovereignty that McNamer attributes to SGGK’s Camelot (92–93). After all, if bodies can 
operate independently of heads, who needs a head? On the other hand, after being decapitat-
ed the Green Knight’s body continues to act in concert with, though at a remove from, its 
head. The Green Knight’s spectacle, then, does not so much pose a threat to Arthur’s sover-
eignty as it shores up the fact that Camelot’s ostensibly top-down body politic, in which the 
head dictates the thoughts and feelings of all other appendages, is undergirded and buttressed 
by a rhizomatic, egalitarian emotional community that can survive estrangement, as Gawain 
must in the challenge to come. 
IV. SHAME AND SEXUALITY 
In addition to its three public, signifying blushes, SGGK also depicts Gawain concealing his 
shame’s communicative function. On the first morning of the “exchange of winnings game,” 
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Gawain awakens to a “littel dyn at his dor,” which heralds the unexpected entrance of the 
Lady “loflyest to beholde” (1183–87). Upon her approach, “þe burne schamed, / And layde 
hym doun lystyly, and let as he slepte” (1189–90) [“the man grew ashamed, and laid down 
cunningly, pretending to sleep”]. Here, Gawain experiences prospective shame: the Lady’s 
approach sets off an emotional alarm signaling a heightened potential for disgrace. As Mark 
Miller points out, Gawain’s shame and concomitant feigned sleep is simultaneously defen-
sive and prolonging:  
Lying down and pretending to sleep is in some sense a defensive gesture: Gawain 
does not know what is going on, so he waits to see what happens before deciding 
what to do. But waiting to see what happens is also a “lysty,” desiring act here. One 
might think, on reading the further fact that as Gawain lies down in this way he does 
so in shame, that he is nursing some illicit sexual hope or goal, and that that is what 
he is waiting for and ashamed of. But that would be to miss the way both his desire 
and his shame are bound up in a gesture of deferral and prolongation. What Gawain 
does here [. . .] is to avoid anything that would confer a definitive meaning on his or 
the Lady’s actions, in order to remain in the delicious suspension of flirtatious innu-
endo. (236) 
Once again, Gawain’s shame functions to maintain the bonds of communal enjoyment, this 
time between himself and the Lady, whose company furnishes the knight considerable mirth. 
While prospective shame helps Gawain to enjoy the Lady’s presence without disgracing him-
self, it leads him to feign sleep, thereby inhibiting his shame’s communicative function. Of 
course, if the Lady believes Gawain to be asleep, she cannot empathize with the sense of 
moral danger that her presence stirs in him. Then again, since her goal is to lure an unknow-
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ing Gawain into an ethical double bind, she might well use an empathic recognition of his 
prospective shame to rhetorically disable the knight’s sense of danger without removing the 
“actual” danger—actual, at least, from the perspective of the chivalric order—that it fore-
bodes. Indeed, the Lady repeatedly exclaims that Gawain ought to be ashamed of his unwill-
ingness to discuss matters of love or offer her kisses. Just as his internal, prospective shame 
helps Gawain continue enjoying the Lady’s company; her external accusations of shame 
force him continue to do so.   
 While Gawain’s shame in the bedroom prolongs “the delicious suspension of flirta-
tious innuendo” between knight and Lady, it also reminds the knight of his social bond with 
Bertilak and, by extension, the entire homo-social order of knighthood. In fact, Lawrence 
Warner posits that, when describing Gawain’s third day of flirting with the Lady in his bed-
room, the narrator explicitly states that Gawain must avoid danger to his chivalric reputation 
by thinking more about Bertilak than his Lady (263–65). For Warner, lines 1768–69 of 
SGGK—“Gret perile bitwene hem stod, / Nif mare of hir knyȝt mynne—which have long 
taken to mean “Great peril stood between them [i.e. Gawain and the Lady] / Unless Mary is 
mindful of her knight,” actually mean “Great peril stood between them, / If he [Gawain] were 
not thinking more of her knight [Bertilak].” For SGGK’s narrator, it seems, the homosocial 
bond between Bertilak and Gawain ought to trump any heterosocial or heterosexual bond be-
tween Gawain and the Lady.  
As Carolyn Dinshaw points out, however, the exchange of winnings game’s rules al-
low Gawain to enjoy heterosexual encounters with the Lady, so long as he also engages in 
analogous homosexual encounters with Bertilak. By eliding, but not foreclosing on, the fact 
that Gawain could rightfully have sex with both husband and wife, SGGK implies that the 
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knight’s rejection of this option “goes without saying” and thereby participates in “a broad 
heterocultural strategy of unintelligibility” (223). It is a tacit, prospective shame that forces 
Gawain to carefully only show the amount of physical affection to the Lady that his heter-
onormative ideology allows him to show Bertilak later. Dinshaw’s Foucaultian reading of 
SGGK recognizes both a containing, heteronormative ideology at work in the poem and an 
opportunity to subvert this ideology “in the practice of reading, in constantly queerying the 
text” (223). One way of doing so, I think, is to point out the profound difficulty that an un-
spoken, heteronormative ideology places on Gawain’s “shame system” during the exchange 
of winnings game. If SGGK’s narrator and the poem itself implicitly promote the constant 
use prospective shame to prohibit homosexual acts, the poem also exposes the manner in 
which prohibitive, heteronormative ideologies utterly complicate shame’s capacity to engen-
der ethical behavior. After all, it is in the bedroom that Gawain lands himself in an ethical 
double bind by promising the Lady to keep the Green Girdle after he already promised Ber-
tilak to exchange all of his winnings upon the latter’s return to Hautedesert. Had he not been 
so preoccupied using prospective shame to avoid a homosexual encounter with Bertilak, 
Gawain might well have used employed it to anticipate and avoid his monumental shame be-
fore the Green Knight and, later, Camelot’s king and courtiers. 
V. SECOND BLUSH: SHAME, SELF-LOATHING, SCAPEGOATING 
SGGK’s second blush occurs after Gawain has absconded from Hautedesert with the Green 
Girdle. When he neglects to trade the Green Girdle for the thieving fox on the third round of 
the exchange of winnings game, Gawain believes it imbued with apotropaic magic and there-
fore “a juel for þe jopardé þat hym iugged were” (1856) [“a jewel for the jeopardy for which 
he was judged”]: his upcoming New Year’s meeting with the Green Knight’s ax. While the 
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Green Girdle’s supposed power to ward off death is wonderful in the sense that its modus 
operandi is utterly unknown to Gawain, the knight hopes it will imbue determinacy into a 
profoundly indeterminate future—especially where his head’s juncture with his body is con-
cerned. He soon discovers, however, that during his stay at Hautedesert, Bertilak and his La-
dy were not simply the purveyors of mirth he believed them to be, but also assessors of 
“trawþe” and that they judged his imperfect. Despite the fact that the Green Knight’s overall 
assessment of Gawain is resoundingly positive—(2364–65) “[a]s perle bi þe quite pese is of 
prys more, / So is Gawayn, in god fayth, bi oþer gay knyȝtez” [“as pearls are more precious 
than pees, so much greater is Gawain, in good faith, than other merry knights”]—he asserts 
that Gawain lacked “lewté” (loyalty) in absconding with the Girdle, which he deems a com-
paratively minor transgression since it was committed in the interest of self-preservation: “ȝe 
lufed your lyf—þe lasse I yow blame” (2368) [“since you loved your life, I blame you less.”]   
The Green Knight’s revelation sends Gawain into a whirlwind of emotion rivaling 
that of Arthur in Fitt I. First, he stands in contemplation, trembling with anger: “Þat oþer stif 
mon in study stod a gret whyle, / So agreued for greme he gryed withinne” (2369–70) 
[“Gawain stood stiff in thought for a great while, so grieved with anger/shame that he trem-
bled within”]. Up to this point in SGGK, the noun “greme” has signified the ferocious bold-
ness befitting a knight. Recall, for example, that Arthur is deeply ashamed in Fitt I when the 
Green Knight accuses his court of lacking “gryndellayk and [. . .] greme” (312). Since it is 
directed at his own past indiscretion, however, Gawain’s “greme” at the Green Knight’s 
revelation cannot be readily translated into martial action. Consequently, his puffed up anger 
quickly shrinks into retrospective shame: “Alle þe blode of his brest blende in his face, / Þat 
al he schrank for schome þat þe schalk talked” (2371–72) [“All the blood in his breast rushed 
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into his face and he shrank for shame for the words the other man talked”]. When he finally 
musters words, he curses his own cowardice in taking the Green Girdle and his covetous de-
sire to keep it, both of which compel him to betray his knightly nature (2379–84), and 
launches into his famous “anti-feminist diatribe” (2407–28), a litany of Biblical men be-
guiled by women, whose precedent Gawain evokes to validate his own wrongdoing: 
And alle þay were biwyled 
With wymmen þat þay vsed. 
Þaȝ I be now bigyled, 
Me þink me burde be excused. (2425–28) 
[Since these men were tricked by the women who they used, I think my person should 
be excused for having been beguiled.] 
Where Gawain previously blames the abstract vices cowardice and covetousness for engen-
dering his “sorȝe” (sorrow), his scapegoating speech locates the “wyles of wymmen” at the 
root thereof (2415). By resolving to love and distrust women—“[t]o luf hom wel and leue 
hem not” (2421)—Gawain attempts to convert his retrospective shame into prospective 
shame. In so doing, however, he elides the memory of his own ethical failure—which con-
sists, not of trusting a woman, but of agreeing to two conflicting promises—and thereby un-
dermines his retrospective shame’s capacity to inform prospective shame.  
 If Gawain’s anti-feminist diatribe mitigates his harsh, retrospective self-loathing, it 
does so only temporarily. In fact, he subsequently resolves to keep the Girdle, not as a testa-
ment to the Lady’s unethical behavior or that of ladies in general, but to his own: 
[. . .] in syngne of my surfet I schal se hit ofte, 
When I ride in renoun, remorde to myseluen 
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Þe faut and þe fayntyse of þe flesche crabbed, 
How tender hit is to entyse teches of fylþe; 
And þus, quen pryde schal me pryk for prowes of armes, 
Þe loke to þis luf-lace schal leþe my hert. (2433–38)         
[as a sign of my surfeit/sin I shall see it often, when I ride in glory it will remind me 
of the fault and the feebleness of the vicious flesh. How vulnerable it is to being en-
ticed by filthy teachings. And thus, when prowess of arms pricks me to pride, the 
sight of this love-lace shall humble my heart.] 
Since he simultaneously saw the girdle as a “juel for þe jopardé þat hym iugged were” and 
believed himself ever afraid of “trecherye” and “vntrawþe” (2382–84), Gawain’s faith in 
prospective shame’s capacity to ethically regulate his behavior is shaken. He does not, how-
ever, give up on prospective shame altogether, but adopts the Girdle as an external reminder 
of the necessity to perform it all the more willfully in the future. If retrospective shame’s ca-
pacity to inform prospective shame is fallible, it is still fundamental to the project of engag-
ing the world ethically. 
 The efficacy of Gawain’s shame does not lie solely in the fact that his retrospective 
perception of it will prevent similar ethical transgressions in the future; his blush clearly 
communicates distress to the Green Knight, complimenting his verbal plea for forgiveness:    
I biknowe yow, knyȝt, here stylle, 
Al fawty is my fare; 
Letez me ouertake your wylle 
And efte I schal be ware. (2385–88) 
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[I recognize that I have fared poorly sir, but let me back in your favor and I shall be 
more wary hereafter.] 
Gawain assures the Green Knight that his retrospective shame will become prospective 
shame (“efte I schal be ware”), even if the latter forgives him. His plea vocalizes the three 
intertwined functions—retrospective, prospective and communicative—that his shame simul-
taneously accomplishes. Although the Green Knight readily accepts his apology—“Þou art 
confessed so clene, beknowen of þy mysses, / And hatz þe penaunce apert of þe poynt of 
myn egge” (2391–92)—Gawain refuses his offer to return to revel at his castle and be ac-
corded his wife. Instead, he asks the Green Knight to give his regards to the Lady of 
Hautedesert and her aged companion “[þ]at þus hor knyȝt wyth hor kest han koyntly bigyled” 
[“who beguiled their knight with their clever stratagems”] (2413). While we can certainly 
read this as moment in which retrospective shame informs prospective shame (fool me once, 
shame on you; fool me twice . . .), it is equally possible that Gawain, satisfied that the Green 
Knight has accepted his apology, is simply eager to return so Arthur’s court can do the same.  
It is ultimately unclear whether or not Gawain’s vow to “never trust a woman” out-
lives his enraged, anti-feminist diatribe. In any event, SGGK gives us no reason to believe 
that following that policy would do anything to allow Gawain to avoid future shame. After 
all, it is the Green Knight’s hyperbolically masculine rhetoric that initially entrains Gawain 
into his adventure at Hautedesert, though the Green Knight conveniently enough attributes 
his own subterfuge to the wiles of a woman, or, as he calls her a “goddess”: Morgan le Fay. 
Just as Gawain blames his mistakes on the wiles of a woman, so too does the Green Knight. 
As Randy P. Schiff demonstrates, both the Green Knight and Gawain nervously apologize to 
each other for subordinating their allegiance to the homo-social order of knighthood to their 
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respective transgender alliances, thereby simultaneously venting the Gawain-poet’s misogy-
nist anxieties about contemporary female sovereignty in the midlands of England during the 
Hundred Years’ War and fantasizing about a world in which treachery among men can be 
easily attributable to the wiles of women (89–93).136 While I by no mean disagree with this 
astute reading, it is worth mentioning that SGGK narrates Gawain’s misogynist scapegoating 
simultaneously bolstering the communicative function of Gawain’s blush and undermining 
the process through which Gawain’s retrospective shame at committing himself to an ethical 
double bind might prevent him from avoiding similar pitfalls in the future. Perhaps despite 
his intentions, the Gawain-poet illustrates the disastrous consequences of shame inspired by 
misogynist and homophobic ideologies.  
VI. THIRD BLUSH: SHAME, SOCIALIZATION, SOVEREIGNTY 
By far the most intentionally driven of the three, SGGK’s third and final blush occurs after 
Gawain returns to Camelot and reveals to the court the “nirt of þe nek” [“scar on his neck”] 
from the Green Knight’s gentle punishment (2499), causing him groan “for gref and grame” 
[“for grief and pain”] and his face to redden for shame: “Þe blod in his face con melle” 
(2502–03). The Middle English Dictionary cites the Gawain-poet’s use of melle here as an 
example—tellingly, its sole example—of a Middle English author using the verb medlen to 
mean “to work, have an effect” (MED, s.v. “medlen,” Def. 2f). While the Gawain-poet does 
not use the verb medlen elsewhere, he repeatedly employs the verb melen to mean “to speak, 
talk” (MED, s.v. “melen,” Def. 1a).137 It is much more probable, then, that the Gawain-poet 
meant “[t]he blood spoke in his face,” rather than “[t]he blood worked in his face,” by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 cf. Ingham 107–36. 
137 See SGGK 543, 974, 1280. 
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phrase the “[þ]e blod in his face con melle,” though he might well have intentionally punned 
on both of these potential readings of melle. A visual symbol of Gawain’s retrospective 
shame, his blush successfully solicits the king and court’s compassion—it speaks to them.  
Just as Gawain’s blush before the Green Knight furnishes semaphoric support for the 
knight’s rhetorical apology, his blush before the court precedes a verbal apology. Having 
grievously recounted his misadventure to the court, Gawain brandishes the Green Girdle and 
declares: 
Þis is þe bende of þis blame I bere in my nek, 
Þis is þe laþe and þe losse þat I laȝt haue 
Of couardise and couetyse þat I haf caȝt þare; 
Þis is þe token of vntrawþe þat I am tan inne, 
And I mot nedez hit were wyle I may last; 
For mon may hyden his harme, bot vnhap ne may hit, 
For þer hit onez is tachched twynne wil hit neuer. (2506–12) 
[This is the badge of the blame that I bear on my neck. This is the injury and the loss 
that I have invited. The sign of the cowardice and covetousness that I caught abroad. 
This is the token of the treachery that I was discovered in and I must wear it as long 
as I live, for a man may hide his fault, but he may never undo it; it can never be sun-
dered from where it has once attached.] 
While the physiological signifiers of his blame—his blush and the nick on his neck—will 
fade, the blame itself will not (at least according to Gawain) and he must therefore resort to 
the Girdle to externally signify his past shame. For Gawain, the Green Girdle is a prosthetic 
extension of his retrospective-prospective shame system. The knight dons the Girdle to keep 
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himself and others perpetually mindful, not only of his historical disgrace, but also of the fact 
that it originated in a dearth of prospective shame. Although Gawain’s need for the Girdle 
suggests that, by the end of SGGK, the knight no longer trusts his psychic capacity to eschew 
future shame by recalling past shame, it also suggests that he is committed to trying to do so 
more deliberately in the future.  
Like SGGK’s blushes, the Girdle is also communicative—a call for the compassion-
ate consolation directed at the denizens of Camelot. Like the blushes, moreover, the Girdle’s 
communicative function works “like a charm” (albeit one whose apotropaic power lies, in 
part, in its ability to remind viewers that charms are not always what they seem): 
Þe kyng comfortez þe knyȝt, and alle þe court als 
Laȝen loude þerat, and luflyly acorden 
Þat lordes and ladis þat longed to þe Table, 
Vche burne of þe broþerhede, a bauderyk schulde haue, 
A bende abelef hym aboute of a bryȝt grene, 
And þat, for sake of þat segge, in swete to were. 
For þat watz acorded þe renoun of þe Rounde Table, 
And he honoured þat hit hade euermore after. (2513–20) 
[The king comforted the knight, as did the entire court. They laughed loud at him and 
lovingly decided that lords and ladies that belonged to the Table, each member of the 
brotherhood should wear a baldric: a silk band of bright green worn about him, for the 
sake of that knight, as a sign of respect. They decided that he who wore it possessed 
the renown of the Round Table and was honored ever after.] 
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Arthur and the courtiers of Camelot once again transvaluate the Girdle, this time from a 
badge of personal shame (at least from to the perspective of the homosocial order that 
Gawain slighted by promising the Lady to break his promise to Bertilak), to a symbol of 
Gawain’s belonging to that that order and the collective honor thereof. Arthur’s decision to 
elevate Gawain’s shame to honor in Fitt IV complements his desire to be astounded by the 
unknown world in Fitt I. If Arthur’s court is designed to court wonder, it must also readily 
forgive shame, which is nothing more than wonder under duress. SGGK’s ultimate act of 
sovereignty is also one of socialization: the Girdle, like a blush, strengthens Gawain’s imper-
iled communal bond to Camelot. SGGK celebrates both Gawain’s public performance of 
shame and Arthur’s concomitant sovereign decision to transvaluate a threat to Gawain’s 
courtly belonging into a strong identificatory bond between king, knight and court. Sovereign 
is s/he who turns shame to honor.  
It is certainly difficult to picture Gawain lowering his inhibitions and joining the 
court’s bacchanalian revelry immediately after delivering a harangue on the indelible nature 
of “blame.” It is understandable, therefore, that some critics read the Gawain of the end of 
the poem as akin to Young Goodman Brown (or Old Badman Brown) at the end of Nathanial 
Hawthorne’s story: a paranoid puritan unable to trust himself or others to avoid satanic sin 
(203–05). McNamer, for example, contends that the knight’s retrospective regret that he 
loved his life over his honor permits a:  
disidentification with Gawain when he rejects what the audience has been led to ex-
perience as a core value. Instead, listeners can identify with Arthur and the courtiers 
at the romance’s end, thus imagining, in their own lives, a similar conversion experi-
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ence, in which the greenness of loving one’s life tempers the gold of rigid chivalric 
troth.” [emphasis original] (256)  
While McNamer is not wrong to recognize a dissonance between Gawain’s guilt-ridden pub-
lic apology and the celebratory forgiveness of Arthur and the courtiers, her assertion that 
SGGK prompts its audience to dis-identify with Gawain is hard to swallow, especially since 
Arthur transmutes the Girdle into a signifier of communal identification. Why would SGGK 
prompt its readers to dis-identify with Gawain only to prompt them to identify with Arthur 
and the courtiers, who are bent of re-identifying with the traumatized Gawain?  
Conversely, other critics read SGGK as valorizing Gawain’s guilt. Robert L. 
Kindrick, for example, argues that SGGK stages Gawain progressing from a shame-honor 
value system to guilt-innocence value system: While Gawain initially acts as though his fail-
ure to surrender the Green Girdle on the third night of the exchange of winnings game is in-
consequential as long as it remains unknown to anyone except the Lady, after the Green 
Knight reveals that this transgression is public knowledge, he adopts the revised opinion that 
“the true knight is personally committed to a sense of integrity which includes the chivalric 
ideals. Only the recreant knight acts in accordance with the standards of chivalry simply to 
meet public expectations” (32).138 For Kindrick, as for McNamer, Gawain’s guilt differenti-
ates him from the king and courtiers who do not seem to partake in his torment. While both 
McNamer and Kindrick are certainly correct that Gawain’s emotional relation to his past at 
Hautedesert and, by extension the Green Girdle, is categorically different from those of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 cf. Wasserman 80. 
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king and peers,139 both pay short shrift to the considerable lengths king, court and SGGK it-
self go to answer Gawain’s call for communal compassion.  
The Order of the Garter’s Old French motto—“Hony soyt qui mal pence” [“Shamed 
be him who thinks ill of it”]—appears at the end of SGGK’s sole manuscript-attestation in 
Cotton Nero A.x, though it seems to have been written in a different hand than that which 
recorded the romance. Like many critics before her, Stephanie Trigg suggests that the its 
presence constitutes “strikingly concrete evidence [. . .] that at least one reader thought that 
the romance referred directly to the Order of the Garter, and wanted to assert or underline 
that connection” (61). According to the Order’s foundation myth, Edward III caught a group 
of knights sniggering at a lady whose blue garter had slipped down her leg while dancing 
and, uttering the Order’s motto for the first time, he elevated the lady’s garter from a signifier 
of shame to one of the highest renown. “It is easy,” Trigg writes,  
to see the correspondences between [SGGK] and the Garter myth. [. . .] However, 
there are substantial differences between the two stories. The two objects in ques-
tion—one a green and gold girdle, and the other a blue garter—enjoy very different 
narrative trajectories. One starts its ritual life as a secret gift invested with magical 
properties that is the key prop in an elaborate moral test; and the other is a piece of 
underwear that accrues ritual significance only through a daring act of royal willpow-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 cf. Pearsall, who argues, somewhat romantically, that Gawain’s ostracized status at then 
SGGK brings to the fore his essential humanity: 
There is nothing to be done, no action which will cleanse and renew his humiliated 
self, no person, however well-disposed, who will properly understand what has hap-
pened to him, but the quality he has found in himself is the quality in individuals that 
we have become accustomed to believe constitutes them in their essential individual 
humanity as distinct from their animal or their social being. (361) 
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er. The final scenes of [SGGK] which show how a sign of shame can be converted to 
a sign of honor, offer the strongest connection between the two stories. (61) 
Like the uncannily similar Garter myth, SGGK portrays shame and sovereignty working to-
gether to strengthen imperiled social bonds. SGGK is about shame’s role in socialization, at 
least insofar as it provides a powerful portrait the complex interaction between willful shame, 
salvific sovereignty and socialization that produced and maintained an imagined, chivalric, 
emotional community. 
CONCLUSION: FEELING GOOD ABOUT FEELING BAD IN COTTON NERO A.X 
In addition to SGGK, Cotton Nero A.x contains Pearl, an elaborate dream vision in which the 
narrator encounters his dead daughter, now a crowned queen of heaven; Cleanness, an allit-
erative homily on divine retribution; and Patience, a re-telling of the book of Jonah. Critics 
have long argued over why SGGK—an ostensibly secular romance—is bound up with these 
works of religious devotion. Although I can offer no definitive answer to this immense ques-
tion, I would like to conclude by suggesting briefly that, like SGGK, the devotional works in 
Cotton Nero A.x are closely attuned to the importance of so-called negative emotions to day-
to-day human existence. As we have seen, SGGK depicts shame as crucial to closely related 
processes of ethical decision-making and socialization. Likewise, Pearl depicts envy as both 
inevitable and useful: the Dreamer not only envies his daughter’s heavenly enjoyment, but 
also ultimately realizes that the terrestrial subject’s proper emotional position vis-a-vis the 
celestial subject is always envy. As Eric J. Johnson demonstrates, moreover, Cleanness in-
stills within its audience a modus timendi (mode of fearing) focused on divine, rather than 
human, retribution (16–17). Finally, Patience defines its eponymous virtue as the endurance 
of discomfort: “Forþy penaunce and payne topreue hit in syȝt / Þat pacience is a nobel poynt, 
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þaȝ it displese ofte” (531–32) [“Therefore penance and pain prove the fact that patience is a 
mark of nobility, though it’s often displeasing”]. All of Cotton Nero A.x’s poems prompt 
their audience to embrace and, where possible, render deliberate the many ways in which 
negative emotions mold the contours of identity. This is not to say, however, that Cotton Ne-
ro A.x endorses a brand of emotional asceticism in which practitioners perform bad emotions 
and repress good ones. Just as SGGK, evinces a great appreciation from mirth, wonder and 
love, so do Pearl, Cleanness and Patience. All of these poems depict emotions, whether posi-
tive or negative, as crucial and definitive components of the human experience.  
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CHAPTER 6: 
COURTLY LOVE HATE: SADOMASOCHISTIC PRIVILEGE IN TROILUS AND CRISEYDE 
On the subject all the historians agree: courtly love was, in brief, a poetic exercise, a 
way of playing with a number of conventional, idealizing themes, which couldn’t 
have any real concrete equivalent. Nevertheless, [. . . t]he influence of these ideals is a 
highly concrete one in the organization of contemporary man’s sentimental attach-
ments, and it continues its forward march.  
                                                                                        — Jacques Lacan (148) 
. . . we are far from inventing a new “formula” capable of replacing the matrix of 
courtly love. 
                                   — Slavoj Žižek (The Metastates of Enjoyment 109) 
Courtly love has not timed out. It is revocalized whenever the relationship between 
jouissance and submission to the signifier is historically repositioned. 
                                                                 — L.O. Aranye Fradenburg (Sacrifice your Love 20) 
I. ŽIŽEK’S COURTLY LOVER AND THE SPECTER OF SADISM  
Courtly love is not dead. Courtly love keeps marching. Courtly love is undead. Not only do 
we remain courtly lovers, we also remain intent upon analytically unearthing the courtly 
roots of modern romance. We recognize courtly love’s undead presence, but cannot kill it 
because courtly love expresses the framework through which we enjoy submitting to a mas-
ter signifier, be it a Lady, a state, the objective of creating an ideal future or the objective of 
conserving the values of the past. Like most zombies, courtly love is not pretty. It is no coin-
cidence that courtly love’s undead presence in our culture is gleaned foremost through a psy-
choanalytic hermeneutic designed to recognize and work through the consequences of psy-
chic trauma. Indeed, our repetition of the analytic dictum “courtly love is undead” follows 
the logic of posttraumatic signification. We are always already traumatized by courtly love.  
Slavoj Žižek’s oft-anthologized essay on courtly love has done as much as any theo-
retical work to acknowledge courtly love’s undead presence in modern culture. Therein, 
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Žižek revives Lacan’s understanding of courtly love through a series of incisive readings of 
cinematic subjects who are simultaneously attracted to and repulsed by love-objects elevated 
to the dignity of the Thing. Žižek’s Lacanian courtly lover both pursues and evades the Lady 
since either consummation with or separation from the traumatic kernel of the Real with 
which she is imbued would be utterly unbearable: “the paradox of the Lady in courtly love 
ultimately amounts to [. . .] the paradox of detour: our ‘official’ desire is that we want to 
sleep with the Lady; whereas in truth, there is nothing we fear more than a Lady who might 
generously bend her will to ours” (96). This paradoxical push-pull of conscious attraction and 
unconscious repulsion causes the courtly lover to continuously circle the Lady—a sentient 
being turned “inhuman partner” in the courtly subject’s mind—at the “safe” distance of 
courtship.140 Courtly love, however, is hardly safe.  
It is now commonplace for medievalists to point out that the works of literature usual-
ly held to express the “original” ethos of courtly love hardly adhere to the Lacanian-Žižekian 
model.141 Lacan’s famous troubadour poem from the perspective of a knight whose Lady or-
ders him to lick her ass turns out to be highly idiosyncratic (Mann 93, n. 21). More common 
are stories like Chaucer’s Miller’s Tale that joyfully portray a rube unwittingly kissing his 
would-be lover’s bare ass and thereafter complaining that his lady has grown a beard (The 
Riverside Chaucer 75, ll. 3729–46). In such stories, deferral takes on a new meaning. We can 
neither simply reduce the figure of the courtly Lady in medieval romance to an inhuman au-
tomaton generating random injunctions, nor reduce the process of courtly love to one of con-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Lacan originally dubs the Lady an “inhuman partner” in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 
150. 
141 See Bruce Holsinger 75–83. Mann 92–94; for a more favorable analysis of Lacan’s 
engagement with medieval troubadours see Labbie 129–36.   
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stant deferral. As Jill Mann demonstrates, seminal works such as Guillame de Lorris and Jean 
de Meun’s Romance of the Rose and Andreas Capellanus’ De amore celebrate long-delayed 
sexual consummation with blatant triumphalism (Mann 104–10). If medieval courtly lovers 
really were terrified that their Lady would “generously bend her will” to theirs, this certainly 
did not stop them from partaking in sex, often without the consent of their partner.142 If she 
did not bend her will, he might bend it for her. True, courtly love often involves a masculine 
display of passivity,143 a performed surrender of the aristocratic male will to aristocratic 
women. But the aristocratic men who invented and performed courtly passivity on other oc-
casions used violence to exploit, extort and rape those around them. Capellanus, to give a 
famous example, advises aristocratic men to show the utmost deference to aristocratic ladies 
and rape unwilling peasant women (149–50). Medieval courtly lovers were rarely, in actuali-
ty, nice guys, but they frequently pretended to be nice guys (or at least passive guys) in an 
effort to convince aristocratic women to sleep with them.  
Žižek provocatively compares the medieval courtly lover to Gilles Deleuze’s bour-
geoisie masochist who guiltlessly enjoys patriarchal privilege at every moment except during 
a carefully pre-regulated period of masochistic play, in which he enjoys suffering at the 
hands of his victims (Metastases of Enjoyment 91–94). From this perspective, the courtly 
lover’s feigned subordination to the Lady constitutes an unconscious attempt to compensate 
for his day-to-day impingements on the agency of others. Courtly love, in other words, func-
tions as a sort of patriarchal safety valve through which the aristocratic male vents his uncon-
scious guilt without surrendering any actual power. On one hand, the Deleuzian-Žižekian di-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 For an account of rape culture in medieval England see Dunn 52–81. 
143 For an argument against the courtly lover’s passivity see Mann 104–10. 
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agnosis of the medieval courtly lover as masochistic brilliantly explains why powerful men 
in a violently patriarchal era would enjoy adopting a servile demeanor towards women. On 
the other, it somewhat obfuscates (as does much medieval courtly literature) the sadistic vio-
lence perpetrated by medieval and modern courtly lovers alike. Sadism, Žižek argues, is not 
an inversion of masochism: “Sadism follows the logic of institution, of institutional power 
tormenting its victims and taking pleasure in its victim’s helpless resistance” (The Metastases 
of Enjoyment 91). Sadism and masochism are both forms of enjoyment bound up with privi-
lege. The former enjoys lording power over the less privileged by causing them suffering; the 
latter enjoys temporarily surrendering power to the less privileged and suffering in a pre-
scripted manner at their hands. None of Žižek’s cinematic courtly lovers explicitly toe the 
line between sadism and masochism. None of them renounce the role of courtly lover for that 
of courtly hater. As I’ll try to demonstrate in this chapter, however, the courtly lover’s maso-
chism always carries with it an implicit threat of mutating into violent sadism. If sadism, ac-
cording to Žižek, “is at work in the obscene superego underside that necessarily redoubles 
and accompanies, as its shadow, the ‘public’ Law,” then the masochist becomes a sadist 
when he stops enjoying feigning subjugation to the less privileged and starts enjoying inflict-
ing suffering upon them (Ibid.). As Capellanus’ dual advice to rape peasants and defer pas-
sively to aristocratic ladies demonstrates, medieval courtly lovers used class distinctions to 
enjoy both sadism and masochism. They were sadomasochists. Masochism cannot help but 
evoke the specter of sadism because the masochist always already possesses the privilege to 
turn into a sadist on a whim.  
For Žižek, courtly love is not dead, but it was born. A dutiful Marxist, he historicizes 
courtly love, locating its origin in thirteenth-century Europe and (in)famously arguing that 
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“[i]t is only with the emergence of masochism, or the masochistic couple, toward the end of 
the [nineteenth] century that we can now grasp the libidinal economy of courtly love” (Ibid. 
89). There is, of course, some validity to Žižek’s proverbial contention that “history has to be 
read retroactively,” which he somewhat ironically attributes to Marx, a great predictor of fu-
ture revolutions (Ibid.). From a strictly historicist perspective, however, it is dangerous to 
privilege our retrospective diagnosis of historical subjects over the self-understanding of 
those subjects who actually inhabited it. Žižek implies that premodern subjects uncritically 
complied with the strictures of courtly love, which they invented but could not diagnose. The 
discourse of courtly love and its psychic effects, however, have been subject to diagnosis 
since courtly love’s premodern conception. Dante Alighieri, for example, condemns Paolo 
and Francesca to the inferno for reading about and imitating Lancelot and Guinevere’s affair 
(80–81, ll. 127–42). Pastoral theologians, moreover, often associated courtly love with the 
sin of lechery, warning that any man who cherishes a lady (even his wife) too much is, as 
Geoffrey Chaucer’s Parson puts it, an idolater (The Riverside Chaucer 318, l. 859). Devo-
tional discourses vituperated courtly discourses precisely because the latter prompt subjects 
to elevate a terrestrial Lady, rather than a celestial God, to the dignity of the Thing. The nine-
teenth century did not invent masochism (though it might have invented the word for it). Me-
dieval subjects were zealous masochists most obviously in the Catholic Church’s system of 
confession and penance, which equated suffering with spiritual (and soteriological) gain. In 
the wake of the Black Death, radically masochistic sects of flagellants arose who, in the 
words of the chronicler Jean Froissart, “scourged themselves with whips of hard knotted 
leather with iron spikes [. . . and] made themselves bleed very badly between the shoulders 
and some foolish women had cloths ready to catch the blood and smear it on their eyes, say-
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ing that it was miraculous blood” (Chronicles 111–12). These flagellants deliberately lacer-
ated themselves in a courtly display of love for God. Like Deleuze’s masochist, they hurt 
themselves for their sins; they just did so with more self-awareness. 
In addition to devotional discourses, self-negating romances known as anti-romances 
de-sublimate courtly love only to sublimate chaste love of God or love of chivalric brother-
hood:144 although Lancelot is the best knight, his courtliness prevents him from transcending 
the category in the Grail quest (the paradigmatic anti-romance), as does his son Galahad;145 
and in SGGK the Lady’s appeals to courtliness turn out to be so many traps in a female or-
chestrated scheme to test Gawain’s loyalty to the ostensibly homosocial order of knighthood 
(2445–78). Rather than disprove that Žižek’s model of courtly love was at work in the Mid-
dle Ages, their preference for anti-romance proves that medieval subjects transcended the 
strictures of courtly love by extending its very logic of sublimation and deferral. Unlike the 
Lady, who is after all a sentient being rendered an “inhuman partner” only within the courtly 
lover’s psyche, the transcendental signifier “God” and the historical signifier “Christ” cannot 
be completely accessed from a worldly perspective, but can only be glimpsed “through a 
glass darkly” (though this Pauline maxim did not stop medieval mystics from communing 
with both signifiers regularly).146 The metaphysical glass separating terrestrial subjects from 
a celestial God is functionally analogous to the carceral glass separating the imprisoned Fer-
gus from his visitor Dil at the end of The Crying Game (1992), which Žižek reads as ena-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 For the term “anti-romance” see Bercovitch, “Romance and Anti-Romance” 30–37.  
145 Though Lancelot definitively fails the grail quest in the original Old French grail 
romance, Lancelot’s quest for the grail in Sir Thomas Mallory’s Middle English version 
“may be construed as a semisuccess.” See Armstrong 145. 
146 1 Corinthians 13:12. 
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bling, rather than restricting, their courtly love (The Metastases of Enjoyment 104–05). 
If courtly love is masochism incognito, Christian devotion is doubly so. I would ar-
gue, moreover, that both Christian devotion and courtly love entail a sadomasochistic rela-
tionship with a love-object elevated to the dignity of the Thing. If it at first seems odd to at-
tribute sadism to Christians, recall the zeal with which they constantly regard Christ’s suffer-
ing, the radical redemption they believe to have gained therefrom and the spiritual benefit 
some continue to attribute to meditating thereon. Of course, many Christians will claim that 
there is a categorical difference between the savage sadism with which Roman citizens 
watched gladiators die or modern teenagers watch The Many Faces of Death and the devout 
compassion with which medieval Christians meditated on Christ’s suffering and modern 
Christians watch Christ suffer in Mel Gibson’s modern “mystery play” The Passion of the 
Christ (2004).147 We might respond, however, that any line between devout compassion and 
sadistic voyeurism is inevitably blurred upon gleaning the uncanny similarities between me-
dieval hagiography and brutal modern horror films such as Saw (2004) and its sequels. The 
range of moral values to which we assign our enjoyment of different fantasies of suffering is 
remarkable indeed. 
While Žižek’s work on courtly love is extremely valuable insofar as it recognizes the 
undead medieval discourses haunting modern structures of enjoyment, it too readily deprives 
medieval subjects the capacity to enjoy diagnosing their own courtly-devotional economy of 
(de)sublimation and the sadomasochism it entails. Moreover, Žižek’s courtly lover lacks the 
propensity for sadistic violence evinced both in medieval courtly literature and aristocratic 
life. As I will try to demonstrate in the next section, Geoffrey Chaucer’s Troilus and Crisey-
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de contains a critique (or at least the potential for a critique) of courtly love analogous but not 
identical to Žižek’s. Chaucer, I claim, was a Žižekian. Unlike Žižek’s courtly lover, however, 
Chaucer’s Troilus manifests a penchant for sadistic, militarized violence all too common in 
courtly lovers, medieval and modern. Although Chaucer’s Troilus initially elevates Criseyde 
to the dignity of the Thing, when faced with the prospect of de-sublimating Criseyde and re-
sublimating another Lady, he instead assumes the position of superegoic sadist bent on im-
posing retributive suffering upon Diomede in service of the Trojan state and rides willingly 
to his death, eager to take as many Greeks down with him as possible. Courtly love is indeed 
an undead presence in contemporary culture and so is the sadistic violence of those who re-
nounce it. Unlike Chaucer’s Troilus, most courtly lovers do not have a war raging at the gates 
of their city in which they can readily sacrifice themselves on the alter of military glory after 
becoming disillusioned with courtly love. As we will see, Troilus sans siege is a frightening 
entity indeed. 
II. COURTLY LOVE HATE IN TROILUS AND CRISEYDE   
Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde is an (anti)romance insofar as it offers both one of the most 
sublime medieval accounts of the vicissitudes of courtly love and one of the most stunning 
medieval de-sublimations thereof. In fact, L.O Aranye Fradenburg influentially suggests that, 
since “Troilus and Criseyde’s enjoyment is caught up [. . .] in the objet a as (sentient) object 
of exchange,” the poem is characterized by “a constant oscillation between sublimation and 
desublimation” (Sacrifice Your Love 203). The characters of Troilus and Criseyde are com-
pelled to constantly sublimate and de-sublimate each other because they elevate each other to 
the dignity of the Thing, to which they are consciously attracted and by which they are un-
consciously repulsed. Troilus and Criseyde shows lovers simultaneously exchanging love-
   
	  
	   196	  
objects and recoiling in horror as they are exchanged as love-objects in an emotional econo-
my of fortune in which one character’s bliss corresponds to another’s remorse. 
Though Chaucer is deeply mired in a culture of courtly love, his attitude toward that 
culture is ambivalent. He is simultaneously courtly love’s most eloquent proponent and its 
most dour critic. Paradoxically, it is Chaucer’s very ambivalence regarding courtly love that 
renders him a Žižekian courtly lover par excellence. Every time he wants out, they pull him 
back in. Chaucer’s narrator’s ambivalence about courtly love is felt early in Troilus and Cri-
seyde: 
 For I, that God of Loves servantez serve, 
 Ne dar to Love, for myn unlikilynesse, 
 Pryen for speed, al sholde I therefore sterve, 
 So fer am I from his help in derknesse. 
 But natheles, if this may don gladnesse 
 Unto any lovere, and his cause availle, 
 Have he my thonk, and myn be this travaille (15–21). 
The narrator characterizes himself not as a courtly lover but as a servant of courtly lovers. As 
such, he does not dare pray to the God of Love for success, even though neglecting to do so 
might kill him. Although his non-prayer is presented to us in the form of a humility topos, we 
can detect a certain aggression undergirding the narrator’s ostensibly humble refusal to pray 
to the master signifier Love. Instead, he obsequiously thanks any lover who might find de-
light or advancement through his narrative labor. In adopting the role of servant of servants 
of Love, Chaucer’s narrator quietly eschews the role of Love’s servant. This is far from the 
only time that one of Chaucer’s narrators defines himself at odds with the God of Love: in 
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Parliament of Fowles, Scipio Africanus explicitly identifies Chaucer’s narrator as not “Loves 
servaunt,” since he has lost his taste for love (159–60); and the narrator of The Legend of 
Good Women is chastised by the God of Love for writing none other than Troilus and Cri-
seyde (228–316). Yet it is worth noting that the narrator’s servile self-description—“I, that 
God of Loves servantez serve”—subtly alludes to the Pope’s title: “servant of the servants of 
God.”148 On one hand, Chaucer’s narrator is a bumbling outsider in the religion of courtly 
love. On the other, he is its high priest. Ambivalence is all.   
Chaucer’s narrator is analogous to Žižek’s courtly lovers in that he is simultaneously 
infatuated with and repulsed by a love-object elevated to the dignity of the Thing, but he ele-
vates the master signifier Love, rather than a sentient Lady. Consequently, he enjoys the God 
of Love’s scorn as much as his affection. The narrator’s aggressive undertone is not lost on 
the God of Love. “The unthreatening cuteness or desexualized gallantry,” Fradenburg writes, 
“of the Chaucerian narrator does not fool the God of Love. He knows that the narrator is after 
something that belongs to him, and we should believe him” (Sacrifice Your Love 233). The 
narrator’s diminutive self-portrait masks a servile aggression somewhat akin to Nietzschean 
ressentiment. Just as the initially white crow of Chaucer’s Manciple’s Tale eagerly awaits his 
chance to bring down his master’s house by speaking truth to power,149 the narrator of Troi-
lus and Criseyde vents his servile aggression towards the God of Love by shoring up exactly 
how the passive male courtly lover displaces responsibility for his erratic, lovesick actions 
onto the Lady who “caused” them by spurning him. “Unlike the traditional masculine sub-
ject,” Holly A. Crocker and Tison Pugh write, “whose ability to act in relation to others situ-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 See Troilus and Criseyde (ed. Barney) 7, n. 3. 
149 See Fradenburg, “The Manciple’s Servant Tongue” 85–115. 
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ates his identity, Troilus is defined more extremely by his immuring passivity” (84). The fan-
tasy of the courtly lover is one of absolute freedom from responsibility to act. In other words, 
Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde illustrates that the male courtly lover’s enjoyment depends 
on a passive eschewal rather than an active exercise of sovereignty. Of course, that passive 
eschewal of responsibility is not strictly passive, but an affected social performance only 
available to very privileged, male subjects. As such, it produces a gendered ethical dynamic 
that displaces responsibility from men to women. The male courtly lover’s mantra is: “Return 
my love or there’s no telling what I’ll do!” He is an emotional terrorist. In this light, the 
“great works” of courtly love—Capellanus’ De amore and de Lorris and de Meun’s Romance 
of the Rose—are nothing more than medieval equivalents of “pick-up artist” books through 
which modern men teach each other tricks for manipulating unwilling women into sex.150 
Like masochistic courtly love, this more aggressive, arguably sadistic practice of courtly love 
remains quite alive today.  
The ambivalence between servility and sovereignty in Troilus and Criseyde is no-
where more explicit than in the scene of Troilus’ initial encounter with the God of Love. The 
narrator introduces Troilus strutting at the head of a homosocial military assemblage and 
scornfully denigrating lovers who cede their sovereignty to another (other than the Trojan 
state, of course) (183–210). Troilus’ pride, however, angers the God of Love who promptly 
subjugates the knight to Criseyde and himself. Troilus is always already subordinated to the 
law-of-the-Father: even a king’s son is a son. The God of Love rips him out of his role as a 
militaristic ego-ideal and places him in the new role of courtly lover: “That Love is he that 
alle may bynde, / For may no man fordon the lawe if kynde” (237–38). Troilus trades one 
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form of submission for another, or rather is forced to balance two. In Troilus’ subjugation (or 
at least the narrator’s first account thereof) Criseyde’s agency is completely displaced onto 
the God of Love. Not for the last time, powerful men appropriate Criseyde’s agency. Indeed, 
this early displacement of agency foreshadows that through which the Trojan parliament 
trades Criseyde to the Greeks for Antenor, though during the latter dispute, Hector at least 
complains: “We usen here no here no women for to sell” (182). Chaucer’s Criseyde is the 
daughter of a traitor and a widow who may or may not have children. When Troilus initially 
falls in love with her she is shrouded in mourning attire (132–33). Whether or not this takes 
some part in Troilus’ initial attraction to Criseyde is an open question, but once Troilus is in 
the throes of love her “weedwes habit” becomes an obstacle to his happiness (170). He 
quickly enlists Criseyde’s creepy uncle Pandarus to help him alleviate his lovesickness. Like 
the narrator, Pandarus is eager to serve love’s servants, though he is himself a spurned lover 
(though we never learn by whom). He begins his task as a go-between by seducing Criseyde 
on Troilus’ behalf, trying to put her “in the mood”: “Do wey your barbe, and shew youre face 
bare; / Do wey your book, rys up, and lat us daunce, / And lat us don to May som ob-
servaunce” (110–12). In a series of succinct imperatives Pandarus orders Criseyde to cast off 
her widow’s habit (“barbe”), throw down her book (a romance on the siege of Thebes, timely 
subject matter for a besieged Trojan) and dance in the name of religious deference to May.  
Like the narrator, Pandarus is an ambivalent figure. He is potentially, as Jessica 
Rosenfeld argues, “the poem’s problematic spokesperson for an earthly happiness that might 
evade the Law of the Father, trick Fortune at her own game, and might disturb our convic-
tions that earthly happiness, because necessarily fleeting, is a foolish or even impossible pur-
suit” (Rosenfeld, Ethics and Enjoyment 152). On the other hand, Pandarus’ actions often 
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smack of more unsavory (incestuous and compulsory) forms of desire and enjoyment. In-
deed, Criseyde’s Theban romance, among other details surrounding the poem’s treatment of 
Pandarus and Criseyde’s relationship, hints toward a specter of incestuous rape (Rushton 
147–60). Critics less generous than Rosenfeld have therefore read Pandarus as a walking knot 
of incestuous and voyeuristic desire shrouded in patriarchal privilege (Ibid. 148–52). While 
the poem does not clearly state that Pandarus molests Criseyde or watches Troilus and Cri-
seyde have sex, it strongly leads us to ask these uncomfortable questions. If Pandarus endors-
es the evasion of the unenjoyable aspects of the Law of Father (predominantly that love 
hurts), he also represents the obscene enjoyment animating that Law. Pandarus reminds us, as 
Fradenburg puts it, that “the big Other does not even care about its own rules when its jouis-
sance is at stake” (Sacrifice Your Love 212). Pandarus is not unlike Žižek’s postmodern su-
perego that endlessly enjoins us to enjoy. Anything but a proponent of endless deferral, Pan-
darus taunts those around him into enjoying immediately, before it is too late. Anticipating a 
great many of Shakespeare’s sonnets, he warns Criseyde that old age devours beauty by the 
hour: “Thenk ek how elde wasteth every houre / In ech of yow a partie of beautee” (393–94). 
An aesthetic, rather than reproductive, biological clock is ticking and Criseyde cannot afford 
an endless deferral of romantic enjoyment. She must love now while someone, a king’s son 
no less, will love her back.  
After unsuccessfully appealing to her anxieties about ageing, Pandarus appeals to Cri-
seyde’s compassion, claiming that Troilus will die of love sickness and he himself will die of 
pity if she refuses to return the lovesick knight’s affections. When Criseyde attempts to re-
fuse this unfair ethical burden, Pandarus disavows his un-amorous niece: “I se wel that ye 
sette lite of us, / Or of oure deth!” Pandarus’ death threats impinge directly on Criseyde’s 
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agency. Perhaps here more than anywhere in Troilus and Criseyde, the uneven gender dy-
namic of courtly love is most obvious. Troilus is afforded the leisure of eschewing the re-
sponsibility for maintaining his life when he is subjugated to love, but that agency must be 
relocated and Pandarus’ rhetoric delivers it directly to Criseyde, who thereafter internalizes 
it: “And if this man sle here hymself—allas!— / In my presence, it wol be no solas” (459–
60). It is Criseyde’s compassion, her capacity to be not just Love’s servant (as Troilus is) but 
also the servant of Love’s servants that causes her to assume Troilus’ responsibility.  
Unlike Troilus, to whom the poem grants the privileged position of involuntary vic-
tim of love, Criseyde is forced to carefully ponder whether she ought to love or not, weighing 
the evidence of her senses, emotions and social experience. She possesses the empathic 
awareness necessary to engender a sense of ethical responsibility and therefore recognizes 
that all decisions must be made with both self and other in mind. In other words, Criseyde 
experiences Sartrean angoisse without fleeing from it in “bad faith.” Indeed, critics have 
rightfully lauded Criseyde’s sense of existential responsibility to the other. For J. Allan 
Mitchell, Criseyde’s act of knowingly subordinating herself to the ever-unpredictable dictates 
of an other (Troilus) constitutes the ethical act par excellence, since the poem endorses a pro-
to-Levinasian ethics according to which “ethical choices can be as much a matter of passive 
discovery and acceptance as of positive self-determination” (42). Mitchell’s reading is valua-
ble insofar as it shores up Criseyde’s knack for balancing emotion and volition, ethical re-
sponsibility and the pursuit of happiness. As we have seen, however, Crocker and Pugh 
demonstrate that Troilus’ “radical passivity” both affords and is afforded by the prince’s 
privileged social status. Is Criseyde not ethically heroic precisely because she takes on the 
responsibility to act under duress that Troilus has the luxury to quietly ignore? In rendering 
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Criseyde’s acquiescence to Troilus ethically heroic, moreover, Mitchell pays rather short 
shrift to the more troubling aspects of her consent. “Troilus and Criseyde makes a powerful 
contribution to the literature of rape,” Fradenburg argues, “not by clarifying consent, but by 
showing its difficulty” (Sacrifice Your Love 208). The process through which Criseyde falls 
in love with Troilus emblematizes the profound ambivalence of her consent and the notion of 
consent in general. Troilus is instantly subjugated to love, Criseyde falls in love gradually 
based on visions of Troilus returning from battle (645–65), a dream in which an eagle vio-
lently exchanges her heart for Troilus (925–31), and the fearful compassion solicited by Pan-
darus and Troilus’ aforementioned death threats. Although Criseyde ostensibly consents to 
Troilus’ sexual advances, we are never fully certain whether love compels her to do so or she 
compels herself to do so out of a sense of ethical responsibility for Troilus-Pandarus’ well 
being (as if the self-serving and altruistic motives behind any given decision could ever be 
neatly extricated). If Criseyde consents based on concern for the joint well being of Troilus 
and Pandarus, how much does that count as consent?  
The narrator curiously elides the task signifying Criseyde’s consent. Prior to con-
summation, Criseyde, the narrator tells us, “opned hire herte and tolde hym hire entente” to 
the singing of a nightingale (1233–39). While there’s plenty of reason to follow Mitchell in 
celebrating Criseyde’s radical passivity, it would be wrong to neglect the manner in which 
Troilus’ passivity—his promise to die if unloved by Criseyde—impinges upon Criseyde’s 
decision to consent to his love. Even though Criseyde has already chosen to love Troilus, he 
continues to imply that she has no choice but to consent: “Now yeldeth yow, for other bote is 
non!” (1208). Those are not the words of a subject who respects his love-object’s infinite al-
terity. The nightingale reminds some of Ovid’s Philomela, who is transformed into a nightin-
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gale after using art to revenge her rape (Metamorphoses 134–42). “It is possible to hear,” 
Fradenburg writes, “behind Criseyde’s inaudible (to us) voicing of her ‘entente,’ the mutilat-
ed mouth of Philomela. [. . .] The possibility of Criseyde’s rape is spoken in Troilus and Cri-
seyde through intertextual haunting” (Sacrifice Your Love 226). Elaborating Fradenburg’s 
work, Patricia Clare Ingham reminds us that the nightingale that alludes to Philomela’s trau-
ma during Troilus and Criseyde’s sex scene can also be heard on the morning that a lovesick 
Pandarus sets about courting his niece in Troilus’ name. For Ingham, Pandarus’ lovesickness 
animates his vicarious courtship: “Pandarus will deflect his wounding onto Troilus (and, not 
coincidentally, Criseyde); but this is not only repetition, but also redirection. The earlier 
wounding is relived by passing it on, duplicating the event not on his own flesh, but on the 
flesh of another” (“Chaucer’s Haunted Aesthetics” 236). Traumatized by love, Pandarus is 
compelled to relive his trauma vicariously through Troilus. He is a traumatized traumatizer. 
Whether Troilus and/or Pandarus rape(s) Criseyde, the process through which the two men 
wear down her initial resistance is disturbing. Criseyde’s situation is not unlike one described 
by Žižek in his essay on courtly love:  
One of the most painful and troubling scenes from David Lynch’s Wild at Heart 
[1990] is also comprehensible only against the matrix of the logic of suspension that 
characterizes courtly love. In a lonely motel room, Willem Dafoe exerts a rude pres-
sure on Laura Dern: he touches and squeezes her, invading the space of her intimacy 
and repeating in a threatening way “Say fuck me!,” that is, extorting from her a word 
that would signal her consent to the sexual act. (The Metastases of Enjoyment 101)  
Unlike Dafoe’s character, Troilus does not abruptly step away and politely refuse the offer 
immediately after managing to coerce a “barely audible” statement of consent. If Troilus re-
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sembles Dafoe’s character in that he “wants to extort the inscription, the ‘registration,’ of her 
consent in the field of the big Other,” he also wants to and does enjoy having sex with Cri-
seyde. It is telling that for all its interest in narrating the rude pressure that Troilus and Panda-
rus apply to Criseyde, Troilus and Criseyde refuses to register her consent in the field of the 
big Other. 
In the wake of her transfer to the Greek camp, Criseyde makes the fateful decision to 
succumb to Diomede’s active advances and forsake Troilus, though she is prophetically 
aware that doing so will earn her a lasting literary reputation for unfaithfulness: “Allas, of 
me, unto the worldes ende, / Shal neyther ben ywriten nor ysonge / No good word, for thise 
bokes wol me shende” (1058–60). When weighing Criseyde’s case, it is impossible to over-
state the ethical significance of the parallel between the widow’s initial “decision” to mourn 
her lost husband and love Troilus on the one hand and her later decision to mourn Troilus 
and love Diomede on the other. Criseyde never wanted to mourn her husband in the first 
place. She never wanted to reinvent herself, but learning to re-cathect her love ultimately en-
ables her to secure future happiness in the Greek camp by loving Diomede (despite suffering 
some prophetic shame at her lasting reputation for infidelity). Troilus and Pandarus deliber-
ately force her out of a melancholic state by holding her accountable for their lives.151 After 
the Trojan senate trades Criseyde for Antenor and Troilus sits on “ful of angwissh and grisly 
drede” but doing nothing to prevent it (155), she repeats the process exactly as Pandarus 
taught her to, mourning a lost love-object for a new one before she is too old to love or be 
loved again. How can such analogous shifts in object-love lead to such dramatically different 
social reactions? After hearing that Criseyde has traded Troilus for Diomede, Pandarus vows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 For the classic account of mourning as a healthy psychic reaction to loss and melancholia 
as a pathological reaction to loss see Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia” 237–58. 
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“I hate, ywys Cryseyde; / And, God woot, I wol hate her evermore!” (1732–33). How can he 
hate his niece for doing the very thing he just pressured her into doing, the very thing for 
which he fashions himself the spokesperson? Because the big Other breaks its own rules in 
pursuit of jouissance. Of course, Troilus, unlike Criseyde’s husband, remains alive and in 
love with Criseyde, but in order to love Troilus she would be forced to endure love at a dis-
tance: the Žižekian courtly lover’s modus operandi. Criseyde opts to love an accessible ob-
ject that can love her back, but she also regrets doing so. For Crocker and Pugh, “Criseyde’s 
recognition that she made the wrong choice when she traded Troilus for Diomede prevents 
the affair from becoming a homosocial struggle over a passive object of desire” (92). Crisey-
de is ethically heroic, not just for her radical passivity, but also because she accepts the re-
sponsibility to act and its inherent danger of acting regrettably.152 She is ethically heroic be-
cause she refuses to be either the Žižekian courtly lover or his Lady. 
Symbolizing her exchange of lovers, Criseyde gives Diomede a broach that Troilus 
had given her: an object that Žižek might call a Hitchcockian MacGuffin153 When he sees 
Diomede wearing the broach, Troilus finally abandons hope of regaining Criseyde, taking 
Diomede’s possession of the broach as evidence of Criseyde’s infidelity (1654–66). But the 
broach is also evidence of Criseyde’s willingness to draw an overt analogy between her love 
for Diomede and her prior love for Troilus. What if Criseyde gives Diomede the broach be-
cause she knew Troilus would see it? What if she gives Diomede the broach in an effort to 
teach Troilus, as he taught her, to cure his melancholia through mourning a lost love-object a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 For arguments for Criseyde’s ethical superiority see Koppelman 97–14; and Beck 
(Christian) 143–212. 
153 For Žižek’s account of the MacGuffin see Everything You Always Wanted to Know about 
Lacan 6–8.  
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taking a new one? Of course, Chaucer’s poem does not permit us to answer these questions 
definitively. We can, however, read Diomede’s broach as a sort of an encoded letter to Troi-
lus, one meant to draw his attention to his own indirect role in facilitating Criseyde and Dio-
mede’s love by insisting that she mourn her husband in the first place. Although Žižek has 
yet to write on Chaucer’s poem, he writes about a similar scene of communicative betrayal in 
Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida (In Defense of Lost Causes 26–29, 81–82). Therein, 
Ulysses brings Troilus to the Greek camp and allows him to look in on Cressida flirting with 
Diomedes. After Diomedes leaves, Troilus overhears Criseyde address him, though she is 
ostensibly unaware of his presence: 
Troilus, farewell! One eye yet looks on thee, 
But with my heart the other eye doth see. 
Ah, poor out sex! This fault in us I find: 
The error of our eye directs our mind. 
What error leads must err. O then conclude:  
Minds swayed by eyes full of turpitude. (The Norton Shakespeare 1990, ll. 107–12) 
For Žižek, “[t]he key question to be raised here is: what if Cressida had been all the time 
aware of being observed by Troilus and just pretended to be thinking aloud alone? [. . .] The 
general lesson of this is that, in order to interpret a scene or an utterance, sometimes, the key 
thing to do is to locate its true addressee” (In Defense of Lost Causes 82, emphasis original). 
In Žižek’s example, the fictional and the actual addressee are one and the same person; the 
ambivalence lies in whether Cressida pretends to be unaware that she is actually addressing 
Troilus, or actually is unaware of his presence and simply believes herself to be apostrophiz-
ing him. We find this same ambivalence in the broach that Chaucer’s Criseyde gives to Dio-
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mede. Is it a signifier of Criseyde’s lack of care for Troilus’ feelings? Or is it a hidden mes-
sage meant to explain to Troilus that she has moved on and he ought to as well? Is its true 
addressee Diomede or Troilus (or both)? While neither Chaucer’s poem, nor Shakespeare’s 
play permit us far enough into Criseyde/Cressida’s interior to determine her actual addressee, 
both make it difficult for us to judge her decisions, just as it is difficult for her to decide what 
to do in any given situation. 
If Criseyde does intend the broach as a call for Troilus to mourn, he certainly does not 
accept it as such. Despite his earlier desire to make Criseyde mourn her dead husband, Troi-
lus is unwilling to mourn his lost love-object and elevate a new Lady to the dignity of the 
Thing. He quite simply will not practice what he preached. If Criseyde learns over the course 
of Troilus and Criseyde to abandon a melancholic attachment to a lost love-object, mourn 
that object and subsequently love a new object, Troilus like the Black Knight of The Book of 
the Duchess is paralyzed in anguish over a permanently unavailable love-object (Riverside 
Chaucer 346, ll. 1298–333). Unlike the Black Knight, however, Troilus does not abandon the 
prospect of enjoyment in despair, but elevates the Trojan state to the dignity of the Thing 
and, consequently, channels the monumental energy he devoted to loving Criseyde into sa-
distic hatred of the Greek invaders. “Troilus’ submission to the Trojan state,” Fradenburg 
reminds us, “represents not a conflict between enjoyment and duty but the enjoyment of duty 
itself” (Sacrifice Your Love 205). Indeed, Troilus goes immediately from blaming an absent 
Criseyde for all of his pain to relishing in the prospect of inflicting pain on Diomede: 
“. . . I se that clene out of youre mynde 
Ye han me cast—and I ne kan nor may, 
For al this world, withinne myn herte fynde 
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To unloven yow a quarter of a day! 
I cursed tyme I born was, weilaway, 
That yow, that doon me al this wo endure, 
Yet love I best of any creature!” 
 
“Now God,” quod he, “me sende yet the grace 
That I may meten with this Diomede! 
And trewely, if I myght and space, 
Yet shal I make, I hope, his sydes blede. 
O God,” quod he, “that oughtest taken heede 
To fortheren trouthe and wronges to punyce, 
Whi nyltow don a vengeaunce of this vice?” (1695–708)  
In the liminal space between stanzas, Troilus jumps from a masochistic-melancholic enjoy-
ment of pining for a lost love-object to a sadistic-aggressive lust for vengeance. Like Othel-
lo’s handkerchief, Troilus’ broach appears in the possession of another man, thereby trauma-
tizing the jealous male (Othello-Troilus) and causing him to switch instantly from a maso-
chistic courtly lover to a sadistic purveyor of vengeful violence. Troilus does not simply 
translate his frustration at losing Criseyde into a blanket hatred of all invading Greeks—he 
wants Diomede, he wants to make his (in)sides bleed, to turn him inside out. Troilus’ sadistic 
fantasy of mangling Diomede is bound up closely with his sense of transcendent justice. He 
reminds God (it is unclear which one) of his duty to advance truth and punish wrongs and 
even goes so far as to reprimand him for not yet exacting vengeance for “this vice.” But of 
what vice does Troilus speak? What has Diomede done that he himself did not? Troilus pos-
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sesses the big Other’s privilege and therefore does not have to tolerate even his own rules 
when they conflict with his sadistic jouissance. 
In Troilus and Criseyde, Cory James Rushton notes, “Chaucer plays most explicitly 
with the gap between courtly love and male aggression” (153). There is no logic behind Troi-
lus’ belief in the divinity backing his righteous anger. The big Other is on his side and if the 
big Other is not on his side, the big Other is wrong. Troilus assumes the big Other’s role of 
righting all wrongs: the role of the Žižekian sadist. As such, he is something like Leonard 
(Private Pyle) from the opening act of Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket (1987), in which 
a walking superego of a drill sergeant drives the initially inept Leonard to kill himself and his 
tormenter with mock-military precision. “I don’t think Leonard can hack it anymore,” Private 
Joker muses shortly before Leonard’s paroxysm, “I think Leonard’s a Section 8” (“Section 8” 
is military parlance for a subject unfit to serve due to mental instability). “It don’t surprise 
me,” Private Cowboy replies. According to Žižek, Leonard lacks the “proper ironic distance” 
from military ideology necessary for an “efficient soldier.” He identifies too closely with the 
“obscene military rituals” meant to suture the soldier’s sexual enjoyment to the enjoyment 
attained by submitting to a superegoic state: “if you get too close to it,” Žižek exclaims in 
The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology, “if you over-identify with it, if you immediately become the 
voice of this super-ego, it’s self-destructive. You kill people around you. You end up killing 
yourself.” The obscene drill sergeant of Full Metal Jacket is not unlike the God of Love in 
Troilus and Criseyde, both conflate subordination to a homo-social order with heterosexual 
enjoyment. Like Leonard, Troilus resumes the sovereignty stripped from him by the God of 
Love and becomes, in his own mind, a God-like purveyor of punishment.  
Unlike Leonard, Troilus does not turn on the military organization that made him. 
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Nevertheless, he resolves to die for the Trojan cause—“Myn owen deth in armes wol I 
seche” (1718)—and kills thousands of Greeks (but not Diomede) before being killed (some-
what ingloriously) by Achilles (1800–06). Troilus deliberately “goes out” in a spree of semi-
militaristic, semi-vengeful, semi-suicidal violence. He is therefore a sadomasochist and the 
boundary between his masochism and his sadism is as thin and hollow as that separating two 
stanzas of a poem. True, he does not go Section 8. But are Troilus’ killings morally laudable 
because they were accomplished within the symbolic parameters of proper military service? 
Do Greek lives matter? In Chaucer’s Tale of Melibee—one of the two Canterbury Tales that 
he assigns to his narrative surrogate—the heroic parrhesiastes Prudence argues doggedly 
against violence, even against those who have invaded her home and violated herself and her 
child (Riverside Chaucer 217–39). If Chaucer explicitly identifies with a moral philosophy 
centered on non-violence in The Canterbury Tales, how are we to take the fact that his narra-
tor lionizes Troilus’ vengeful slaughter of thousands of Greeks in Troilus and Criseyde? To-
ward the poem’s conclusion, the disembodied, sublimated Troilus triumphantly floats up 
through the spheres of heaven, de-sublimating Criseyde and the entire world in a frenzy of 
anti-romantic laughter (1814–34). Troilus is ultimately happy. Never mind the thousands of 
people he just killed. They do not fall under the narrator’s jurisdiction, which consists of 
Troilus’ love, not his hate. But is Troilus’ masochistic love not bound up inextricably with 
his sadistic hate? If Žižek is right that we should take seriously the undead nature of maso-
chistic courtly love, should we not also take seriously that of sadistic courtly hate?  
III. COURTLY LOVE HATE IS UNDEAD: THE TWISTED WORLD OF ELLIOT RODGER  
Anger occurs when the subject believes himself to have been wronged. Anger marks a mo-
ment of ethical failure that proves subjects have an ethical code to be violated: the exception 
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that proves the rule. From an evolutionary perspective, anger anticipates ethics, since our 
brain’s emotional systems evolved long before the relatively recent prefrontal cortex, which 
is necessary for complex ethical reasoning (Panksepp 187–205). Anger is the visceral older 
brother of ethics and he is not moving away from home any time soon; hence stoic philoso-
phy’s long preoccupation with anger management, which is exemplified in Chaucer’s Tale of 
Melibee. Anger, Lacan writes in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, constitutes a “reaction of a 
subject to a disappointment, to the failure of an expected correlation between a symbolic or-
der and the response of the real. In other words, anger is essentially [. . .] expressed in a for-
mulation of Charles Péguy’s [. . .]—it’s when the little pegs refuse to go into the little holes” 
(103). We can be relatively certain that Lacan is well aware of the phallic nature of Péguy’s 
“little pegs.” Indeed, male sexual frustration—“when the little pegs refuse to go into the little 
holes”—is the root-cause of some of our culture’s most vitriolic and dangerous anger. Such 
displays are often also driven by envy or jealousy, which we can think of as certain types of 
anger, occurring when the subject believes himself unrightfully excluded from a sphere of 
jouissance surrounding his (would-be) love-object and a rival or series of rivals. Everyone’s 
having fun without me: fun that I should be having. Shakespeare’s aforementioned tragedy 
Othello teaches us the violence of which jealousy, that “green-eyed monster,” is capable. 
Troilus and Criseyde teaches us what a courtly lover becomes after disavowing love out of 
anger and jealousy: a courtly hater. 
Troilus spends most of Troilus and Criseyde a thoroughly masochistic, thoroughly 
passive subject of the God of Love, but he eventually rejects courtly love along with the no-
tion that the big Other will correct all “injustices” against him. Like Leonard in Full Metal 
Jacket, he assumes the position of the militaristic super-ego and becomes a suicidal killing 
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machine fueled by vengeful jealousy and patriotic zeal. Unlike Leonard, however, Troilus 
does not go Section 8, but inflicts violence only on the invading Greeks. The object of Troi-
lus’ jealous anger (Diomede) coincides roughly with the object of the Trojan group-body’s 
anger (the Greeks). Consequently, both the Trojan state and his narrator can celebrate Troi-
lus’ sadistic violence as heroic. If Lacan and Žižek are correct that masochistic courtly love 
marches on, does it still periodically lapse into sadistic-militaristic hate? The answer, unfor-
tunately, is unequivocally yes. If the masochistic courtly lover is undead, so is the sadistic 
courtly hater: the angry, envious ex-lover out for blood.  
Elliot Rodger, I claim, was one such courtly hater. On May 23, 2014, Rodger terror-
ized Isla Vista, the “student ghetto” adjacent to the University of California, Santa Barbara. 
After stabbing his two roommates and their overnight guest, Rodger got in his black BMW 
and shot no less than six people and struck at least seven others with his car. In total, he 
killed six people and injured thirteen others before committing suicide. Rodger left behind a 
series of short videos and a 140-page autobiographical manifesto, My Twisted World: The 
Story of Elliot Rodger, which detail his reasons for engaging in the killing spree that he 
called “the Day of Retribution.” Above all, Rodger was angry with women who did not 
freely offer themselves to him as sexual objects and envious of the other young men who he 
believed to be hoarding all the world’s jouissance, leaving him only suffering and pain. This 
gendered mixture of anger and jealousy translated into potent sadistic hatred of both men and 
women (135–37). Obsessed with losing his virginity, Rodger moved to Isla Vista and attend-
ed Santa Barbara City College with great sexual expectations: he was going to live in Isla 
Vista, the utopic capital of Southern Californian jouissance (77–83). When his expectations 
failed to materialize, when the “little pegs refused to go into the little holes,” tragedy ensued.  
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One of the many shocking aspects of My Twisted World is how little Rodger says 
about his actual attempts at courting women. Although he was obsessed with his virginity he 
was, like Troilus, completely unable to express his love to the women for whose company he 
so yearned. Unlike Troilus, however, Rodger had no Pandarus, no pimp to procure him a 
woman without him having to broker the deal himself, though he did have a series of counse-
lors paid to spur his social life (119–28). Rodger seems to have sought male advice for court-
ing women in the form of the aforementioned community of so-called “pickup artists”: self-
described outcasts who trade coercive and altogether disturbing techniques for tricking wom-
en into sex. One such technique is “negging,” or purposefully deriding a woman on the as-
sumption that she is a masochist who will be attracted to such derision (Strauss 151–52). If 
Rodger ever sought to belong to the pickup artist community there is no record of him doing 
so, though there is an extensive record of his vitriol toward that community, which he ex-
pressed on the anti-pickup artist forum (PUAhate.com), which is inhabited by radical misog-
ynists, left disenchanted, angry and jealous after the pickup artist community’s advice failed 
to trick women into sex as advertised.154 In My Twisted World, Rodger describes discovering 
PUAhate.com (“a forum full of men who are starved of sex, just like me”), becoming de-
pressed based on its contents (“it shows just how bleak and cold the world is due of the evil-
ness of women [sic]”), and sending the link to his parents, who sadly failed to examine the 
website closely (117–8). Misogynist ideology did not corrupt Rodger, or drive him to vio-
lence, but it did show him that he was not alone in his jealous anger.  
Rodger and other such men self-identify as “incels,” short for “involuntary celibate,” 
i.e. those who desire sex but do not have it. They congregate online on a subreddit called 
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ForeverAlone.155 For many (though not all) of these men, volition alone (their desire for sex) 
should be enough to manifest willing female sexual partners. They believe they ought to be 
the privileged recipients of female sexuality and bewail that they are not, that the little pegs 
just won’t go into the little holes. Consequently, incels often see themselves as lacking sex 
only due to female cruelty. Women are not fulfilling their obligation to have sex with worthy 
incels. On the dating website OkCupid, for example, one can indicate whether or not “there 
are circumstances in which a person is obligated to have sex with you?” Such a repugnant 
question is necessary only because some people answer “yes.”156 Rodger certainly believed 
he deserved sex: in My Twisted World, he repeatedly refers to himself as a “magnificent gen-
tleman” (90, 109, 118 and 133) He rejects, however, the lifestyle of the “kind gentleman”: 
“Everything my father taught me was proven wrong. He raised me to be a polite, kind gen-
tleman. In a decent world, that would be ideal. But the polite, kind gentleman doesn’t win in 
the real world. The girls don’t flock to the gentlemen. They flock to the alpha male” (28)/ 
Later in My Twisted World, when reflecting upon purchasing the Glock 34 semiautomatic 
handgun he used on the Day of Retribution, he writes: “After I picked up the handgun, I 
brought it back to my room and felt a new sense of power. I was now armed. Who’s the al-
pha male now, bitches? I thought to myself, regarding all of the girls who’ve looked down on 
me in the past” (113). It is no coincidence that Rodger decides to move to Santa Barbara up-
on seeing Alpha Dog (2006): a movie about a young, privileged male turned murderer (77). 
Rodger’s problems with anger management were manifest long before the Day of 
Retribution. My Twisted World details two separate occasions on which he became so livid at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 For an account of Rodger’s self-identification as an “incel” on the web see Woolf (Nicky). 
156 For an excellent account of a sadly defunct Tumblr detailing the OkCupid profiles of self-
identified “nice guys” who answer “yes” to such questions see Baker (Katie). 
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couples evincing public displays of affection that he spilled a beverage on them (coffee and 
iced tea) before running away (87–88). He recalls a long series of social interactions in which 
hearing about the sexual activities of another man, or seeing another man successfully inter-
acting with women drove him into a fit of rage (20, 29, 47, 55, etc.). After happening upon 
images of teenagers having sex on the internet, Rodger experiences “extreme feelings of en-
vy, hatred and anger towards anyone who has a sex life,” which transform readily into sadis-
tic desires to halt the pleasure of others: 
I began to have fantasies of becoming very powerful and stopping everyone from 
having sex. I wanted to take their sex away from them, just like they took it away 
from me. I saw sex as an evil and barbaric act, all because I was unable to have it. 
This was the major turning point. My anger made me stronger inside. This was when 
I formed my ideas that sex should be outlawed. It is the only way to make the world a 
fair and just place. If I can’t have it, I will destroy it. That’s the conclusion I came to, 
right then and there. (57) 
In several of these accounts he recalls being particularly angry that men of other races 
(Rodger’s father was English and his mother Malaysian) fornicated with white women in his 
stead. In one such instance, a black college student tells Rodger he lost his virginity at thir-
teen. Rodger later recalls his angry internal monologue as follows: “How could an inferior, 
ugly black boy be able to get a white girl and not me? I am beautiful, and I am half white 
myself. I am descended from British aristocracy. He is descended from slaves” (84). In addi-
tion to blacks, Rodger denigrates Hispanics (89–90) and Asians (121) clearly favoring his 
white ancestry over his Asian heritage. Rodger saw himself as immersed in a “war on wom-
en.” Hitler-like, he fantasizes a “final solution” in which the vast majority of women are sys-
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tematically starved to death in “concentration camps” as he looks on from the vantage of a 
giant throne (136–37). But he backs away from his gynocidal fantasies, admitting their im-
plausibility. He settles instead for planning the Day of Retribution, which he originally imag-
ined as involving much more killing and torture than he actually accomplished (135–36).  
Both Rodger and Troilus grew up in positions of privilege. Although Rodger was 
hardly a prince, he grew up in the suburbs of Los Angeles. His parents divorced and vied for 
his affection as divorced parents do. He drove a black BMW 328i coupé of which he was ex-
tremely proud and relished in buying and shrouding himself in designer clothing (94–110, 
128–32). Despite their privilege (or perhaps, as Žižek and Deleuze would have it, because of 
it), both Rodger and Troilus obsess over their own suffering at the hands of unwilling wom-
en. Like Troilus, Elliot Rodger believed in an ordered universe of which he was the center. 
Before committing to the Day of Retribution, Rodger wholeheartedly believed that he was 
destined to win the lottery and acquire sexual gratification without effort by virtue of his vast 
wealth (104–05). He spent $700 on tickets in one drawing (104), and drove from California 
to Arizona to buy tickets in another (111). Upon losing he sunk into desperate crying fits, un-
able to comprehend why the universe that was supposed to love him was causing him to suf-
fer (112). Why can’t I win the lottery and attract women to have sex with me? Why isn’t Di-
omede dropping dead for stealing Criseyde from me? Both lovers stop loving, stop trusting 
the big Other to right all their wrongs and, Leonard-like, take matters into their own hands. 
Both knowingly ride to their death with no desire to live beyond a desire for vengeance 
against the men who supposedly prevented their happiness. Of course, Troilus does not inten-
tionally kill women, unlike Rodger who imagined killing an entire sorority and would have, 
had their house not been locked (132). Troilus does not even kill civilians, but only the 
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Greeks who stole his girlfriend and want to break into Troy and steal everything else from 
him. Rodger is Troilus-like only insofar as he channels his masochistic frustrations into sa-
distic violence. Žižek is quite correct that the courtly lover is undead, but his exemplary 
courtly lover is entirely too innocent: a passive, ineffectual rube, unable to decide whether he 
is attracted to his Lady or repulsed by her. He pays too little attention to the equally undead 
courtly hater: a murderous masochist turned sadist and there’s no telling what he will do. 
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CONCLUSION: 
TEACHING FEELING 
The pages above explore Middle English literary texts that consistantly portray ethics as a 
patently emotional affair. The introduction rehashes recent neuroscientific discourses that 
similarly assert the centrality of emotion in processes of ethical decision-making, as well as 
other contemporary theoretical and historiographic accounts of emotion. Chapter 1 argues 
that Middle English rhetorics of righteous and sinful anger played an important role both in 
sparking the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 and in retroactively reevaluating the dangers of unin-
hibited anger in the uprising’s posttramatic wake. The second chapter discusses Middle Eng-
lish discourses on dread that suggest that devotees in late medieval England conceptualized 
the ascetic project of dreading well as integral to the ethical project of living well. The third 
chapter argues that the three successive versions of Piers Plowman, as we know them today, 
contain three strikingly different theologies of love and dread. Rather than reading these as 
evidence of one man’s gradual movement from a theology of dread to one of love, it 
reimagines the production of Piers Plowman as a densely intersubjective affair that engen-
dered a network of differing (and deffering) theologies of love and dread. Chapter 4 turns to 
the famous Middle English elegy Pearl, arguing that the Pearl-maiden does not prompt the 
dreamer to happily share in her celestial estate, but instead stirs his envy of her heavenly 
bliss, suggesting that terrestrial devotees ought to work through, rather than eschew, their en-
vy of their celestial loved ones. Chapter 5 focuses on another poem soley attested in Cotton 
Nero A.x: Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. While critics often read Gawain’s shame at the 
end of the poem as sundering him from his fellow courtiers, I read Gawain’s shameful con-
fession to the court as profoundly and successfully reparative of the homosocial, chivalric 
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habitus wounded by Gawain’s life loving transgression. Moving next to Geoffrey Chaucer’s 
Troilus and Criseyde, Chapter 6 builds on a scholarly tradition that reads Troilus as a maso-
chistic courtly lover, arguing that, at the poem’s conclusion, Troilus spontaneously trans-
forms into a sadistic courtly hater. Since masochistic courtly love and sadistic courtly hate 
constitute different responses to social privilege, the courtly lover always already possesses 
the potential to morph suddenly into a courtly hater, as does Chaucer’s Troilus when he 
channels his disappointment at having lost Criseyde’s love into vengeful, militarized violence 
against any and all Greeks. Below, by way of conclusion, I discuss some of the pedagogical 
implications of my research into Middle English ideologies of emotion, focusing particularly 
on the vexed question of how one might ethically teach medieval cultures of compassion. 
. . . 
For years, I’ve been haunted by the phrase “emotional intelligence,” both in my research on 
and teaching of Middle English literature. On the one hand, I find the phrase extremely use-
ful in justifying not only the importance of literature, but also the relevance of teaching litera-
ture. Indeed, I’ve come to appreciate and revere the way that some Middle English texts 
teach their audience—indeed have taught me—to take seriously and learn from emotional 
judgments while still maintaining an awareness of emotion’s propensity to incite rash, regret-
table decisions. On the other hand, my studies in Middle English ideologies of emotion have 
made it abundantly clear (to me at least) that standards of emotional intelligence are cultural 
constructs and therefore dictated by biased individuals possessing the privilege to construct 
culture: the so-called winners who write the history books. Of course, any such standard 
should be taken with a sizable grain of skeptical salt. We need to think deeply, and to teach 
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our students to think deeply, about how judgments regarding emotional intelligence reinforce 
unfair social structures.  
Medieval literature, therefore, presents us with at least two pedagogical opportunities: 
First, by teaching medieval texts with the benefit of hundreds of years worth of hindsight, we 
can help our students recognize that any standard of emotional intelligence is always already 
tied up in Foucaultian knowledge/power and prompt them to think more critically about the 
subtle ways that their own cultural biases inform their judgments regarding emotional intelli-
gence. Secondly, teaching medieval texts can also demonstrate to students how emotional 
pedagogy (i.e., teaching others to be taught by emotion) enriched the lives of medieval sub-
jects, as it can enrich our own lives. The trick is to help students recognize that cultural bias 
always informs judgments about emotional intelligence without burdening them with a para-
lytic skepticism that prevents them from fostering emotional attachments to medieval texts. 
To my mind, among the biggest problems with popular discussions of emotional in-
telligence is that they too often sideline ethics. Indeed, the term “emotional intelligence” has 
found much more acceptance in the world of neoliberal business culture than in that of clini-
cal psychology (Goleman x–xvii). While psychologists accuse the term’s foremost popular-
izer, Daniel Goleman, of uncritically gathering a loosely correlated set of capacities and 
skills under the umbrella of “emotional intelligence,” plutocratic executives frequently hire 
him to make themselves and their employees more emotionally intelligent (Goleman 3–
12).157 Problematically, Goleman tantalizes such executives with the prospect of increased 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 According to Goleman’s mixed model, “emotional intelligence” is a complex network of 
competencies involving self-awareness, self-regulation, social skill, empathy and motivation. 
Although it has gained considerable popularity in both academic and business-oriented 
circles, the concept of emotional intelligence has met with substantial criticism. See, for 
example, Locke, “Why Emotional Intelligence is an Invalid Concept.”	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profits, rather than that of possessing more ethical employees, which, in many cases at least, 
translates into less profits. Executives who forgo the latter for the sake of the former demon-
strate that emotional intelligence is not always put to ethical use. Some serial killers, for ex-
ample, are extremely good at controlling their own emotions and manipulating those of oth-
ers for the sake of the most perfidious ends. I’d imagine Bernie Madoff was, in his prime, 
quite adept at such dissimulations as well. And yet, Goleman’s emotional intelligence 
movement is not simply a front for making predatory businessmen more successfully preda-
tory by offering them insight into the emotional lives of others. He also co-writes books with 
the Dalai Lama, which advocate pedagogies designed to produce and expand compassion 
(Destructive Emotions 1–20). It’s hard to disagree with Goleman here. Indeed, a dearth of 
compassion is a common trait amongst serial killers, predatory businessmen and school 
shooters. Goleman and the Dali Lama, moreover, are not alone in their call teach compas-
sion; more academically renowned figures like Martha Nussbaum argue for the political ne-
cessity of expanding compassion all to narrow scope, particularly through art and literature 
(Political Emotions 137–60). 
We should, I think, get rid of the term “emotional intelligence” and its diagnostic 
counterpart “emotional quotient” or EQ. Like all ideological standards designed to striate the 
human community, emotional intelligence is in the eye of the beholder and is therefore inex-
tricably bound up with the beholder’s ethical perspective. We cannot afford, however, to 
leave a gaping void in the cultural space that they used to occupy. I propose that instead of 
ranking students according to emotional intelligence, we start teaching them emotional eth-
ics. Unlike emotional intelligence, emotional ethics is not a set of skills and competencies, 
but an intersubjective practice through which subjects deliberately engage emotion in an ef-
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fort to make the world a better place for themselves as well as others. Emotional ethics is not 
simply a matter of rendering emotion voluntary or subject to cognitive control. It’s also a 
matter of recognizing the ways that emotion always already undergirds ethical decision-
making. Indeed, there arguably would be no ethics without emotion.  
Emotion’s role in ostensibly rational decision-making is sadly clarified in people who 
lack the capacity to recognize or experience certain emotions and are consequently plagued 
with social difficulties. According to Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis those of us 
without such rare ailments make decisions through recourse to emotional memories of good 
and bad experiences. Recall from the introduction that, in his book on Spinoza, Damasio 
imagines “dire scenario” in which “humanity had dawned with a population deprived of the 
ability to respond toward others with sympathy, attachment, embarrassment, and other social 
emotions that are known to be present in simple form in some nonhuman species.” “I sus-
pect,” Damasio writes, “that in the absence of social emotions [. . .] even on the unlikely as-
sumption that other intellectual abilities could remain intact, the cultural instruments we 
know as ethical behaviors, religious beliefs, laws, justice, and political organization either 
would not have emerged, or would have been a very different sort of intelligent construction” 
(Looking for Spinoza 156–57). Although it’s true that complex cognition occurs in the neo-
cortex—that engorged, relatively recent section of the human brain unmatched in most, 
though not all, other species—it also involves the limbic system: the much older seat of emo-
tion and emotional memory common to the brains of most higher mammals. There is, there-
fore, a neurological distinction to be made between emotional judgments and cognitive 
judgments, but we should always keep in mind that our cognitive faculties grew out of and 
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evolved in tandem with our emotive faculties. Not simply an archaic hindrance to cognition, 
emotion is the root of cognition and, by proxy, ethical decision-making.   
Of course, Damasio oversimplifies intellectual history by ascribing body-mind and 
emotion-reason dualism to Renee Descartes’ error. Like a host of nostalgic medievalists, 
Damasio turns Descartes into a scapegoat, punished for a long history of Western culture 
subordinating emotion to reason that stretches back through premodernity. Nevertheless, me-
dieval texts often depict ethics as an emotional process, rather than a cognitive process hin-
dered by emotion, and can therefore help us teach our students to practice emotional ethics 
more deliberately than they always already do. For the remainder of this conclusion, I’ll ex-
plore how teaching medieval discourses on one particular emotion, compassion, might help 
us to do just that. Any student of affective piety knows that medieval Christians designed 
scores of devotional texts to generate compassion for Christ by narrating his suffering in 
gruesome detail. As McNamer argues, these texts and others acted as emotion scripts, the 
performance of which solidified compassion-based emotional communities. In addition to 
building communities, medieval devotees built themselves by performing compassion. In 
such performances, they quite literally inscribed Christian ideology on their bodies and 
brains, internalizing a standard of emotional intelligence structured around Christian ideals of 
compassion. 
Upon a generous reading, medieval Christians used affective meditation on Christ’s 
suffering to enhance their capacity for compassion and, in so doing, fueled subsequent com-
passion for actual, living people. Upon a less generous reading, medieval Christians ironical-
ly ignored the suffering of others in order to meditatively conjure compassion for Christ. In-
deed, meditating on the crucifixion did not only evoke compassion from medieval Christians, 
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it also evoked hateful resentment of the Jews. I think we should equip our students with both 
the generous and the less generous readings of medieval cultures of compassion, prompting 
them to think critically about compassion’s complex relation to their day-to-day ethical deci-
sions. Although I have not yet had the opportunity to teach such a class, I can imagine (or 
meditate on) an undergraduate class on medieval compassion in which students read “The 
Wooing of our Lord” (Anchoretic Spirituality 245–58) next to Chaucer’s treatment of the 
Prioress in The Canterbury Tales. 
I’d begin with “The Wooing,” prompting students to imagine a medieval community 
of nuns bonded together by textually solicited compassion. I’d share with them McNamer’s 
observation that the manuscript pages containing the sole attestation of “The Wooing” are 
disproportionally worn, suggesting that its earliest audience touched and cried on them regu-
larly (Affective Meditation 215). Without delving too deeply into the scholarly debate over 
whether affective piety was empowering or disempowering for medieval women, I’d suggest 
to students that it was both: sometimes a platform on which women could appropriate 
Christ’s transcendental authority; sometimes an authoritarian mechanism for reducing wom-
en (and men) to unthinking automatons. But I would not stop at speculating on the historical 
uses of compassion. I would ask students to think about the ways that the pop songs to which 
they compulsively listen with their friends bond them together into an emotional community, 
though not necessarily an ethical one. I would also show students that ethicists still practice 
affective meditation today by introducing them to Peter Singer’s famous essay “The Drown-
ing Child and the Expanding Circle,” which posits that our un-thought failures to provide un-
seen children charity are tantamount to so many refusals to save a drowning child for fear of 
ruining one’s new shoes. As Nussbaum points out, compassion’s scope is typically narrow, 
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so Singer’s hypothetical thought experiment (or meditation) is designed to generate compas-
sion for the suffering of people who are otherwise out of sight and therefore out of mind. De-
spite the explosion of communicative technologies through which we’re living, such modern-
day affective meditations remain crucial to ethical praxis.         
I’d move next to Chaucer’s Prioress, whose portrait in the General Prologue triggers 
us to question, not whether or not she is compassionate, but whether or not her compassion is 
ethical (or, at least, as ethical as it could be). Chaucer’s narrator tells us that the Prioress di-
rects compassion towards mice caught in traps and her hungry lapdogs. If compassion also 
drives her to help the poor and hungry, we certainly do not hear about it. The Prioress’ Tale 
simultaneously solicits compassion for Christian suffering and sadistic enjoyment at Jewish 
suffering. Sadly (for a modern audience at least), this obviously racist tale leaves the Canter-
bury pilgrims all too impressed, immersed in a haze of wonder. Chaucer’s Prioress embodies, 
therefore, medieval culture’s idealization of compassion, but Chaucer’s parodic treatment of 
her registers a certain distrust for unethically directed compassion. I would explain to my 
students that hateful compassion is still with us today and not only in anti-Semitism. I would 
ask them to consider the ways that the Bush administration used compassion for the suffering 
of the victims of the 2001 attacks on New York City to stir up anti-Islamic sentiment and jus-
tify directing unprovoked aggression at Iraq.  
In concluding my hypothetical class I would try to impress upon students that they 
need to be vigilantly skeptical of discourses on compassion, but they still need to cultivate, 
engage, and critically direct compassion. Is the appropriate object of compassion rats in traps, 
lap dogs, Jewish gurus who died more than two thousand years ago, drowning children or 
starving Africans? Instead of telling them where they should direct their compassion, I would 
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beseech them to decide for themselves. For homework, or maybe even during a quiet mo-
ment at the end of class, I would ask them to meditate on where they direct their compassion, 
from whom they withhold compassion, how compassion already informs their ethical deci-
sions and how it might inform them differently in the future. By not only teaching, but as-
signing medieval practices of meditation, I hope, not to make students more emotionally in-
telligent, but to make them better practitioners of emotional ethics.  
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